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ABSTRACT
LOCAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FIRMS AND CONSUMERS
Lindsay E. Relihan
Gilles Duranton
This dissertation studies how the spatial distributions of firms and consumers shape their
interactions in local credit markets. For firms, proximity provides information about the
preferences and credit quality of local consumers. For consumers, it facilitates gathering
information about product availability and the prices at local firms. I explore these dynamics
by developing stylized models that illustrate the key dynamics of interest and motivate
empirical estimations that I take to data. In particular, this dissertation uses many novel
big data assets that provide new insights into the functioning of local credit markets.
In the first chapter, I study whether online retail is a complement or substitute to local
oﬄine economies by studying how consumers reorganize their trips to grocery stores and
coffee shops after they become online grocery shoppers. To do so, I use new, detailed data
on the daily online and oﬄine transactions of millions of anonymized customers. My results
show that consumer behaviors can create positive complementarities between online retail
and some brick-and-mortar stores, creating both winning and losing stores and consumers
to online retail. In the second chapter, I study the impact of branch presence on mortgage
credit outcomes in the surrounding neighborhood using the density of nearby bank branch
networks to instrument for actual branch presence. I find that lenders with branches lend
more mortgages to borrowers in the surrounding neighborhood and that those operated by
local lenders have the most positive impact for low socioeconomic-status borrowers. How-
ever, I show that branches disadvantage competing lenders by lowering the credit-quality
of the competing lenders’ applicant pool. This adverse selection causes an aggregate neg-
ative effect of branch presence on neighborhood mortgage outcomes. In the third chapter,
v
co-authored with Benjamin J. Keys and Jane K. Dokko, we construct a novel county-level
dataset to analyze the relationship between rising house prices and non-traditional features
of mortgage contracts. We apply a break-point methodology and find that, in many mar-
kets, rising use of non-traditional mortgages predates the start of the housing boom and
continues to rise thereafter.
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CHAPTER 1: Is Online Retail Killing Coffee Shops? Estimating the Winners and
Losers of Online Retail using Customer Transaction Microdata1
1.1. Introduction
U.S. households bought online retail products worth $105.7 billion in the second quarter
of 2017. While still only 8.2 percent of retail sales, online sales grew almost four times
as fast as total sales, at 16.3 percent from the year before.2 This trajectory is likely to
continue as retailers improve their online platforms, reduce delivery times, and find new
ways to deliver more products online. Consequently, there are wide-spread predictions of a
“retail apocalypse” for brick-and-mortar stores.3 However, we know little about how online
retail affects the distribution of local economic activity. For instance, such predictions often
ignore that some stores and products can be complements to online retail. Furthermore,
access to online products can bring substantial benefits to consumers. This paper aims to
provide new insight into the distributional effects of online retail for firms and consumers
to better understand its transformational impact on local economies.
I use new data containing the daily card transactions of tens of millions of anonymized
customers to overcome the key challenges in identifying the oﬄine winners and losers of
online retail. The first challenge is the low occurrence of online purchases, which make
it difficult to detect the effects of those purchases without similarly large samples.4 The
second is that consumers endogenously decide which online products to purchase. Thus, the
causal effect of an online purchase is hard to separate from the effects of other unobserved
factors on purchase decisions. For example, if consumers purchase more products online
1This research was made possible by a data use agreement between myself and the JPMorgan Chase
Institute (JPMCI), which has created de-identified data assets that are selectively available to be used for
academic research. More information about JPMCI de-identified data assets and data privacy protocols are
available at www.jpmorganchase.com/institute. All statistics from JPMCI data reflect cells with at least 10
observations. The opinions expressed are my own and do not represent the views of JPMorgan Chase & Co.
While working on this paper, I was a paid contractor of JPMCI.
2Monthly Retail Trade Survey report. https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec current.pdf.
3For one example, see “What in the World is Causing the Retail Meltdown of 2017?” The Atlantic, 10
April 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/retail-meltdown-of-2017/522384/
4In Couture et al. (2017) low initial take-up rates for new online channels complicate measurement.
1
when they are busy, then the observed changes in their oﬄine purchases could be due to
time constraints rather than the online purchases.
To address this endogeneity, I identify the causal effects of online retail in the special case
of online groceries. Online grocery platforms have uniquely high fixed-costs to operating
in a city, such as building refrigerated warehouses, purchasing refrigerated trucks, and
hiring food baggers and delivery drivers. For this reason, platforms first open in cities
with enough customers to recoup their fixed costs, rather than the cities with the most
profitable customers.5 This implies that changes in observed purchase patterns after entry
can be attributed to the platforms rather than the other, unobserved customer attributes
that make them more profitable.
Given the focus on online grocery platforms, I first study their impact on grocery stores
as their most direct oﬄine competitors. I find that grocery stores are negatively affected
by direct product substitution to online grocery platforms: platform users reduce their
expenditures at grocery stores in the month of take-up by as much as 18 percent. This is
the first direct impact of online competition estimated with individual customer data and
identified with national variation across cities. Previous research finds that oﬄine retailers
selling similar products to those available online are hurt because online products are often
more convenient and less expensive.6
In addition to the direct product substitution effect, I also show, for the first time, that
direct and indirect competitors can be affected through the shopping complementarities of
oﬄine stores to online products due to consumer trip-chaining. Trip-chaining is defined
as grouping visits to stores on shopping trips to save on travel costs and the fixed cost of
making a trip.7 This behavior is central to the distributional effects of online retail because
5Similar to airlines (Goolsbee and Syverson 2004), Walmart (Holmes 2011), and bank branches (Relihan
2017).
6Direct effects are studied in Brynjolfsson (2009), Forman (2009), Avery et al. (2012), and Zervas (2017).
7The role of trip-chaining in consumer purchase decisions is studied in Narula et al. (1983), Brooks et al.
(2004 and 2008), Dellaert (1998 and 2008), Baker et al. (2017). Closely related in concept, Nevo and Wong
(2015) show that consumers change their shopping behaviors with their time availability.
2
consumers may completely reorganize their shopping trips when they replace visits to some
stores with online purchases.
To isolate the role of trip-chaining, I study customers’ reorganization of trips to grocery
stores and coffee shops after platform entry. Coffee shops are an example on the extreme end
of the spectrum of stores that are less substitutable in product with online groceries because
their primary product – hot, fresh-brewed coffee – is not available online. Therefore, changes
in the frequency of coffee shop visits after entry cannot be due to consumer switching to
buying the same hot coffee online. Instead, changes must be due to indirect effects, like
consumer trip-chaining. In contrast, other stores, like restaurants and pharmacies, are
somewhat directly substitutable with online groceries because they sell similar products.
Thus, it is difficult to tell how much of the changes in their trip frequency after entry are
through direct versus indirect mechanisms.
I then develop a discrete choice model that predicts changes in consumers’ trip choices due
to the direct and indirect effects of online grocery platforms that I test in the data. In the
model, a consumer decides whether to be an online grocery shopper and, conditional on that
choice, what local oﬄine trip to make each day to satisfy her need for groceries and coffee.
The trip decision depends on her values for the stores, the distances between her and the
stores, and the substitutability of different trips. The model predicts that (1) consumers
with high time costs for trips are more likely to take-up an online grocery platform and that
(2) after take-up consumers may increase or decrease their visits to different stores through
the reorganization of their trips. For example, a consumer who would visit a coffee shop on
the way to the grocery store may not choose to visit only the coffee shop once she becomes
an online grocery shopper. Alternatively, she could use the time saved on grocery shopping
to visit more and different coffee shops than before.
To test these predictions, I focus on the reorganization of trips by early adopters of the
platforms who used them for an extended period of time. Compared to a matched sample
of non-users, I find that these high-use early adopters reduce their spending at grocery
3
stores by 18 percent in the month of take-up and by an average of 4.5 percent in the two
years after. The negative effect is driven by a reduction in trips to grocery stores (not
including coffee shops), with the strongest relative declines on weekdays.
During the same two years after take-up, I find that the high-use early adopters also in-
creased their spending at coffee shops by 7.6 percent. The positive effect is driven primarily
by an increase in trips to coffee shops (not including grocery stores) during weekdays in
customers’ zip codes. Trip-chaining suggests that these customers used the time saved shop-
ping at grocery stores to increase their visits to nearby coffee shops when their time was
most valuable. Thus, some oﬄine stores can win from the rise of online retail through such
complementarities to online products.
The results are economically important for retail firms because they help predict the po-
tential impacts of more mature online product markets on their stores. For example, if
just 20 percent had immediately taken up and used online grocery platforms like the high
users in my sample in 2016, grocery stores would have sold $5.5 billion less and coffee shops
would have sold $48.9 million more nationally.8 Importantly, I show that the impacts in the
short-run are unevenly distributed, creating winning and losing stores, which could imply a
different optimal spatial distribution of stores in the long-run due to online retail. However,
those short-term impacts are still minimal in aggregate due to low take-up rates; I only de-
tect a statistically significant decrease in grocery store trip frequency in a city’s population
after multiple online grocery platform entries.
For consumers, the discrete choice framework provides a straightforward approach to es-
timating the welfare benefits of online grocery platforms. The estimated welfare gains,
as a function of neighborhood take-up rates, are three times higher for customers in the
least grocery dense zip codes and eight times higher in zip codes with the highest average
customer income. This implies that the greater availability of online products will lower
8This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation based on industry projects and retail sales figures for 2016.
Details are in the Online Retail Data appendix.
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the value to consumers of living close to stores that sell similar products and shift their
value of retail density toward those that sell products and services not available online. In
addition, if online products mostly benefit customers with high-incomes, then the move to
online retail could exacerbate economic inequality, especially if the shift of higher-income
consumers closes stores that low-income consumers value.
This paper closely relates to several strands of research exploring the effects of online retail
on consumer consumption. The economics literature primarily focuses on the effects specific
to internet sales taxes (Goolsbee 2000; Ellison 2009; Baugh et al. 2014; Einav et al. 2014).
In marketing, studies explore the motivations behind switching to online retail (Bakos 1997;
Grewal 2004; Jin and Kato 2007; Shankar et al. 2011; Bhatnagar 2016), the characteristics of
consumers who shop online (Chiang 2003; Passyn et al. 2011; Rajamma et al. 2007; Toufaily
et al. 2013), and the effect of retail channel on purchases (Laroche 2005; Dhar et al. 2007;
Kukar-Kinney 2009). This research advances our understanding of the effects of online retail
on oﬄine retailers, specifically in the online grocery market and the distributional impacts
more generally.
The findings in this paper also contribute to literature on the spatial relationships between
firms and consumers. For firms, we know that location decisions are shaped by the benefits of
retail agglomeration (Arentze et al. 2005; Branda˜o et al. 2014; Jardim 2015) and consumer
shopping behavior (Serra and Colome´ 2001; Leszczyc et al. 2004; Smith 2004; Haltiwanger
et al. 2010; Houde 2012; Ushchev et al. 2015). For consumers, previous research finds that
the value of urban density is large and based on easy access to non-tradable products and
services (Glaeser et al. 2001; Handbury and Weinstein 2014; Cosman 2015; Couture 2015;
Davis et al. 2015). This research suggests that in response to online retail, firms will co-
locate more and closer to consumers and supports the view that cities can be a complement
to online retail (Sinai and Waldfogel 2004).
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1.2. Customer Transaction Data
The JPMorgan Chase Institute data assets used here contain a wealth of information on the
daily credit and debit card transactions made by tens of millions of anonymized customers
from October 2012 - May 2017. Crucially for this paper, attached to each transaction
are flags to determine payment channel, transaction date, retailer and store identifying
information, merchant classification codes, and transaction zip codes. The transaction data
are from two base datasets, one containing all transactions for customers in each month
who make at least five transactions in that month and the other containing all transactions
made in 15 large cities, regardless of customer. These are complemented by a customer
information dataset containing customer zip codes and basic socioeconomics.9 Below, I
give an overview of the construction process of the final customer transaction datasets used
in the analysis and details of the online grocery market that motivate my empirical strategy;
further details can be found in the Online Retail Data appendix.
1.2.1. Customer Sample
From the full universe of customers in the customer-based dataset, I build a sample suitable
for analyzing consumer consumption behavior. Most importantly, customers are required
to have a strong relationship with JPMorgan Chase, meaning they make frequent purchases
across a large number of product types every month of the sample period (implying the data
contain the majority of their spending).10 Furthermore, to ensure accurate measurement
of city-wide effects, even in small cities, I only include in my final sample customers in
cities with at least 1,000 of these customers. The basic socioeconomics and shopping be-
havior of the sample customers compare well to outside data.11 The final sample contains
9Customer zip codes are based on mailing address and socioeconomics on a mix of provided and imputed
information.
10Internal analysis comparing the card spend of these customers to information from credit bureau data
suggests the vast majority of their card spend is captured by the JPMCI data. In addition, survey results
suggest that the majority of banked customers have a single banking account (Welander 2014) or “home”
on a single card for purchases (Cohen and Rysman 2013, Shy 2013).
11Details on the identification of online transactions, a comparison with spending in the Monthly Retail
Trade Survey, and additional summary statistics are included in the Online Retail Data appendix.
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approximately 4.5 million customers.
An important feature of JPMCI data is the general upward trend of transactions and spend-
ing over time due to payment channel switching among customers.12 As reported by surveys
of consumer payment methods, consumers are gradually making fewer purchases using cash
and making more of them on cards. This reflects both greater access to cards among con-
sumers and their increasing preference for making payments on cards. In addition, the
advent of cheaper card terminals (for example, Square) and mobile payments has increased
the number of merchants accepting card payments. To illustrate this trend in my sample,
Figure 1 shows the average trips and spend per day for grocery stores. The upward trend
appears in both measures and is compounded by price inflation for spending. To control
for this throughout my analysis, I include quarter time fixed effects that vary by zip code
or city. My results are then identified off of the remaining variation, conditional on the
quarter and zip code or city.
For detailed spatial analysis, I rely on the JPMCI city-based transactions dataset to measure
retail density across the zip codes in 15 cities. The benefit of this dataset is that it is
highly unlikely that a grocery store or coffee shop that exists in those cities does not have
transactions recorded in this dataset, so long as they accept card payments. Therefore, I
can measure close to the full set of stores available to the customers in my sample even if
those customers never transact there.
I also rely on the city-based transactions to improve my measurement of the distances
between customers in those cities and the merchants at which they transact. Due to differ-
ences in internal data processing between the two base datasets, knowledge of true merchant
zip codes is much better in the city-based dataset. Combining information from the two
datasets, I know the zip codes associated with 50 percent of grocery and coffee purchases
for consumers living inside the central city boundaries, but only 20 percent for consumers
12These trends are discussed in the Federal Reserve Payments Study 2016: Recent Developments in Con-
sumer and Business Payment Choices.
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living outside the central cities. Therefore, in the analysis of purchase frequency at stores
at different distances from the customer, I restrict the sample to customers who live in the
central city.13
1.2.2. Online Grocery Platforms
The broad relationship of interest is the effect of an online purchase on consumers’ oﬄine
purchases:
Yqcm = βOnlinePurchaseqcm + φm + φz × φq + µqcm (1.1)
where Yqcm is an oﬄine purchase frequency or expenditure for consumer q in city c in month
m, OnlinePurchaseqcm indicates an online purchase, φm are month fixed effects, φz × φq
are zip code by quarter fixed effects to control for different time trends in card spend across
neighborhoods, and µqcm is a consumer specific shock to her purchase outcome. There
are likely many observable factors that would cause the estimate of β to be biased due
to correlations between µqcm and a consumer’s choice to make different online and oﬄine
purchases. For example, someone who has a baby or needs to work more hours probably
has less time for shopping. That may make them both more likely to make online purchases
and change the frequency and composition of their oﬄine purchases. Therefore, this simple
regression cannot be used to disentangle the effect specific to an online purchase.
This endogeneity problem motivates my empirical strategy of leveraging the entry of online
grocery platforms across different cities for identification. To pinpoint the month of entry of
an online grocery platform into a city, I rely on a surge in transactions in the full customer
dataset that are charged to that platform by customers who live in that city.14 As Figure
2, Panel (a) shows, the surge in the month chosen as entry is sudden and sharp and closely
matches the publicly available data for platforms about their month of entry into different
markets.15 Using this measure of entry, the data show that multiple platforms often enter,
13Customers living in central cities vary demographically and geographically from other customers, leading
to a selected sample. In the Onlien Retail Data appendix, I show the results for customers living outside
these cities.
14There are 14 platforms for which these entry dates are determined.
15Prior to entry, a very small fraction of customers are recorded with transactions – driven by some
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with upwards of 5 platforms entering into the largest cities, like New York (Figure 2, Panel
(b)). Furthermore, the map in Figure 3 shows that many cities across the country experience
at least one new platform entry during my sample period.
To use the entry of online grocery platforms as a source of exogenous variation in oﬄine
consumer consumption patterns, entry needs to induce take-up and be uncorrelated with
unobserved factors that also influence oﬄine consumption. The time between entry and
take-up for customers who take-up a platform is seen in Figure 4, Panel (a). A significant
share of customers take-up an online grocery platform in the months immediately after
entry. However, many more customers take-up the platforms for the first time much later.
Take-up rates between 10 and 30 months after entry even grow over time, perhaps reflecting
learning among customers about the availability and functionality of the platforms. So while
immediate effects on oﬄine economies of online grocery platform entry may be felt through
early users, the full effects of the platforms will not be felt for years.
The ability of online grocery platforms to differentially target more profitable customers
is the greatest threat to the exogeneity of platform entry to oﬄine consumption. While
platforms may be able to target specific customers within a city after entry, through direct
marketing campaigns or limiting delivery to specific zip codes, targeting specific cities overall
is much harder. Previous research suggests that similar businesses with large fixed costs
target the most populous cities first to ensure a large enough customer base to be profitable
(Chopra 2003; Goolsbee and Syverson 2004; Holmes 2011, Kung and Zhong 2017). This
is clearly the strategy that Amazon Fresh, for example, followed: After initial availability
in Seattle in 2008, the platform expanded to Los Angeles and San Francisco in 2013; San
Diego, New York, and Philadelphia in 2014; Baltimore and Sacramento in 2015; and Boston,
Dallas, and Chicago in 2016.
I also show that platforms are not systematically targeting their entry into cities to take
inaccuracy in current customer zip codes due to moving or multiple residences. Then in the month prior to
that chosen as entry, there is an uptick due to the fact that some platforms enter mid-month.
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advantage of seasonal differences in initial take-up of platforms. As shown by the line in
Figure 4, Panel (b), there is a rise in take-up rates each winter over the general trend line.
This almost certainly reflects that online grocery shopping is more attractive than traveling
to grocery stores when it is cold. However, as represented by the dots, there is no clear
seasonal pattern to entries. It seems clear that if platforms were timing their entries, they
would do so just before winter to attract the largest customer base.
Another feature of the online grocery market is that despite wider availability, take-up
rates after platform entry across the entire population are initially very low. Such low rates
are common in new online product markets, due to factors such as slow learning among
customers about the new online product and hesitancy to try something new, particularly
among older customers. Furthermore, the online grocery platforms themselves are still
learning how to best deliver a wide variety of highly perishable items to their customers
quickly, lowering the attractiveness of online groceries and retention rates among those who
try a platform. This infrequency also makes the β in equation (1) difficult to statistically
detect, even with exogenous variation in online purchases. To that point, by the end of my
sample period only 3.3 percent of the entire population have ever tried an online grocery
platform and only 1.3 percent are actively purchasing from one in a given month (Figure
5, Panel (a)). In addition, about two-thirds of those that do try a platform use it for only
one or two months (Figure 5, Panel (b)). These low and slow take-up rates make entry too
weak an instrument for the effect of online grocery platforms and make the detection of fine-
grained effects in aggregate very difficult. For these reasons, I study a group of customers
who use online grocery platforms separately from the entire population, as outlined later in
the empirical strategy in section IV.
1.3. A Consumer Model with Trip-chaining
I use a discrete choice consumer utility maximization problem to predict the effects of online
retail on oﬄine retailers through both product substitution and trip-chaining.16 I then test
16In the style of McFadden (1973).
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the predictions for trip-chaining in the data against other possible indirect effects with the
empirical strategy outlined in the next section. As laid out in the two-stage decision tree in
Figure 6, the consumer first decides whether to take-up an online grocery platform and then
on her trips. To purchase groceries and coffee outside the home, I assume the consumer only
has one grocery store and one coffee shop to choose from and can only make one shopping
trip per day. I also assume that even though groceries and coffee are consumed every day,
groceries are durable and do not need to be purchased every day, while hot, fresh-brewed
coffee is not durable and needs to either be purchased or made at home every day.17 The
model is solved by backward induction, with the consumer first determining the expected
value of her trip choices conditional on her online grocery shopping decision.
1.3.1. Daily Trip Choice
Consider the trip choice problem of a consumer who does not have access to an online
grocery platform and is therefore not an online grocery shopper. There are four possible
ways she can combine purchases at the grocery store and coffee shop on a trip: (1) grocery
store and coffee at home, (2) coffee shop, (3) grocery store and coffee shop, and (4) coffee at
home. I assume the consumer’s utility maximization problem for choosing one of the four
trips on a day takes the form:
max
gi,cj
Vq(gi, cj) = v(gi) + v(cj)− τqTq(gi, cj) + q(gi, cj) (1.2)
where Vq(gi, cj) is the value to consumer q of picking the stores in a trip with gi = g1(gi = gn)
signifying store (no) purchase of groceries and cj = c1(cj = c0) signifying store (home)
purchase of coffee. The utility from a grocery store, v(gi), or coffee shop, v(cj), visit is
separable and overall utility is reduced by τq times the amount of time, Tq(gi, cj), it takes
17In their most recent survey the National Coffee Association estimated that 62 percent of adults drank
coffee in the previous 24 hours. In addition, over 80 percent make coffee at home.
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to make trip gi, cj where:
Tq(g1, c0) = 2tq(g1) + tq(c0)
Tq(gn, c1) = 2tq(c1)
Tq(g1, c1) = tq(g1) + td + tq(c1)
Tq(gn, c0) = tq(c0)
and tq(g1) is the time it takes to travel to the grocery store from the consumer’s home
(likewise for tq(c1)), td is the time it takes to travel between the grocery store and the coffee
shop, and tq(c0) is the time it takes to make coffee at home. In addition, the consumer has
a random taste shock, q(gi, cj), for each trip.
The daily trip choice problem is distinct from the typical discrete choice problem because
consumers face distance costs specific to their individual locations. To illustrate, Figure 7
shows that in a world with one grocery store and one coffee shop and two consumers, Ava
and Beth, each has a different relative distance to each of the stores. This implies that any
shock to the value of a trip should impact them differently. For example, imagine that Ava
and Beth are the same in every way, except their locations, and on one particular day each
wakes up with the same craving for coffee from the coffee shop, leading to high q(gi, c1)’s
for both consumers for trips that include the coffee shop. Because Beth is farther from the
coffee shop, we would expect her to be less likely to make the trip, even with the craving.
Or if she does make the trip, the coffee shop’s proximity to the grocery store might make
her more likely to visit both the coffee shop and the grocery store to economize on travel
costs. However, Ava might be much more likely to just visit the coffee shop since she has
lower travel costs for all trip types on any given day.
This example points to another challenge in this discrete choice setting – the high degree of
correlation across the values of trips for an individual consumer in a day. This is because
any shock to an individual component of a trip’s utility is likely to affect any other trip
that also contains that component. Therefore, on a day when Beth, for example, wakes up
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wanting coffee from the coffee shop, any trip containing a visit to the coffee shop should
be more likely for her, leading to a Corr(B(g0, c1), B(gn, c1)) > 0. The same applies to
shocks to the value of visiting the grocery store or the time it takes to travel to any location.
Such correlations are integral to understanding trip substitution patterns, but the classic
logit and nested logit models do not capture them.18
Models that account for the full set of cross elasticities created by these correlations can
become very computationally burdensome, especially with large choice sets. One solution,
the classic model developed in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (BLP 1995), is to project the
choices into characteristic space. This means that the elasticities of any two choices are
then a function of the coefficients for the characteristics of the two choices. However, that
method cannot be applied here because the key choice characteristic, consumer distance
to stores, is consumer-specific. Then it is impossible to reduce the dimensionality of the
consumer choice set by reducing choices to their characteristics. Other BLP-style models
tackle such issues by simulating correlated shocks; however, the size of this data make such
an approach impractical.19
I use an alternative solution, inspired by the transportation literature, that models the
trip choice with the paired combinatorial logit (PCL) model developed in Koppelman and
Wen (2000). The original inspiration for this model was the study of substitution patterns
between travel routes that share common links. In a similar way, trip choices in my model
can be thought of as having common links in either product or time cost. This model has
a similar structure to the traditional logit and nested logit models, but allows simultaneous
nesting of any trip with every other trip to account for different correlations between each
pair of trips. Essentially, for any trip k, the model sums up the product of the value of trip
k relative to trip l, Pk|k,l, and the value of a pair of trips relative to other pairs, Pk,l, across
18See the Trip-chaining Model appendix for comparisons between models.
19Thomsassen et al. (2017) simulate these shocks in a similar setting to capture substitution between
grocery stores in response to price changes.
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the possible l 6= k. The probability of a trip k is then:
Pk =
∑
l 6=k
Pk|k,lPkl (1.3)
where
Pk|k,l =
exp( Vk1−σk,l )
exp( Vk1−σk,l ) + exp(
Vl
1−σk,l )
Pk,l =
[exp( Vk1−σk,l ) + exp(
Vl
1−σk,l )]
1−σk,l∑n−1
s=1
∑n
m=s+1[exp(
Vk
1−σs,m ) + exp(
Vm
1−σs,m )]
1−σs,m
where Vk is the value of trip k and 0 < σk,l < 1 is a similarity index that captures the
substitutability between the two trips, with σk,l = 1 for perfect substitutes. Trip k is more
likely, then, if trip k is valuable relative to trip l or the value of the pair of trips k and
l is high (due to either high values of the components of the two trips or high similarity
between them).
The benefits of this model are that it directly captures the intuition of the trip-chaining
mechanism, allows the values of individual trips to be consumer specific, and produces
tractable reduced form equations that can be used to make predictions and estimate effects
of interest. To illustrate, consider the log of the relative probability of only going to the
coffee shop compared to the probability of making coffee at home for a consumer on a day:
ln
(
Pgnc1
Pgnc0
)
= ln
∑
gicj 6=gnc1
(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pgnc1|gnc1,gicj
(2)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Vgnc1,gicj −ln
∑
gicj 6=gnc0
(3)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pgnc0|gnc0,gicj
(4)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Vgnc0,gicj (1.4)
where
Vk,l =
[
exp
(
Vk
1− σk,l
)
+ exp
(
Vl
1− σk,l
)]1−σk,l
(1.5)
is the value of the pair k and l. According to set (1) of the terms in equation (4), a consumer
is more likely to make a trip only to the coffee shop, rather than make coffee at home, when
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the coffee shop provides more value and low time costs relative to other trips. In addition,
higher values for trip pairs including the trip to the coffee shop, in set (2), increase the
likelihood that she is choosing from between that and another trip. The terms in set (3)
and set (4) for the coffee at home trip are similarly defined, with lower conditional and pair
values increasing the likelihood the consumer will choose the coffee shop trip over the coffee
at home trip. Unlike other discrete choice models, the PCL model captures the ability of
a consumer to differentially substitute between trips to economize on travel costs through
trip-chaining based on her unique time and distance constraints.
1.3.2. Differences for an Online Grocery Shopper
As an online grocery shopper, the structure of her daily trip choice problem is the same,
but some of the parameters that determine trip values change. She has less value for trips
that include a visit to the grocery store (lower v(g1)) and trips with a visit to the grocery
store are now more similar to other trips (increasing those σ’s) now that online groceries
are stocked in her fridge. This implies a lower probability of choosing any trip including the
grocery store from any trip paired with it and lower values for those trip pairs containing a
trip including the grocery store. For example, a lower value for a visit to the grocery store
implies a different conditional probability of making a trip to the coffee shop in the trip
pair including the coffee shop trip and the grocery store and coffee at home trip:
−∂Pgnc1|gnc1,g1c0
∂v(g1)
=
1
1− σgnc1,g1c0
[Pgnc1|gnc1,g1c0︸ ︷︷ ︸]2 > 0 (1.6)
exp
(v(c1)−2τt(c1)
1−σgnc1,g1c0
)
exp
(v(c1)−2τt(c1)
1−σgnc1,g1c0
)
+ exp
(v(g1)+v(c0)−τ(2t(g1)+t(c0))
1−σgnc1,g1c0
)
Furthermore, a lower value for the grocery store visit increases the odds of only going to
the coffee shop more if the grocery store is farther away or she finds the two trips to be
very similar, and particularly so if she has high time costs. At the same time, the value of
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that trip pair decreases with a decrease in value for a grocery store visit by:
−∂Vgnc1,g1c0
∂v(g1)
= −Pg1c0|gnc1,g1c0Vgnc1,g1c0 < 0 (1.7)
These changes affect the terms in set (1) and set (2), respectively, of equation (4) and
change the odds of a customer choosing the coffee shop trip over the coffee at home trip
once she become an online grocery shopper. In addition to the changes in the terms in set
(1) and set (2), the conditional probability of choosing to make coffee at home for other
trip pairs in set (3) and the value of any trip paired with the coffee at home trip in set (4)
will concurrently change with grocery store trip value. Then, the combined effect of all the
inter-trip substitutions determines the overall impact of a change in grocery store visit value
on the trip probability for the coffee shop alone trip relative the trip where the customer
just makes coffee at home. In general, the odds of picking the coffee shop trip over making
coffee at home or another trip will be higher when:
1. She is far from the grocery store
2. She is close to the coffee shop
3. The grocery store and coffee shop are far apart
and the effects will vary based on her:
4. Opportunity cost of time
5. Values for the grocery store and coffee shop
6. Similarity for each pair of trips
Similar exercises for the other three trips show that the relative probability of any trip
also depends on the locations of the customer and the stores as well as consumer specific
parameters. Then, extending beyond the simple one grocery store and one coffee shop
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setting, access to additional stores of each type increases the trip options for consumers
and creates a richer set of possible substitution patterns. For example, just one additional
grocery store and one additional coffee shop creates 10 possible trip options.20 With greater
retail density, the model predicts that consumers in:
7. Grocery dense neighborhoods will substitute away from far away grocery store trips
more.
8. Coffee dense neighborhoods will substitute toward more nearby coffee shop trips.21
because the consumer is less likely to choose from that pair for the same reasons. Further-
more, as in equations (6) and (7), these relationships will be more unequal if the consumer
is far from the grocery store or close to the coffee shop, the grocery store and coffee shop
are far apart (predictions 1-3) and will be different base on her time costs, store values,
trip similarities, and nearby retail density (predictions 4-8). Therefore, trip-chaining pre-
dicts stronger effects of online platform take-up on oﬄine trip reorganization for those who
benefit the most from being an online grocery shopper.
1.3.3. Online Choice
To the consumer, I model the entry of an online grocery platform as equivalent to gaining
access to the left half of the decision tree in Figure 6. She is now able to pick being an
online grocery shopper and what oﬄine trips she would make as an online grocery shopper.
The choice depends on the value the consumer gets from the online grocery platform and
her expected value of the daily trips she will make conditional on that choice. I assume
the consumer’s utility maximization problem for online grocery platform adoption takes the
form:
max
T
Uq = [Vq(p)− τq(g0)]1{T = 1}+ Iq|T + µq(T ) (1.8)
20This continues to abstract from other realities, like customers leaving for trips from other locations, such
as work, or making multiple trips in a day.
21A more detailed discussion for predictions 1-8 is in the Trip-chaining Model appendix.
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where T(0, 1) signifies take-up of the online grocery platform, Uq is the long-term utility
of the consumer, Vq(p) is the value of the online grocery to her, g0 is the time cost of online
grocery shopping, Iq|T is the expected value of the oﬄine trips conditional on platform
take-up, and µq(T ) ∼ EV type 1 is the taste shock for being an online grocery shopper.
Intuitively, those consumers who have a higher value for an online grocery platform and
the trip pairs they would choose as an online grocery shopper as compared to the value
of the trip pairs they would choose not being an online grocery shopper. Formally, those
consumers for whom:
Vp − τg0 > (I|T = 0)− (I|T = 1) = ln
[∑n−1
k=1
∑n
m=k+1 Vk,m|T=0∑n−1
k=1
∑n
m=k+1 Vk,l|T=1
]
(1.9)
holds are the consumers who are most likely to take-up the platforms.22
1.4. Empirical Strategy and Results
Due to the infrequency of online grocery purchases, I first study a group of customers who
became online grocery shoppers and used the platforms for at least five months.23 Although
take-up timing and intensity is endogenous, I argue these high-use early adopters would have
used the platforms earlier if they had been available and used them intensely enough to
strongly affect their oﬄine consumption patterns. The intensity of effect is needed to detect
changes along the fine-grained margins predicted by the trip-chaining model. Thus, though
a selected sample, if they changed their trips as predicted, then trip-chaining likely affects
the reorganization of all customers’ shopping trips when they replace some visits to oﬄine
stores with online products. Second, I study the pure average population effect, regardless
of customer platform take-up. These effects are small, due to low take-up rates across the
population, but rely solely on the exogeneity of platform entry for causal identification.
22The Trip-chaining model appendix lays out the detailed changes in trip values for consumers who use
an online grocery platform.
23I chose 12 months specifically to capture those who take-up during the surge immediately post-entry
and those who take-up the first winter after entry, given the strong relationship between season and take-up.
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1.4.1. Matching Specification
The high-use consumers who take-up a platform soon after entry are not randomly selected
from the population. As shown in Figure 8, those who become high-users are significantly
more likely to be part of the younger working-age population, ages 30-50, and have higher
incomes at the start of my sample. Therefore, to measure the effect of platform take-up in
this population, I match them to platform non-users with an exact match on customer zip
code and nearest neighbor matching on socioeconomics and pre-take-up spending patterns:
Tqm = β
1cust zipqm−1 + β2genderq + β3init age binq + β4init incm binq∑
p 6=g,c
η1pSpend
6
pq + η
2
pTrips
6
pq + η
3
pSpend∆
6
pq + η
4
pTrips∆
6
pq
∑
p=g,c
η1pSpend
6
pq + η
5
pSpend∆
init
pq + η
6
pSpend∆
3
pq + η
3
pSpend∆
6
pq
∑
b
η2bTrips
6
bq + η
7
bTrips∆
init
bq + η
8
bTrips∆
3
bq + η
4
bTrips∆
6
bq + νq
(1.10)
where Tqm indicates platform take-up by customer q in month m, cust zipqm−1 is the cus-
tomer’s zip code in the month prior to take-up, genderq, init age binq, and init incm binq,
are the customer’s socioeconomics at the start of the sample period. Spendxpq is daily ex-
penditure on product p over the x months prior to take-up in average dollars per day and
Spend∆xpq is the growth in expenditure over those x months. The products include gro-
ceries, coffee, restaurants, pharmacies, clothing, and fuel. Trips are similarly defined, with
bundled trips for groceries and/or coffee indexed by b. I control for levels and changes in
groceries and coffee spend and the frequency of the bundled trips over 3 months, 6 months,
and since the beginning of the sample to control for short- and long-term trends in the
primary products of interest.24
To create the group of matched non-users, I estimate equation (10) separately for each
24Somewhat surprisingly, customers who briefly try a platform and then abandon it do not make a good
control group because their spending does not return to pre-take-up levels. This may be due to subsequent
experimentation with other food-delivery options and is a topic for future research.
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month of the sample. Each month’s sample includes those high-use early adopters who are
one month from take-up and a random sample of customers who do not take-up but who live
in the same zip codes. In addition, the matching estimation for New York is run separately
from all other cities due to processing constraints driven by the number of customers in New
York. Table 1 gives the estimation results for one month’s sample. The results show that
men are less likely to be online grocery shoppers and that online grocery shoppers tend to be
younger and higher income. In addition, those who take-up generally spent more over the 6
months prior to take-up across all products, but made fewer trips and at a decreasing rate
compared to those who do not take-up a platform. Table 2 shows that, for the same sample,
the high-use early adopters and their two nearest matched neighbors are well balanced in the
included covariates. The average mean difference between the covariates for the matched
non-users is reduced by more than half for almost every covariate as compared to all non-
users.25
With the sample of high-use early adopters and their two matched non-users, I estimate
the effect of online grocery platform take-up on the frequency of oﬄine consumer purchases
with:
Yqcm =
∑
n
δnTakeupqcn + φm + φz × φq + µqcm (1.11)
where Yqcm is either average daily spend or daily purchase frequency for consumer q in city c
in month m, δn is the difference for high-users in month n from take-up of the online grocery
platform, and Takeupqcn are the months from take-up at n = 0. Causal interpretation of
the estimate requires that µqcm is uncorrelated with take-up conditional on the matched
characteristics and fixed effects.
Before a close examination of the effects of online grocery platforms due to trip-chaining,
I show that the aggregate impact on spending at direct competitors, grocery stores, is
strong and negative. As Figure 9 shows, at take-up there is an immediate decrease in
25Not shown, the mean difference between the high-use early adopters and matched non-users is much less
than 25 percent of the standard deviation of the value for the matched non-users for almost every covariate.
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spending at oﬄine grocery stores of $1.91 per day from $10.75 per day (a drop of 18
percent) and a surge in spending on online grocery platforms of $7.56 per day – a large and
economically significant effect for the direct oﬄine competitors. Interestingly, the difference
in these two effects indicates that the substitution between online and oﬄine groceries is
not one-to-one. This is because online grocery platforms can also be substitutes for other
oﬄine retailers selling similar products, like restaurants, and/or lead consumers to increase
their expenditure share on groceries overall.26 Subsequent to the initial month of take-up
(in which every customer spends on the platform), the relative decrease in spending gets
smaller over time because fewer use the platform every month and some later stop using
the platform altogether.27
In terms of purchase frequency, while grocery stores experience a decline in days with a
grocery store purchase after platform take-up, coffee shops experience an overall increase
(Figure 10). Before take-up, consumers purchased coffee 5.0 percent of (or 1.5) days per
month and in the 12 months after, they made purchases an average of 0.003 days more, an
increase of 5.9 percent. This indicates that for the consumers in this high-use early adopter
sample, coffee shops overall benefited from their take-up of the online grocery platforms.
1.4.2. Evidence for trip-chaining
Further dividing purchases into the four possible trip combinations, as in the model in
section III, shows that consumers significantly reorganize the composition of their shopping
trips after take-up. Figure 11 shows all four trips on the same axis. The strongest response
is a shift from days with trips to grocery stores and coffee at home to days in which
consumers only have coffee at home and make no purchases at grocery stores or coffee
shops. Secondarily, the increase in coffee frequency is almost entirely driven by increases
in days with purchases only at coffee shops. Before take-up, consumers made purchases at
26Possible reasons include behavioral changes, stockpiling, and spending less on transportation to grocery
stores.
27There is some remaining seasonality to both initial take-up and use after take-up. Not shown, spending
declines again about one year after take-up.
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only coffee shops 4.0 percent of days in a month and after, increased their frequency by
6.4 percent. The other coffee shop trip, the coffee shop combined with the grocery store,
was only made 1.0 percent of days before take-up. In the five months after take-up, the
frequency of that combined trip slightly dips and then becomes positive for the rest of the
12-month window, an average increase of 3.9 percent. Such a delayed effect may reflect time
needed to reorganize more complex shopping trips. Together, the shift toward the two trips
containing coffee shops shows that coffee shops are benefiting from online grocery platforms
in this sample.
The variation in substitution among the four basic trip types by store distance, retail
geography, and opportunity cost of time provides evidence of the trip-chaining mechanism
creating the aggregate positive effect. For store distance, I measure the change in purchase
frequency of grocery store alone and coffee shop alone trips after take-up for grocery stores
and coffee shops in different distance 1-mile distance bins from the customer’s zip code. I
also measure the change in purchase frequency of grocery stores and coffee shops together
by total distance bins and distance between grocery store and coffee shop bins. For retail
geography, I measure differences in effects for customers by grocery store and coffee shop
density, where zip code density is defined as the share of a city’s grocery stores or coffee shops
in a zip code. For opportunity cost of time, I study differences in effects by day-of-week
and differences by consumer income bin.28
I estimate a slightly modified version of equation (11) to look at these fine-grained effects.
For very specific types (and therefore infrequent) trips, I estimate the average effect post
take-up of the online grocery platform as:
Yqcm = δPostTakeupqcm + φm + φz × φq + µqcm (1.12)
28Distances are measured centroid to centroid between zip codes. The lowest distance bin corresponds to
the same zip code. The average area of customer zip codes in this sample is 5.7 miles, corresponding to a
circle radius of 1.3 miles. Therefore, the second bin indicates different zip codes that are less than 2 miles
apart. The remaining bins increase in 1 mile increments. Zip code grocery store and coffee shop density and
average customer income are divided into quintiles to define bins.
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and for population subgroups, I estimate the average post effect relative to an excluded
group as:
Yqcm =
∑
g
δgPostTakeupqcm ×Gq + φm + φz × φq + µqcm (1.13)
where Gq is an indicator for whether consumer q belongs to group G.
I find that changes in the shares of trips to stores at different distances after take-up implies
that the time-cost of traveling is important in consumer trip choice (Figure 12). Before take-
up, high use early adopters were most likely to make purchases at grocery stores in their
same zip code (3.9 percent of days) and made fewer purchases at grocery stores at greater
distances. After take-up, they reduce their trips to grocery stores in their same zip codes the
most, in absolute and relative terms. This runs somewhat counter to the model, but could
reflect differences in the types of grocery stores available to customers in different locations.
For coffee shops, the most common distance before take-up was at shops in the same zip
code (1.0 percent of days) and after take-up they increase trips to those coffee shops by 12.9
percent. Trips to both a grocery stores and a coffee shops are too infrequent to detect strong
effects, but the results suggest that high-use early adopters do some switching away from
very long combined trips in which the grocery store and coffee shop are far apart toward
trips in the middle distance range.29
Closely related, grocery store density determines the menu of grocery stores available to
customers at different distances from their zip codes, with customers in more dense neigh-
borhoods having more and closer options. Shown in Table 3, for trips only to grocery stores,
I find that all customers on average reduce their trips by 2.6 percent, but that decrease is
more severe as grocery density increases. Coffee shop density (Table 4), in turn, makes
trips containing coffee shops, both alone and combined with grocery stores, more likely in
the most coffee dense neighborhoods. These results closely dovetail with the finding that
consumers are switching between from trips to grocery stores to coffee shops in their same
29To calculate distances for trips to grocery stores and coffee shops, I need both store zip codes which is
even less common than having a zip code for only a grocery store or only a coffee shop.
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zip codes.
Customers during the week and of higher income should have higher opportunity costs of
time and so be more responsive to an increase in the availability of time after platform take-
up. Shown in Figure 13, for grocery store alone trips, customers reduce their trips every
day of the week, but by different amounts. The absolute effect is strongest on Sundays,
which was the most common day for that trip type before take-up (20 percent of Sundays).
But in relative terms, the percent drop in grocery store alone trips during the week is at
least as high and often higher, particularly on Monday. Most of the shift away from grocery
store trips is toward days with coffee at home, but some shift is toward coffee shop alone
trips, in which the daily pattern is even more pronounced. Before take-up, on any weekday
customers bought coffee 4 - 5 percent of days as opposed to 3 percent of weekend days.
After take-up, they substantially increase their coffee shop purchases during the week, by
up to 8 percent on Mondays. These shifts consistently show that customers respond most
on days during the week when their time is more valuable, as trip-chaining suggests they
would.
The results comparing customers across income bins (Table 5) do not provide as clear
an indication. In the pre-period, consumers with higher incomes made more trips to the
grocery store and in the post-period, consumers with higher incomes reduced those trips
the most. And while high-users across incomes reduced those trips in the post period,
those with higher incomes actually reduced those trips by less. This runs counter to the
trip-chaining theory, which suggests that higher income consumers would reduce their trips
more. This discrepancy might be explained by uncontrolled for differences in sorting across
retail geography by income, but does provide additional support for trip-chaining. Overall
though, the variation along these different margins suggests that the reorganization of trips
after platform take-up is at least partly determined by trip-chaining behavior.
Other possible indirect effects do not fully explain these results. For example, a reduction in
trips to grocery stores by some customers could reduce crowding at grocery stores, making
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grocery stores more attractive to other customers. Or grocery stores could respond to online
competition by lowering prices, making them more attractive to all customers. If present,
these would lead me to underestimate effects. However, such general equilibrium effects are
almost certainly too weak during my sample period due to current low take-up rates, but
may play more of a role in the future. Furthermore, the variation I find along distance, day,
and retail geography, particularly with respect to coffee shops, could not be explained by
these alternatives.
1.4.3. Average effect of platform entry across city population
The second population consists of all customers, regardless of platform take-up, located in
the same cities while they have between one and eight platforms, excluding New York.30 I
collapse the customer by month data to a customer average by city by month to estimate:
Ycm =
∑
n
γnPlatformEntryn + φm + φc × φq + µcm (1.14)
where Ycm is an average purchase frequency for a customer located in city c in month m,
γn measures the effect of the nth platform entry, φm and φc × φq are month and city by
quarter fixed effects, and µcm is a city by month shock that needs to be uncorrelated with
platform entry and oﬄine purchase frequencies in order to make causal estimates of the γn.
I find that each platform entry has a statistically insignificant, but positive impact on the
amount spent on grocery platforms in a month (Figure 14). In my sample, about 90 percent
of platform users only ever use one platform, so that each platform entry typically induces
take-up among a different subset of customers. For that reason, each entry should build up
the total share of customers in a city using platforms. However, such a positive trend is
difficult to detect with such low population take-up rates.
In terms of the composition of grocery store and coffee shop trips (Figure 15), I find that the
30At the beginning of the sample period, New York already had more platforms than any other city and
the effect of high-number entries would be New York specific.
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effects of platform entry are only detectable after multiple entries. As with the high-user
sample, the strongest effect is customers’ gradual shift away from grocery store alone trips
to days where consumers stay home and make coffee. By the seventh entry, I detect a 0.8
percentage point decline in daily trips to the grocery store alone. However, the indirect
effect effects on the trips containing the coffee shops are not statistically significant at this
level of aggregation.
Finally, I show that the entry of online grocery platforms into smaller cities, outside the 15
cities studied in the high-use early adopter sample, do not have the same effect of trips to
coffee shops. In these cities, as shown in Figure 16, each platform entry instead reduces the
frequency of trips only to the coffee shop. This may be explained by the fact that these
cities are much smaller (Hartford and Salt Lake City, for example) and do not have the
same density of coffee shops. Many consumers may not have the option of substituting into
coffee shops nearby their home zip codes.31
1.4.4. Welfare Measurement
I measure the increase in welfare from the entry of the online grocery platforms as the
compensating variation to consumers. Taking the distribution of the error term, µq(T ),
in the second stage of the decision tree from the consumer problem in section II to be
distributed extreme value type 1, the log sum gain in value from the platforms is:
∆CVplatform = ln
[
exp(Vq(p)− τq(g0) + Iq|T = 1) + exp(Iq|T = 0)
exp(Iq|T = 0)
]
(1.15)
which reduces to a simple function of the probability of online grocery platform take-up:
∆CVplatform = ln
[
1
1− PT
]
(1.16)
where PT is the probability of take-up of the online grocery platform. Intuitively, the higher
the probability of take-up, the higher the increase in welfare to the consumer from being
31There are too few high-use early adopters in these cities to estimate effects specific to them.
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able to be a online grocery shopper. This formulation falls out of the simple structure of
the first stage of the discrete choice, and is not specific to the PCL structure in the second
stage. However, the PCL model is important for predicting and understanding the take-up
and welfare benefits of the online grocery platforms.
The current low take-up of platforms would suggest that those welfare gains are small.
However, that is likely, at least in part, to be driven by uncertainty around new products
and other behaviors that lead to slow adoption in new markets, rather than a permanent
rejection of online grocery platforms by the vast majority of consumers. Furthermore, as
Figure 17 shows, even though the aggregate take-up rate in the population is small, there
are many zip codes in which a much higher share of customers become high-users of a
grocery platform.
Furthermore, understanding the features of these high-use share zip codes provides informa-
tion about which consumers benefit the most from the greater availability of online products.
For that purpose, I do a comparison of the take-up rates by zip code grocery store density
and average consumer income bins. As indicated by the model, consumers will choose to
take up once the utility from the platform outweighs the relative utility of their oﬄine trips
without the platform. Those who would stand to gain the most in terms of trip utility,
then, would be those for whom traveling to grocery stores is very costly because the stores
are far away or their time is valuable. Therefore, I estimate:
ln
[
1
1− PT
]
=
B∑
b=1
νbbz (1.17)
where ln
[
1
1−PT
]
is the welfare measure, as a function of take-up, of the platform from the
consumer choice model, νb is the difference for each bin of either zip code grocery density
or average consumer income, and the bz indicate each grocery density or consumer income
bin.
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I find that welfare increases the most for the consumers predicted by the model to benefit
the most from the time saved making oﬄine trips. Table 6 shows that welfare decreases
in proportion to zip code grocery density and increases in proportion to average consumer
income. Furthermore the differences between the highest and lowest of each category are
substantial – zip codes with average incomes above $100,000 experience a welfare increase
eight times as high as the lowest income zip codes and the least grocery dense zip codes
experience a welfare increase over three times that of the highest density zip codes. This
implies that the welfare gains from the current and continued availability of online grocery
products will not be evenly distributed across socioeconomics or geography.
1.5. Conclusion
The continuing and rapid rise of online retail will transform local oﬄine economies and the
way consumers and retailers interact. The research presented here indicates that those of-
fline retailers that compete directly with online retailers on product are negatively impacted,
particularly those that are most costly or inconvenient for consumers to reach. Other of-
fline retailers, even if they do not compete on product, are also affected through changes in
consumer behavior. I find that trip-chaining is one such mechanism through which online
retail can disrupt and reorganize the composition of consumers’ shopping trips. By being
close to consumers or co-located along durable travel paths, like a commute to work, those
indirect competitors, including coffee shops, can be winners rather than losers from that
trip-chaining behavior. Furthermore, those consumers who can afford to access new online
retail products and live in less retail dense neighborhoods stand to benefit the most from
new online marketplaces.
The implications of the results for local oﬄine economies go beyond which consumers buy
what products where to the functioning of other sectors. These include local labor markets,
in which almost 15.4 million people are currently employment in brick-and-mortar retail
jobs (12.3 percent of private employment).32 Over the past five years, growth in those jobs
32Calculated using Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Survey. Brick-and-mortar employment
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has stalled, even while the rest of the labor market continues to perform well; many point
to online retail as a primary driver.33 In addition, more of the commercial property market
may suffer once new online markets are as mature as those for clothing and non-durables
(Zhang 2016). Local governments may also struggles to meet their funding needs as the
revenue from traditional sales taxes declines. However, while these changes may be painful,
those economies that can transform to coexist and complement online retail will ultimately
be able to improve the welfare of their residents.
defined as retail minus non-store retail employment.
33For one example, see “Death of the Salesmen: Technology’s Threat to Retail Jobs.” The Atlantic, June
2013. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/06/death-of-the-salesmen/309309/
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Table 1.1: High-Use Early Adopter Predictors
Dependent variable:
High-use Early Adopter
Male -0.54***
(0.05)
Unknown -0.93***
(0.08)
Age Bin 2 1.17***
(0.08)
Age Bin 3 0.56***
(0.09)
Age Bin 4 -0.01
(0.10)
Age Bin 5 -0.02
(0.12)
Age Bin 6 -0.04
(0.16)
Incm Bin 2 -0.08
(0.19)
Incm Bin 3 0.17
(0.19)
Incm Bin 4 0.33*
(0.19)
Incm Bin 5 0.48***
(0.19)
Incm Bin 6 0.74***
(0.19)
Spend 6 Rest. 0.01***
(0.001)
Spend 6 Cloth. 0.01***
(0.001)
Spend 6 Fuel. 0.02***
(0.002)
Spend 6 Pharm. 0.01***
(0.002)
Trips 6 Rest. -0.01
(0.13)
Trips 6 Cloth. -3.13***
(0.45)
Trips 6 Fuel. -1.43***
(0.17)
Trips 6 Pharm. 2.01***
(0.20)
Spend∆ 6 Rest. 0.001
(0.001)
Spend∆ 6 Cloth. 0.001
(0.001)
Spend∆ 6 Fuel. -0.0001
(0.001)
Spend∆ 6 Pharm. -0.01***
(0.002)
Dependent variable:
High-use Early Adopter
Trips∆ 6 Rest. -0.27**
(0.12)
Trips∆ 6 Cloth. -0.21
(0.26)
Trips∆ 6 Fuel. -0.01
(0.16)
Trips∆ 6 Pharm. 0.05
(0.18)
Spend 6 Grocery 0.01***
(0.002)
Spend 6 Coffee 0.08**
(0.04)
Spend∆ Init Grocery -0.01***
(0.002)
Spend∆ Init Coffee -0.001
(0.001)
Spend∆ 3 Grocery 0.003
(0.002)
Spend∆ 3 Coffee -0.05**
(0.03)
Spend∆ 6 Grocery 0.02
(0.03)
Spend∆ 6 Coffee 0.04
(0.03)
Trips 6 g1c0 -2.08***
(0.59)
Trips 6 g1c1 -2.49
(1.55)
Trips 6 gnc0 -1.49***
(0.56)
Trips∆ Init g1c0 -0.64
(0.68)
Trips∆ Init g1c1 0.30
(1.68)
Trips∆ Init gnc0 0.53
(0.61)
Trips∆ 3 g1c0 -0.86
(0.60)
Trips∆ 3 g1c1 0.72
(1.23)
Trips∆ 3 gnc0 -0.11
(0.53)
Trips∆ 6 g1c0 -0.66
(0.61)
Trips∆ 6 g1c1 -2.85**
(1.20)
Trips∆ 6 gnc0 -0.96*
(0.53)
Notes: Observations: 334,122. Log Likelihood: -11,197.60. Akaike Inf. Crit.: 23,519.20. Significance levels
are ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. This table shows the socioeconomics and spending characteristics that
predict online grocery platform take-up for a sample of high-use early adopters.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of a subsample of high-use early adopters and non-users
from the same zip codes.
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Table 1.3: Effect by Customer Zip Code Grocery Density
Bundles:
Grocery Store &
Coffee at Home
Grocery Store &
Coffee Shop
Coffee
at Home
Coffee
Shop
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-user -0.0063*** 0.0001 0.0041** 0.0021***
(0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0008)
Post -0.0143*** -0.0008* 0.0172*** -0.0021*
(0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0025) (0.0011)
Bin 2 -0.0055 0.0010 0.0036 0.0010
(0.0040) (0.0011) (0.0053) (0.0028)
Bin 3 0.0009 0.0057*** -0.0169*** 0.0104***
(0.0041) (0.0011) (0.0053) (0.0030)
Bin 4 0.0058 0.0026** -0.0127** 0.0043
(0.0041) (0.0011) (0.0054) (0.0029)
Bin 5 -0.0047 0.0045*** -0.0049 0.0051*
(0.0041) (0.0011) (0.0055) (0.0030)
HU x P -0.0044** -0.0002 0.0046** -0.00003
(0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0010)
HU x B 2 0.0076*** 0.0005 -0.0065*** -0.0017
(0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0011)
HU x B 3 0.0016 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0017
(0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0012)
HU x B 4 0.0057*** 0.0014*** -0.0095*** 0.0024**
(0.0022) (0.0005) (0.0027) (0.0012)
HU x B 5 0.0028 0.0010** -0.0041* 0.0003
(0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0025) (0.0012)
P x B 2 0.0027 -0.0009 0.0016 -0.0035**
(0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0017)
P x B 3 0.0035 -0.0028*** 0.0053 -0.0060***
(0.0030) (0.0007) (0.0037) (0.0020)
P x B 4 -0.0003 -0.0014* 0.0036 -0.0019
(0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0037) (0.0017)
P x B 5 0.0062** -0.0020*** -0.0032 -0.0010
(0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0037) (0.0018)
HU x P x B 2 0.0023 0.0007 -0.0064** 0.0034**
(0.0026) (0.0006) (0.0031) (0.0015)
HU x P x B 3 0.0003 0.0015** -0.0063* 0.0045***
(0.0026) (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0016)
HU x P x B 4 -0.0018 0.0005 0.0004 0.0008
(0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0036) (0.0016)
HU x P x B 5 -0.0084*** 0.0010 0.0048 0.0027*
(0.0026) (0.0007) (0.0033) (0.0016)
Observations 1,180,528 1,180,528 1,180,528 1,180,528
Adjusted R2 0.0769 0.0449 0.0709 0.0455
Notes: Significance levels are ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. This figure shows table shows how the
reorganization of trips after online grocery platform take-up varies with the density of grocery stores in the
customers same zip code.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of 9,629 high-use early adopters.
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Table 1.4: Effect by Customer Zip Code Coffee Density
Bundles :
Grocery Store &
Coffee at Home
Grocery Store &
Coffee Shop
Coffee
at Home
Coffee
Shop
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-user -0.0051*** 0.0007*** 0.0036** 0.0008
(0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0007)
Post -0.0141*** -0.0006 0.0175*** -0.0029***
(0.0019) (0.0004) (0.0022) (0.0010)
Bin 2 -0.0090** 0.0019** 0.0056 0.0016
(0.0040) (0.0010) (0.0051) (0.0025)
Bin 3 0.0042 -0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0010
(0.0039) (0.0010) (0.0049) (0.0026)
Bin 4 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0013
(0.0039) (0.0010) (0.0050) (0.0025)
Bin 5 -0.0106*** 0.0057*** -0.0044 0.0093***
(0.0040) (0.0010) (0.0053) (0.0026)
HU x P -0.0052*** -0.0003 0.0047** 0.0008
(0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0009)
HU x B 2 0.0037* 0.0008 -0.0058** 0.0013
(0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0025) (0.0011)
HU x B 3 0.0061*** -0.0004 -0.0053** -0.0004
(0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0011)
HU x B 4 0.0050** 0.0009* -0.0107*** 0.0048***
(0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0012)
HU x B 5 -0.0011 -0.0009* 0.0013 0.0007
(0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0012)
P x B 2 0.0080*** -0.0022*** -0.0025 -0.0033*
(0.0027) (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0018)
P x B 3 -0.0001 -0.0014** 0.0042 -0.0028
(0.0028) (0.0006) (0.0033) (0.0017)
P x B 4 -0.0026 -0.0016** 0.0056 -0.0014
(0.0029) (0.0006) (0.0036) (0.0016)
P x B 5 0.0057** -0.0030*** -0.0016 -0.0010
(0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0037) (0.0018)
HU x P x B 2 0.0013 0.0011* -0.0046 0.0022
(0.0025) (0.0006) (0.0032) (0.0015)
HU x P x B 3 -0.0012 0.0006 0.0005 0.0001
(0.0025) (0.0006) (0.0031) (0.0015)
HU x P x B 4 -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0008 0.0014
(0.0027) (0.0007) (0.0034) (0.0016)
HU x P x B 5 -0.0024 0.0018** -0.0028 0.0034**
(0.0027) (0.0007) (0.0035) (0.0016)
Observations 1,180,528 1,180,528 1,180,528 1,180,528
Adjusted R2 0.0769 0.0450 0.0709 0.0457
Notes: Significance levels are ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. This figure shows that after online grocery
platform take-up, customers in the highest coffee density zip codes increase their frequencies of the combined
grocery store and coffee shop trip and the trip only to the coffee shop.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of 9,629 high-use early adopters.
33
Table 1.5: Effect by Customer Income
Bundles:
Grocery Store &
Coffee at Home
Grocery Store &
Coffee Shop
Coffee
at Home
Coffee
Shop
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-user -0.0053 -0.0010 0.0135** -0.0072**
(0.0056) (0.0010) (0.0067) (0.0033)
Post -0.00001 -0.0001 0.0033 -0.0032
(0.0050) (0.0010) (0.0060) (0.0032)
Bin 2 0.0046 0.0013* -0.0035 -0.0024
(0.0039) (0.0008) (0.0047) (0.0025)
Bin 3 0.0137*** 0.0005 -0.0086* -0.0056**
(0.0038) (0.0007) (0.0046) (0.0025)
Bin 4 0.0234*** 0.0018** -0.0193*** -0.0059**
(0.0038) (0.0008) (0.0046) (0.0025)
Bin 5 0.0239*** 0.0014** -0.0184*** -0.0068***
(0.0038) (0.0007) (0.0046) (0.0025)
Bin 6 0.0332*** 0.0023*** -0.0272*** -0.0083***
(0.0038) (0.0007) (0.0046) (0.0025)
HU x P -0.0211*** 0.000001 0.0187** 0.0024
(0.0073) (0.0015) (0.0090) (0.0046)
HU x B 2 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0041 0.0042
(0.0060) (0.0011) (0.0072) (0.0035)
HU x B 3 0.0048 0.0016 -0.0134* 0.0070**
(0.0057) (0.0011) (0.0069) (0.0035)
HU x B 4 -0.0059 0.0008 -0.0043 0.0094***
(0.0057) (0.0011) (0.0069) (0.0035)
HU x B 5 0.0068 0.0030*** -0.0192*** 0.0093***
(0.0058) (0.0011) (0.0071) (0.0035)
HU x B 6 0.0051 0.0027** -0.0200*** 0.0122***
(0.0057) (0.0011) (0.0070) (0.0034)
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Table 1.6: Effect by Customer Income, continued
Bundles:
Grocery Store &
Coffee at Home
Grocery Store &
Coffee Shop
Coffee
at Home
Coffee
Shop
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P x B 2 -0.0106** -0.0018* 0.0123** 0.00002
(0.0051) (0.0010) (0.0063) (0.0033)
P x B 3 -0.0090* -0.0025** 0.0141** -0.0026
(0.0050) (0.0010) (0.0061) (0.0033)
P x B 4 -0.0111** -0.0028*** 0.0157** -0.0018
(0.0050) (0.0010) (0.0062) (0.0033)
P x B 5 -0.0141*** -0.0016 0.0169*** -0.0012
(0.0051) (0.0010) (0.0061) (0.0033)
P x B 6 -0.0146*** -0.0020** 0.0175*** -0.0008
(0.0050) (0.0010) (0.0061) (0.0033)
HU x P x B 2 0.0106 0.0006 -0.0092 -0.0020
(0.0077) (0.0016) (0.0095) (0.0048)
HU x P x B 3 0.0088 0.0005 -0.0105 0.0012
(0.0076) (0.0016) (0.0093) (0.0048)
HU x P x B 4 0.0143* 0.0008 -0.0135 -0.0015
(0.0075) (0.0016) (0.0093) (0.0048)
HU x P x B 5 0.0145* 0.0004 -0.0157* 0.0008
(0.0076) (0.0016) (0.0095) (0.0048)
HU x P x B 6 0.0213*** 0.0004 -0.0213** -0.0004
(0.0075) (0.0015) (0.0093) (0.0047)
Observations 1,180,528 1,180,528 1,180,528 1,180,528
Adjusted R2 0.0815 0.0455 0.0741 0.0458
Notes: Significance levels are ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. This figure shows that after online grocery
platform take-up, customers in higher average income zip codes decrease their trips to grocery stores less
than customers in lower average income zip codes.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of 9,629 high-use early adopters.
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Table 1.7: Welfare Change Across Zip Codes
Dependent variable:
Welfare
(By Average Income) (By Grocery Density)
Intercept 0.0045*** 0.0256***
(0.0015) (0.0056)
Bin 2 0.0024 -0.0056***
(0.0018) (0.0010)
Bin 3 0.0072*** -0.0133***
(0.0026) (0.0020)
Bin 4 0.0138*** -0.0141***
(0.0050) (0.0028)
Bin 5 0.0326*** -0.0177***
(0.0080) (0.0051)
Observations 2,427 2,427
Adjusted R2 0.2243 0.0930
Notes: Significance levels are ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p<0.01. This figures show the differences in welfare,
as a function of take-up rates across zip codes by average zip code grocery store density and average zip
code customer income. The welfare gains for customers in the lowest grocery density zip codes and highest
average income zip codes show welfare gains three and eight times as large as the least dense and lowest
average income zip codes. Grocery density bins are defined by quintiles. Average income bins are divided
at 40, 60, 80, and 100 thousand. Average welfare change across all zip codes is 0.016.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of 9,629 high-use early adopters.
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Figure 1.6: Consumer’s Decision Tree
Notes: This figure shows the consumer’s two-level discrete choice problem for how to get groceries and
coffee. In the long-run they decide whether or not to be an online grocery shopper. Then, conditional on
that choice, they decide which of four possible oﬄine shopping trips to make each day.
Figure 1.7: Travel Costs to Stores
Notes: This figure illustrates that each consumer faces unique travel costs for each trip because she lives in
her own location with its unique relative distances to all the stores.
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Figure 1.8: Demographics of High-users of Online Grocery Platforms
(a) Population Age Distribution (b) High-user Age Distribution
(c) Population Income Distribution (d) High-user Income Distribution
Notes: High-users are defined as those that use an online grocery platform in at least five months. Panels
(a) and (b) show that, compared to the sample population, high-users of online grocery platforms a far more
likely to come from the younger, working age population, ages 30-50. Panels (c) and (d) show that high-users
also have higher incomes than the sample population. Source: Author’s calculations using the demographics
from a 4.5 million customer sample and the demographics of 9,629 high-users of online grocery platforms.
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Figure 1.11: Change in Composition of Grocery Store and Coffee Shop Trips
(a) Grocery Store and Coffee at Home (b) Coffee Shop
(c) Grocery Store and Coffee Shop (d) Coffee at Home
Notes: This figure shows that high-use early adopters change the composition of their trips to grocery stores
and coffee shops after they take-up an online grocery platform. The dominant effect is to shift the share
of days spent making trips only to a grocery store to days when consumers do not make a visit to either
a grocery store or coffee shop. However, there are also changes to the trips that include a visit to a coffee
shop. In particular, consumers significantly increase the share of days they visit a coffee shop alone. For
trips to grocery stores and coffee shops, there is an immediate dip in the frequency of those trips, but an
increase over the remaining months of the window.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of 9,629 high-use early adopters of online grocery
platforms and each of their two nearest neighbors matched on zip code, demographics, and pre-take-up
spending patterns.
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Figure 1.12: Changes in the Composition of Grocery Store and Coffee Shop Trips by
Distance
(a) Grocery Store Distance (b) Coffee Shop Distance
(c) Grocery Store and Coffee Shop Trip Distance (d) Distance from Grocery Store to Coffee Shop
Notes: This figure shows that high-use early adopters reduce their visits to nearby grocery stores the most,
which were their primary grocery stores prior to take-up. For trips only to coffee shops, the increase is
dominated by an increase in trips to coffee shops in the customers’ same zip codes. The average zip code size
for customers in this sample is 5.7 square miles, equivalent to a circle with a 1.3 mile radius. Distance bins
were construction such that the bin 1 indicates the same zip code, bin 2 indicates different zip codes with
centroid to centroid distance less than or equal to 2 miles, bin 3 with centroid to centroid distance greater
than 2 but less or equal to 3 miles, etc.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of 9,629 high-use early adopters of online grocery
platforms and each of their two nearest neighbors matched on zip code, demographics, and pre-take-up
spending patterns.
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Figure 1.13: Changes in Composition of Grocery Store and Coffee Shop Trips by Day
(a) Grocery Store and Coffee at Home (b) Coffee Shop
(c) Grocery Store and Coffee Shop (d) Coffee at Home
Notes: This figure shows the importance of consumers’ daily time budgets to the composition of their trips
to grocery stores and coffee shops after they take-up an online grocery platform. Before take-up they were
most likely to go only to a grocery store on a Sunday and, after, the absolute decline on that day is the
highest. However, relative to pre-take-up frequencies, the relative decrease during the week is higher. In
particular, they increase their trips to coffee shops on Monday by 6.2 percent.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of 9,629 high-use early adopters of online grocery
platforms and each of their two nearest neighbors matched on zip code, demographics, and pre-take-up
spending patterns.
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Figure 1.14: Changes in Spending on Online Grocery Platforms
across Large City Population
Notes: This figure shows the average impact of each grocery platform entry on
the average spending on platforms across all customers in a city. The effects are
very small, due to low take-up rates. Source: Author’s calculations using the
average spending patterns of customers in 14 large cities.
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Figure 1.15: Changes in Composition of Grocery Store and Coffee Shop Trips
across Large City Population
(a) Grocery Store and Coffee at Home (b) Coffee Shop
(c) Grocery Store and Coffee Shop (d) Coffee at Home
Notes: This figure shows the average impact of each grocery platform entry on the average trip frequency for
grocery stores and coffee shops across all customers in a 14 large cities, regardless of platform use. The effects
are very small, due to low take-up rates – by the seventh platform entry is there a statistically significant
effect on the frequency of grocery store alone trips of -0.8 percent. Unlike the high-use early adopter sample,
the average effect of each platform entry on coffee shop alone visits is not statistically different from zero.
Source: Author’s calculations using the average spending patterns of customers in 14 large cities.
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Figure 1.16: Changes in Composition of Grocery Store and Coffee Shop Trips
across Small City Population
(a) Grocery Store and Coffee at Home (b) Coffee Shop
(c) Grocery Store and Coffee Shop (d) Coffee at Home
Notes: This figure shows the average impact of each grocery platform entry on the average trip frequency for
grocery stores and coffee shops across all customers in small- and medium-sized cities, regardless of platform
use. The effect for the trip only to the coffee shop are much more negative and may reflect lower retail
density in these cities
Source: Author’s calculations using the average spending patterns of customers in small- and medium-sized
cities.
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Figure 1.17: Distribution of High-users Across Zip Codes
Notes: This figure shows a wide distribution across zip codes in the share of
customers that take-up and become high-users of online grocery platforms by the
end of the sample period. While only a small share of customers in most zip codes
become high users, there are some zip codes where upwards of 10 to 15 percent
of customers become high-users.
Source: Author’s calculations using the take-up statistics of customers living
2,427 zip codes at the end of the sample period.
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CHAPTER 2: Branches in Local Mortgage Markets
2.1. Introduction
The central goal of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 was to increase access
to credit for low socioeconomic-status borrowers. To that aim, the act encouraged lenders
to open branches in more neighborhoods under the assumption that soft information about
borrowers collected during in-person interactions between borrowers and loan officers would
allow lenders to identify credit-worthy low socioeconomic-status borrowers who would oth-
erwise be denied a mortgage (Lang and Nakamura 1993; Avery 1999; Essene and Apgar
2009). Building on this, the Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994 further incen-
tivized banks to locate branches in such neighborhoods (Ludwig et al. 2009).34 In the
following years, thousands of new bank branches were established and the number of census
tracts without any branch fell by 16 percent. Recent research suggests that the concurrent
increase in mortgage credit access over the same period is partly due to the role branches
play in the collection of soft information. For example, Favara and Imbs (2015) propose
that soft information contributed to the 12 percent increase in state-level mortgage growth
that they measure in states that removed branching restrictions after the passage of the
1994 act.
However, access to soft information about borrowers in the small business market, who
have similarly low-quality hard information, is often found to decrease their access to credit
(Broekner 1990; Petersen and Rajan 1995; Boot and Thakor 2000; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez
2004; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006; Degryse and Ongena 2007; Presbitero and Zazzaro
2011; Gormley 2014). They attribute the decrease to an adverse selection problem between
lenders with differential access to soft information. Intuitively, lenders with access to soft
information are able to cream-skim the best borrowers with low-quality hard information.
34This law included amendments to the CRA. It required regulators to evaluate banks’ applications for
out-of-state branch acquisitions and de novo out-of-state branching based on their performance in CRA
evaluations. These evaluations are concerned with increasing banks’ lending to low-income and minority
groups in neighborhoods where they operate. This legislation, in effect, tried to mandate that new branches
would increase access to mortgage credit for low-quality hard information borrowers.
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This leaves other lenders with a lower quality applicant pool, forcing them to either raise
their lending standards or compete by specializing in a particular borrower type. Therefore,
the total effect of soft information can be negative if the latter response dominates.
Given this widely supported result, it seems unlikely that branches would necessarily ex-
pand mortgage access to low-socioeconomic status borrowers through soft information. Out-
wardly, the ownership of a branch by a lender in a neighborhood would create a similar
environment of asymmetric information with other lenders without branches. If that dy-
namic does exist, then federal policy intent on increasing soft information in the mortgage
market could actually decrease credit for low-socioeconomic status borrowers.
The aim of this paper is to use a novel identification strategy and micro data to mea-
sure whether soft information, made available through branches, improves mortgage access
for low-socioeconomic status borrowers in the surrounding neighborhood. The main chal-
lenge to finding a causal relationship is the endogeneity of branch location choice at the
neighborhood level; for example, the choice of lenders to locate branches in neighborhoods
with increasing mortgage demand would create a positive correlation between branches and
mortgage credit. This correlation, then, may obscure the true relationship and lead to the
erroneous conclusion that branches improve mortgage access.
My identification strategy is to build instruments for branch location choice based on a
neighborhood’s distance from a lender’s pre-existing branch network.35 I build a model
of neighborhood mortgage markets to show that the validity of the instrument derives
from the lenders’ branch network optimization problem, in which economies of density in
advertising and management lead lenders to establish new branches that are close to their
pre-existing network (Berger 1997; Bos and Kool 2006; Felici 2008). Furthermore, the
instrument is exogenous to credit access if the location of their pre-existing branches is
uncorrelated with the contemporaneous borrower socioeconomic characteristics that also
35This identification strategy is inspired by estimates in Holmes (2011) that found economies of density
to be large and crucial for Wal-mart store locations. Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) also use network density
as instruments in their study of airline pricing.
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determine equilibrium mortgage credit.
Figure 1 shows the typical pattern for growth of a lender’s branch network, in which the
network starts out as a small cluster of branches that gradually expands from its core.3637
Panel (a) shows the lender, FirstMerit Bank, in 1996 as a small local bank concentrated in
the Cleveland area. That year, it opens three new branches along Lake Erie. Two years later
in 1998 (panel (b)), it merges with another local bank and the combined entity continues
to operate as FirstMerit. Then, in each successive panel it establishes new branches along
the periphery and within its existing market. By 2008, shown in panel (f), FirstMerit
is a substantial regional presence with some branches stretching across state lines. This
growth pattern is the bedrock of my identification strategy – networks that grow densely
and slowly cannot easily respond to changing local economic conditions. It implies a low
correlation between predicted branch location choice and neighborhood socioeconomics and
allows identification of the causal effect of branches.
A second challenge is that soft information, by definition, is not directly measurable. To
detect its use, I rely on two proxy variables that should be affected when lenders use soft
information to make better loans: the percent sold to the secondary market and foreclosure
rates three years after origination. These measure how profitable the lender itself thinks a
loan will be and the realized credit quality of borrowers. In addition, I distinguish branches
owned by small, local banks from those owned by large regional and national banks and
those branches that specialize in mortgages from branches offering a general set of services.
For these branches, the effects of soft information should be strongest because they have
the most ability to collect and use it in their lending decisions.
Using this new identification strategy and detailed micro data, I assess the validity of two
predictions from my model about lender-specific and aggregate lending behavior in mortgage
36This bank’s growth pattern is not unusual. I chose it because the size of its network and its existence
throughout my sample period make the pattern more easily discernible to the eye. Every other year from
1996 to 2008 is shown for compactness.
37For each panel, pre-existing branches are shown as small black dots, branches established in that year
are shown as large blue stars, and branches acquired that year are shown as large red triangles.
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markets with adverse selection. As in the first prediction of the model, individual lenders
react negatively to a competitor’s informational advantage due to the presence of their
branch – by either raising lending standards or selling more mortgages to the secondary
market. For instance, if a competitor to a small, local bank opens a branch, the average
income of the borrowers who receive loans from the local bank increases by 0.9 percentage
points. This implies tighter lending standards at the local bank and fewer loans for low-
socioeconomics status borrowers. Therefore, even if the bank with the branch increases its
lending to those borrowers, the aggregate effect of the soft information could be negative
due to adverse selection. This is the second prediction of the model, and the results show
that the aggregate effect of any branch type is, in fact, negative.
However, the model also indicates that the effect of adverse selection could be reduced if
lenders have competitive advantages for lending to different types of borrowers. A lender’s
competitive advantage could be in either its cost of lending or the quality of its soft in-
formation signal from a branch. Then under such conditions, lenders could segment the
market, rather than compete directly, and lend to more borrowers overall in equilibrium.
Empirically, this matches the situation in which non-local banks have the advantage of
lower capital costs, but local banks are better at collecting and using soft information. And
indeed, the results show that the presence of a branch owned by a local bank has the least
negative impact on low-socioeconomic status borrowers, most likely because they are able
to cater to that borrower type.
My results suggest that national improvements in mortgage credit access subsequent to
branching deregulation were not driven by increased access to soft information about bor-
rowers surrounding new branches. In fact, that soft information lead to a decrease in
credit access for low-socioeconomic borrowers, which ran counter to that specific mort-
gage market policy goal. However, my results do not necessarily negate the positive effect
of branching deregulation on mortgage credit access found at more aggregate levels. For
instance, branches could increase competition and lower mortgage rates for other borrow-
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ers (Calem 1998), increasing aggregate credit access, while still lowering access for specific
low-socioeconomic borrowers. Furthermore, that outcome could be more efficient for the
neighborhood mortgage market if fewer low credit quality borrowers receive loans.
Previous research on the link between soft information and neighborhood mortgage access
has been hampered by the difficulty of controlling for endogenous branch location at the
neighborhood level. Ergungor (2010) and Nguyen (2016) are the only other studies focused
on measurement of the causal effect and use lagged demographics and branch closings due
to bank mergers, respectively, to instrument for the presence of a branch in a neighborhood.
They find a small, positive effect of the presence of branches on aggregate mortgage credit
access. This study is different because it finds a negative effect using a new instrument based
on the fundamentals of the lender optimization problem and examines the lender-specific
responses that lead to the aggregate effect.
This paper relates to other research on the impact of branches and branching regulation
(Jayaratne and Strahan 2006; Huang 2008; Beck et al. 2010; Kerr and Nanda 2010; Acharya
et al. 2011), soft information in the mortgage market (Keys et al. 2010; Agarwal et al.
2011; Jiang 2013), the impact of CRA lending agreements (Schwartz 1998; Bostic and
Robinson 2003), and the role of geography in economic outcomes (Moretti 2004; Giroud
2013; Carlino and Kerr 2015; Handbury et al. 2016). It shows that adverse selection also
affects mortgage markets with asymmetric information, that the localized nature of soft
information can create that asymmetry, and that instruments based on network density
can be used to make causal estimates of the effects of branches.
2.2. Data
The data used in my study include a much more detailed and nationally representative
sample of loans and branches than any previous study on mortgage credit access. Most
importantly, my data is the first to include information on mortgage brokers and non-bank
lender branches, which now dominate a large portion of the origination market. Approx-
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imately 7,000 mortgage brokerage firms were operating in 1987 and originated around 20
percent of all mortgages. By 2003, the number of brokerage firms had risen to over 50,000
and they originated over 60 percent of all mortgages.38 The inclusion of this data allow me
to make a more accurate and comprehensive analysis of credit access within the prevalent
industry structure.
A neighborhood in my study is defined as a census tract.39 This is a particularly useful unit
of observation, since census tract definitions try to keep population size and demographics
somewhat constant while accounting for man-made and natural formations. Census tracts
typically number less than 8,000 people with an target size around 4,000.40 For each census
tract in each year, I know the exact latitude and longitude location of branches within the
tract and characterisitcs of almost every mortgage application and origination.41 Observa-
tions in the merged data are either for a lender in a census tract in a year or a census tract
in a year, depending on the context.
Mortgage loan origination data span 1994 - 2009 and come from the public use version of
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database. HMDA was passed by Congress in
1975 and requires every lender satisfying any of a broad list of criteria to report every loan
and a set of its characteristics to a central repository.42 The sample of loans contains both
38“Mortgage brokers fall on tough times.” USA Today, Web. 31 Sept 2007.
39Due to census tract definition changes between the 1990 and 2000 censuses, I form consistent geographic
units with the census tract relationship file. Census tracts from 1990 and 2000 are assigned to the smallest
geographic area that can be held constant across the censuses. This results in an average “tract” size that
is slightly larger than census tracts in either the 1990 or 2000 files.
40Median census tract size is about 2 square miles. I drop census tracts in the top 5 percent of the size
distribution, as these are not suited to my spatial analysis. For more information, see https://www.census.
gov/geo/reference/pdfs/GARM/Ch10GARM.pdf
41The are several minor datasets I do not detail. Shape files for census tracts for the 1990 and 2000
Census definitions come from the National Historical Geographic Information System. Relationship files for
standardizing tract definitions across Census years come from the United States Census Bureau. Reports
of Condition and Income (Call Reports) from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council were
used in matching regulatory identification numbers between the FDIC and HMDA data. The 2009 5-year
American Community Survey dataset was used to collect one time demographic information on census tracts.
Property deeds records collected by DataQuick were used to calculate the 3-year cumulative foreclosure rate.
Their geographic coverage is less extensive than HMDA and concentrated in more populated areas. Data
Quick does not have a common identifier with the mortgage loan or branch data, and so I can only calculate
foreclosure rates at the neighborhood and not the neighborhood by lender level.
42For more information on criteria see the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s report A
Guide to HMDA Reporting: Getting it Right! at http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/guide.pdf
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purchase and refinance loans, first liens and junior liens. The estimated coverage of HMDA
data for first-lien purchase originations is around or over 90 percent for my sample period
(Scheessele 1998). My own estimates for other loan types show similar coverage.43
Data on mortgage broker and non-bank lender branches come from the Nationwide Mort-
gage Licensing System (NMLS) maintained by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors.44
The NMLS data contain licensing information at the company, branch, and loan officer
level. A snapshot from the earliest, nationally comprehensive data provides the stock of
these licenses since 2008 at each level, nationwide. There are several limitations to the
NMLS data. Due to varying licensing regulations at the state level before 2008, the ex-
istence of each branch and its dates of operation are calculated through a combination of
office licenses and individual licenses for individuals working at each location.4546 A further
limitation is that branches that closed before 2008 are not in this database. In comparison
to outside estimates of the size of this industry, the 2008 NMLS data contain about half
the number of these companies in operation at the height of the housing boom.47
A number of stand-alone lenders have large retail operations.48 The distribution of NMLS
network size is presented graphically in Figure 2. From 1994 to 2009, the size of the largest
network grows from around 200 branches to over 900 branches, shown by the lightest dashed
line. There are also many small lender branch networks. The average size, shown by the
43HMDA refinance loans and junior liens were matched to public record files compiled by DataQuick
44This database was created in the wake of the recent housing crisis by the Secure and Fair Enforcement
for Mortgage Licensing Act (SAFE) of 2008. The SAFE Act created national licensing standards for entities
and individuals involved in the mortgage origination process and requires state agencies to provide such
information to the NMLS database.
45See the excellent compilation of state regulations from 1996 - 2006 from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4983&
46Branch licenses only list the issue date of the license, which may only be issued once states require
branch licensing. Individual licenses list both the issue date and the date at which the employee began
working at her current location. For some states with strict licensing requirements well before 2008, such as
California, I am confident of calculating the correct establishment date. For other states, such as Alaska,
which had no licensing standard of any kind before 2008, the establishment date is less precise. Most states
fall somewhere in the middle of these two extremes.
47Adding data for companies before 2008, assuming it did and continues to exist, would require separate
Freedom of Information Act requests to each individual state regulatory agency. Therefore, despite its
limitations the NMLS data is the best source for information on the location and operation of non-bank
branches.
48For example, American Pacific Mortgage operates almost 300 branches in my data.
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green dashed line, goes from less than 1.5 branches to almost 2 branches by 2009.
The rise in importance of mortgage brokers and non-bank lenders to the mortgage market is
highlighted by Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows that in 1994, my data contain less than 4,000
unique firms. That number climbs to over 20,000 by 2009. This steady increase through the
housing bust reflects the survivorship bias in my sample of these firms.49 Figure 4 shows
how many branch locations mortgage brokers and non-bank lenders owned at each point in
my sample. From 1994 to 2009 these firms went from operating 5,000 branches to almost
40,000 branches.
Bank branch networks and the number of bank branches exhibit similar trends as in the
NMLS data. Data on bank branches from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
(FDIC) Summary of Deposits database from 1994 - 2009 are summarized in Figures 5
and 6.50 The database includes information on every bank branch with federally insured
deposits. The information at the branch level includes address, branch type, specialty,
date established, and date acquired. Information on the bank, bank holding company,
and regulator of the branch is also included. Through available identifiers, I am able to
match each bank directly to the loans it originates, but unfortunately not to the branch of
origination.
In my analysis, I classify branches both by type of lender and the size of the network to
which they belong. There are four types: general service bank branches, bank branches
specializing in mortgages, broker branches, and non-bank lender branches. Bank branches
are classified as mortgage specialists if they are classified that way in the FDIC data at
least half of the time they are in operation. About 26,000 branches, or 8 percent of bank
branches, receive this classification. A branch is defined as belonging to a mortgage broker if
that company is ever issued a license from a state that licenses mortgage brokers as distinct
49Firms with the poorest mortgage practices and located in the hardest hit areas are likely underrepre-
sented due to failure before 2008.
50Under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994, banks for the first time
were allowed to widely own and acquire other banks across state lines and to operate and open new branches
across state lines. For details see Johnson and Rice (2007).
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from mortgage lenders (about half of states).51 About two-thirds of the NMLS branches are
then classified as mortgage broker branches. For bank branches, I also make a distinction by
network size. Local branches are branches with fewer than 37 branches when I first observe
them – this is the 99th percentile for network size in 1994. About half of bank branches are
local.52
Table 1 provides yearly summary statistics on the mortgage characteristics in census tracts.
The first two columns show that during the boom, lenders were more likely to sell origina-
tions into the secondary mortgage market. Changes in the 3-year foreclosure rate are shown
in columns 3 and 4. The median here reflects the cycle of boom and bust, but the stan-
dard deviation highlights the extreme variance in foreclosure rates across neighborhoods.
Columns 5 - 8 show that the reported income of borrowers during the boom fell, although
more of them received conventional loans (as opposed to government financed mortgages
like those from the VA or FHA).
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the stock of branches and mortgage demand and
supply by year for the 55,000 census tracts in my sample. The first two columns examine
the stock of branches within a census tract. From this, it is easy to see that the vast
majority of census tracts have a small number of branches. Over time, the average and
standard deviation of the stock of branches goes up, indicating that new branch openings
are concentrated in a subset of the census tracts. The remaining columns show statistics
for log originations, log applications, and the percent of applications denied. They show a
pattern consistent with recent housing history, in which credit access was reduced slightly
during the downturn around 2000 and severely during the recent crisis. Overall, these two
tables match many of the well documented statistics about the mortgage market over the
recent cycle (Mian and Sufi 2011; Ferreira and Gyourko 2011).
51This likely causes some miss-classification of NMLS lenders. Results are not sensitive to other classifi-
cation rules.
52Mortgage brokers and non-bank lenders are not separated by network size – 90 percent would qualify
as local.
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2.3. Model
In this section, I develop a two-lender model of neighborhood mortgage credit demand and
supply to show how asymmetric soft information can affect lenders’ credit standards and
motivate my choice of empirical specifications.53 The key insight from the model is that
imperfect information about borrower quality drives a wedge between the cost of the loan to
the lender and the mortgage rates available to borrowers. I call this wedge the information
markup. Adverse selection due to asymmetric information changes the information markup
charged by each lender, leading to changes in lender specific and aggregate credit access. I
combine this model of mortgage credit demand and supply with a model of branch network
optimization to show that lenders maximize profit by reducing network costs through higher
density, the basis for my identification strategy.
In the first stage of the model, each lender decides whether to operate a branch in a neighbor-
hood versus lend without one. Subsequently, households sequentially search for a mortgage
from lenders originating loans in their neighborhood. Once contacted, lenders and borrow-
ers receive a signal of a borrowers’ credit quality. Lenders with a branch produce a higher
quality signal due to the availability of soft information. Lenders then decide whether to
make an initial mortgage offer to the borrower. If an offer is made, the borrower can accept
or pay the search cost to seek other offers. Households with multiple offers hold an auction.
Household search concludes once every household has a mortgage or has left the market.
2.3.1. Households
Consider a neighborhood with a unit mass of households, indexed by i, whose utility depends
on housing consumption, Mi  {0, 1}, and non-housing consumption, ci > 0. Households
53My model adapts prior theoretical research (beginning with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) to a mortgage
market with imperfect information. The search and negotiation behavior of consumers when search is costly
has been well explored (Burdett and Judd 1983; Wolinsky 1987; Bester 1988). A strategy of sequential search
with a reservation price and auction is close to the optimal strategy described in McAfee and McMillion
(1987). In the mortgage market, Allen et al. (2014) use a similar model to explain dispersion in mortgage
interest rates. Finally, I follow tradition in the small business literature and use signals of borrower credit
quality to proxy for information quality (Broeckner 1990; Hauswald and Marquez 2006).
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are risk neutral and identical in their income, I, marginal utility of housing, µ > 1, and
mortgage search costs, ρ. They only differ in their creditworthiness, θi  {θh, θl}, in that
high credit quality households of type θh always repay their mortgage and low credit quality
households of type θl always default.
Households in a neighborhood choose whether to buy one of the identically and perfectly
elastically supplied houses available at a normalized price of 1. Households must take out a
mortgage from a lender operating in that neighborhood to completely finance the purchase
of the house. Households who do not take out a mortgage only purchase non-housing
consumption.
The household utility maximization problem takes the form:
max
0≤ci≤Ii,Mi=0,1
ci + µMi (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint:
I − ci − reθiMi ≥ 0. (2.2)
where reθi is the effective interest rate they face after n searches for a mortgage. Search for
a mortgage is conducted sequentially, with households matched randomly to their initial
lender and to the remaining lenders during any additional search.54 Consumers will accept
the mortgage contract if condition (2) holds, in equilibrium they do not expect to receive a
better rate by searching further, and paying for the mortgage is utility maximizing:
(µ− reθi)1{Mi = 1} > 0. (2.3)
54This choice is due to the substantial search frictions in the mortgage market – consumers are generally
confused about the origination process and comparing options requires contacting each lender individually
(Woodward and Hall 2010 and 2012; Allen et al. 2014). Furthermore, a recent survey from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau found that half of borrowers apply to only one lender.
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2.3.2. Lenders
On the supply side, lenders (indexed by j) observe the I, µ, and ρ of the neighborhood.
They also observe the quantity of θh and θl households in the neighborhood, but not the
θi of an individual household. Lenders face a cost of supplying a loan, c
j
θi
> 0, and offer
interest rates such that the expected profits are non-negative for each borrower. Lenders
have access to a screening technology that produces a signal, ηj , that a borrower is of type
θh or θl. The signal, however, is imperfect. Let q
j = Pr(ηj = θh|θi = θh) = Pr(ηj =
θl|θi = θl) be the quality of the signal. Lenders have the option of opening a branch in the
neighborhood, which improves their screening technology through the availability of soft
information. Thus, qj is a function of branch presence such that qj(b = 1) > qj(b = 0). The
opening of a branch incurs a cost, τ jvj , where vj is the cost of operating the branch and τ j
is the distance to the existing branch network. Conditional on their branch entry decision,
lenders will offer interest rates that maximize expected revenue, meaning:
max
0<rjθi
≤1
Pr(θi = θh|ηji = θi)rjθi (2.4)
such that the borrowers accept (meaning (2) and (3) hold) and expected revenue is greater
than the cost of funding the loan:
Pr(θi = θh|ηji = θi)rjθi ≥ c
j
θi
(2.5)
2.3.3. Mortgage Negotiation
Prospective borrowers and lenders participate in a game with the following stages. The
game is solved by backward induction.
1. Lenders decide if they should open a branch in the neighborhood, paying cost τ jvj to
gain access to a higher quality signal of household type.
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2. Households are matched randomly with one of the lenders and they each receive the
same signal of household type. Each Lender makes an initial offer to each borrower
such that expected profits are non-negative.
3. Households decide based on their type signal and initial offer if they should search for
an additional offer from another lender. Those that do search pay the search cost.
4. Households with multiple offers receive a new offer of the lowest possible interest rate
from the lowest cost lender. If both lenders have the same lowest offer, households
choose one randomly.
5. Continue this way until all borrowers receive a mortgage or have left the market.
2.3.4. Solving the Simple Game:
I consider the simplest version of the model, in which there are only two lenders operating
in a neighborhood with equal costs of supplying a loan to both borrower types and opening
a branch. The full details of solving this simple model can be found in Appendix C.
In the two cases of either no lender operating a branch or two lenders operating branches,
there is no information asymmetry. Households who receive a signal that they are type θh
know that they will not receive a better interest rate through searching, while those with a
signal of type θl may search if the expected gains are high enough, i.e. when search costs are
low, the marginal utility of owning is high, or incomes are high. Using Bayes’ theorem I can
solve for the lenders’ lowest rate they are initially willing to offer borrowers with ηj = θi:
rjθh =

c[1 + θlθh
1−q
q
1+q
2−q ] if η
−j
i = θl, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
1−q
q ] otherwise
(2.6)
rjθl =

c[1 + θlθh
q
1−q
1+q
2−q ] if η
−j
i = θl, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
q
1−q ] otherwise
(2.7)
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The second term inside the brackets in equations (6) and (7), is the information markup and
captures the negative relationship between information quality and rates. With full infor-
mation about borrowers, lenders could offer rates at cost for θh households and deny loans
for θl households. When household type is uncertain, the information markup increases
with the proportion of type θl borrowers in the neighborhood and further increases if they
are expected to apply to both lenders (when η−ji = θl, n = 1). But as screening technology
improves, households with ηj = θh receive lower rates and households with η
j
i = θl receive
higher rates. Of course, the lender may be able to charge borrowers interest rates above
the minimum and increase profits if I, µ, or ρ are high.
In the case in which only one lender, say L1, decides to operate a branch, that lender
will have better information about borrower type than the other lender, say L2. Here,
borrowers of type θl who are matched with the L1 may decide to search and receive a lower
offer from the less informed lender, L2, who would be less certain that they are of type θl.
And borrowers of type θh who are initially matched with L2, may also decide to search and
receive a lower offer from L1, who would be more certain that they are of type θh. In this
case, each lender’s lowest rate they are initially willing to offer will be:
r1θh =

c[1 + θlθh
1−q1
q1
1−q2
1+q2
] if η2i = θh, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
1−q1
q1
] otherwise
(2.8)
r1θl =

c[1 + θlθh
q1
1−q1
2−q2
1+q2
] if η2i = θh, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
q1
1−q1 ] otherwise
(2.9)
r2θh =

c[1 + θlθh
1−q2
q2
1+q1
2−q1 ] if η
1
i = θl, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
1−q2
q2
] otherwise
(2.10)
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r2θl =

c[1 + θlθh
q2
1−q2
1+q1
2−q1 ] if η
1
i = θl, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
q2
1−q2 ] otherwise
(2.11)
Searching amounts to multiplying the information markup by an additional term. In the
case of L1, when households with η2i = θh are part of its applicant pool, it raises the
average quality and thus lowers the rates it needs to charge households with both signal
types. Conversely, when households with η1i = θl are part of L2’s applicant pool, it lowers
the average quality and necessitates a rise in interest rates for households with both signal
types. This is a clear illustration of how asymmetric soft information can lead to an adverse
selection problem.
Given the number of branches, the overall amount of credit in neighborhood i, is determined
by the rates offered by each lender as a function of θh, θl, I, µ, and ρ (See Appendix C for
the equation which gives the equilibrium amount of credit). If rjθh and r
j
θl
are low enough,
then all borrowers will want a mortgage. If both are too high, then there will be no mortgage
demand. And if only rjθh is low enough, then only borrowers who receive at least one signal
that they are of type θh will demand mortgages.
The most important fact highlighted by the model is that the soft information acquired
by lenders through branches does not unambiguously increase credit access for all types of
borrowers. Moving from no branches to one or two branches, unambiguously lowers rates
for θh borrowers, but raises rates for θl borrowers. These offsetting effects could cause the
presence of a branch to lower the aggregate number of borrowers who receive credit.
2.3.5. Branch Entry
It remains to determine which lenders will open a branch in the neighborhood. Denote
pije(bj , b−j) as the expected profit from mortgages of lender j given its own and competitor
−j’s entry decision. Lenders face the following game matrix to determine equilibrium entry:
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L1
Branch Not
L2
Branch pi1e(1, 1)− τ1v, pi2e(1, 1)− τ2v pi1e(0, 1), pi2e(1, 0)− τ2v
Not pi1e(1, 0)− τ1v, pi2e(0, 1) pi1e(0, 0), pi2e(0, 0)
The payoffs reflect that building a branch in neighborhood i will have a higher payoff in
areas with higher expected demand, more high quality borrowers, higher incomes, higher
marginal utility from housing, and higher search costs. Such neighborhoods allow lenders
to sell more loans and at rates above their expected cost. The payoff matrix also shows
that profits are higher when neighborhood n is closer to lender j’s network, due to the
assumption that cost increases with distance τ j .
2.3.6. Predictions
The model gives a set of predictions about where branches should locate and their effect
on mortgage credit if that effect works through the use of soft information. The first two
focus on detecting the presence and effect of adverse selection and the third on causal
identification:
1. Lenders prefer to locate branches in locations that fit into a dense network of branches,
have less competition, and more profitable borrowers.
2. Lenders operating branches will extend more credit to borrowers with low-quality
hard information. Lenders without a branch will lend less to these borrowers when
their competitors operate a branch.
3. The aggregate credit response to a branch is ambiguous, and depends on the combined
positive and negative responses of individual lenders.
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2.4. Identification and Empirical Approach
The model highlights the central identification challenge of isolating the causal effect of
branch presence on credit outcomes. While branches may affect credit access through the
availability of soft information, high credit demand and potential profits themselves may
encourage entry. Therefore, any simple regression of credit outcomes on branch presence
will necessarily be biased, most likely toward increased credit access. This can be seen by
writing a linearized version of the quantity of credit, Qnt, in equilibrium for neighborhood
n at time t:
Qnt = β0pint(I, µ, ρ, θh) + β1Branch
1
nt + β2Branch
2
nt + unt (2.12)
where pint(I, µ, ρ, θh) is the profitability of neighborhood n, Branch
j
nt is an indicator for
whether or not lender j has a branch in neighborhood n at time t, and unt is an iid error
term. The profitability of the neighborhood is observable to the lenders, but not to the
econometrician. Being unable to control for it, a regression which omits it will necessarily
be biased, as en = un + β0pint(I, µ, ρ, θh) will covary with each Branch
j
nt.
My identification strategy relies on the property that lenders are more profitable when
they build dense networks of branches to minimize the operating costs, τ jnvj . Therefore,
neighborhood distance from the existing network will be an important factor in the branch
entry decision.
Branchjnt = Γ0pint(I, µ, ρ, θh) + Γ1Branch
−j
nt + Γ2τ
j
nt + vnt (2.13)
I argue that the distance from existing branch networks is a strong predictor of branch
presence in a neighborhood, but is not related to the credit conditions of that neighborhood.
More formally, that Cov(vjnt, ent) ≈ 0.55 This is because the vast majority of lenders in my
sample were founded well before my sample period, based on the economic environment
55It is unlikely that this covariance is exactly zero due to long run persistence in local economic growth,
foresight by lenders, etc., but it is assumed to be small.
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of that time and not today. Subsequently, it would be very difficult for lenders to quickly
respond to changing economic conditions due to the large financial and regulatory fixed
costs of branch network adjustment.5657
To illustrate this point, the data in my sample show that in a year a lender opens an average
of only 0.3 branches, about 9 percent of their total stock. And, on average, only 15 percent
of lenders open one or more branches in any year. Closings are even more rare. On average,
0.13 branches are closed per lender each year, about 0.7 percent of their existing stock. This
slow adjustment process inhibits lenders’ ability to open and close branches based solely on
short-term mortgage profitability. Thus, distance between the neighborhood and lender j’s
existing network of branches can serve as a valid instrument for the presence of lender j’s
branch in neighborhood n.
Furthermore, I can show that distance predicts branch presence through my entire sample,
not just branch reorganization after mergers. If I exclude years after 2002 (when a wave of
bank mergers began) or major mergers during that time period, my instruments are actually
stronger (see Appendix B). This suggests that my instruments capture a more fundamental
feature of the branch location decision that instead supports instruments based on bank
mergers, rather than the other way around. Specifically, that the openings and closings of
branches post-merger are exogenous to local economic outcomes because the combined firm
must re-optimize the entire branch network to fully exploit economies of density. However,
my instrument allows me to study the effect of any branch and not just those affected by
bank mergers.
56Bancography, a consulting firm specializing in branch planning, has conducted several surveys
of the start-up costs for a new branch. Physical capital costs for a free-standing branch, includ-
ing construction, equipment, and furniture, typically range from $1 - $1.5 million dollars. Other
start-up costs include land and the hiring and training of new staff. For more information, see
http://www.bancography.com/downloads/Bancology0803.pdf
57The requirements for opening, relocating, or closing a bank branch depend on the bank’s regulatory
agency. To open a new branch, a bank submits an application that often requires such information as
compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act, an environmental impact statement, and satisfaction
of local zoning regulations. To close a branch, a bank typically must give at least 90 days notice to the
regulatory agency and its customers.
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Apart from the endogeneity of branch location, the causal interpretation of my results is
threatened by other neighborhood features that affect neighborhood mortgage activity and
branch location decisions. The panel structure of my data allows me to circumvent any that
are fixed at the neighborhood, neighborhood by lender and/or year levels using fixed effects.
This demeaning removes the omitted variables bias from any factor that remains fixed at
the fixed effect level and affects mortgage outcomes.58 My coefficients are then identified
off of the deviations from the mean of a mortgage outcome for a neighborhood (or lender
in a neighborhood) in a year from deviations in the mean predicted stock of branches (or
branches owned by a lender) in a neighborhood in a year. Given the thousands of fixed
effects that this sometimes entails, my estimates will be subject to attenuation bias and
should be interpreted with this in mind.
Beyond these causal concerns, attributing my estimates to the presence of soft information
is its own identification challenge. In the mortgage market, soft information is derived from
features – the stability of the borrower’s income, her character, the quality of the mortgage
collateral, etc. – that are inherently difficult to quantify (Stein 2002; Keys et al. 2010;
Agarwal et al 2011). Therefore, I rely on a pair of proxy variables that should be affected
by the use of soft information by lenders to detect its influence. Specifically, I measure the
percent of originations sold to the secondary market, because lenders may sell more of their
loans (avoiding future losses from defaults) if they have low confidence in borrower credit
quality (Keys et al. 2010). In addition, I measure cumulative foreclosure rates three years
after origination as an ex post measure of the use of soft information, under the assumption
that higher quality mortgages will default less often. Then, I can use changes in these proxy
variables to infer the effects of soft-information on low socioeconomic status borrowers, as
characterized by their income and qualification for conventional loans.59
58Of course, fixed effects do not remove the bias from omitted variables that vary over time and are
correlated with both lender branch presence and mortgage outcomes and are unrelated to branch network
optimization. Ideally, I would control for the variables that I show correlate with branch location decisions,
but these census tract level statistics are only available in decadal census years. To the extent that census
tract population, income, and other features are relatively invariant in the short term, much of their effect
should be captured in the fixed effects.
59To qualify for a conventional loan, a borrower must meet certain eligibility and financing requirements
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In addition to the use of proxy variables, I work toward being able to attribute my findings
to soft information by focusing on a set of census tracts with a very clear information
structure that matches my model. These are census tracts that have zero branches in 1994
and either never experience a branch opening or transition from zero to one branch. This
means that at the beginning of my sample, in these tracts, no lender has an informational
advantage and, in those where one branch is later established, one lender clearly gains a
soft informational advantage over all others. Then, any change in my outcome variables
due to a change in the information structure between lenders is most likely caused by the
soft-information collected by that branch.60 Focusing on this sub-sample has additional
advantages in that (1) they are predominately rural and less likely to be affected by nearby
dense branch networks, (2) best match the simple model on which my predictions are based,
and (3) are the type of neighborhoods that policies encouraging branching are intended to
help. Figure 1 gives the location of the census tracts.
Turning to my empirical approach, I capture the density of a lender’s branches around a
neighborhood by the number of a lender’s branches within rings of distance from a neigh-
borhood: from 5-10, 10-20, 20-50, and 50-100 miles away. Likewise for competitor density.
Overall distance is captured by two features: neighborhood distance from the geographic
center of the branch network and the standard distance between branches in the network.
Standard distance is a measure of geographic spread; networks which are more spread out,
conditional on branch location, can build new branches that are farther away without low-
ering network density.
At the aggregate tract level, I use instruments that try to capture both the density of
nearby branches and the density of individual lenders. To this goal, I use the total number
of branches within the same rings of distance from the census tract centroid, the number of
that may be difficult for low-socioeconomic status borrowers to meet. For more on these requirements see
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/eligibility information/eligibility-matrix.pdf
60Studying different combinations of lenders with and without branches is also practically difficult, because
there are not enough of these transitions to detect any statistically significant results. By far the most
common transition is from 0 to 1 branch.
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lenders operating at least 5 branches within those rings, and the number of network centers
that are located within each of those rings. For instruments for a particular branch type, I
amend this by using the number of lenders operating at least 2 branches of that type in each
ring. I use this smaller number since each branch type is less common than any individual
branch.61
I now lay out the estimating equations that will build evidence for the effect of soft infor-
mation on local mortgage markets. They are based on the predictions from the model of
section IV and my strategies for dealing with the identification challenges posed by lender
branch endogeneity and attribution to soft information.
2.4.1. Endogeneity of branch location choice
The first hypothesis is that lenders prefer to locate in neighborhoods with more profitable
borrowers and lower network costs from branch network density. This provides evidence for
the existence of the endogeneity problem and for the relevance of my instruments. I run
equations of the form:
Branchesitj = Σ
N
n=1βnNetDistnitj + Σ
M
n=1βmCompDistmit−j + λXi + φj + γt (2.14)
where Branchesitj is the number of branches operated in neighborhood i at time t by
lender j, the coefficient βn measures the coefficient on NetDistnitj (one of N measures of
distance to the lender’s own branch network), the coefficient βm measures the coefficient on
CompDistmitj (one of M measures of distance to the competing branch networks), and λ
is a vector of coefficients on the set of Xi demographics that correspond to income, search
costs, and the propensity to demand a mortgage. The Xi variables do not vary over time,
and so this specification does not include fixed effects for each census tract, but does include
lender and year fixed effects, φj and γt. Due to this data limitation, the primary purpose
of this specification is to highlight the endogeneity of branch location choice.
61In Appendix B, I provide a version of my results where I construct a predicted number of branches for
each lender in a census tract and then use the sum as the predicted aggregate number of branches in a
census tract. The results are widely consistent with my main set of tract level instruments.
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2.4.2. First-stage estimates.
The instrument lender-specific versions that do serve as the first stage are given by:
̂Branchesitj = ΣNn=1βnNetDistnitj + ΣMm=1βmCompDistmit−j + αij + γt (2.15)
̂Branchesit−j = ΣNn=1βnNetDistnitj + ΣMm=1βmCompDistmit−j + αij + γt (2.16)
where the αij are lender by census tract fixed effects.
The first stage for the aggregate number of branches in a tract, regardless of lender, is the
predicted number of aggregate branches given by:
B̂ranchit = Σ
P
p=1βpNetDistpit + αi + γt (2.17)
where βp is the coefficient on NetDistpit (one of P measures of distance to any lender branch
networks).
For regressions that look at a specific branch type or multiple lenders operating branches,
the equations are analogous to (15) - (17) with T̂ ypeit or ̂Competitorsit substituted for
B̂ranchit and independent variables adjusted accordingly.
2.4.3. Lender-specific effects
The second hypothesis is that lenders operating a branch in a neighborhood are able to
screen out and lend to more high-quality borrowers with low-quality hard information be-
cause they now have access to their soft information. Additionally, when a competitor bank
opens a branch, banks lend less to low-quality hard information borrowers and retreat to
borrowers with higher hard information quality. For the subsample of banks with branches
(the only lenders for whom I can match mortgage information) I run equations of the form:
Yitj = β1 ̂Branchesitj + β2 ̂Branchesit−j + αij + γt (2.18)
74
where Yitj is a mortgage outcome, Branchesit−j is the number of branches in neighborhood
i at time t operated by other other −j lenders.
2.4.4. Hypothesis 3: Aggregate effects
The third and final hypothesis is that presence of a branch has an ambiguous effect on
overall credit access, and may depend on the type and size of the lender operating the
branch (results from the modification of the model to include these variations are found
in Appendix C). For the subsample containing tracts before or while they have their first
branch, I estimate equations of the form:
Yit = β1B̂ranchit + αi + γt (2.19)
where Yit is the aggregate mortgage outcome from neighborhood i at time t and αi and γt
measure census tract and year fixed effect.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Endogeneity of branch location choice
Evidence of the branch location endogeneity problem is useful for showing that an identi-
fication strategy is necessary for finding causal effects and for setting expectations about
the direction of bias in OLS estimates. The evidence presented here is that lenders choose
branch locations based on the profitability of local borrowers, even after controlling for the
location of local branch networks. The results in Table 3 show that lenders have a strong
preference for locating branches in census tracts with more households, higher household
income, and prefer whiter neighborhoods – which also tend to be wealthier.62 There is also
a strong negative correlation with owner-occupancy, suggesting that lenders prefer to locate
branches in areas with more potential mortgage demand. Overall, lenders are clearly opting
62The percent of households with a degree was included as a possible correlate of search costs, assuming
a high concentration of households without degrees would indicate an area with less knowledge about the
mortgage market. I find almost no correlation, which is somewhat unsurprising given the difficulty of
measuring search costs at the neighborhood level. But, it at least appears that lenders do not avoid areas
with less educated households, holding other features fixed.
75
to locate in more profitable neighborhoods.
This preference for profitable neighborhoods implies that OLS estimates of the effect of
branch presence will be biased toward greater mortgage access and higher borrower quality.
For example, in tracts with a growing population of profitable borrowers, lenders should
sell fewer loans to the secondary market, experience lower foreclosure rates, lend to more
borrowers with higher incomes, and originate more loans as conventional. When lenders
locate branches in these tracts, OLS results at any level of aggregation will reflect that bias
for each outcome.
As predicted, the OLS results for lender-specific and aggregate mortgage effects do suggest
that branches expand mortgage access and shift lending to more profitable borrowers. In
Table 4, I show that a lender’s own branches and competitors’ branches both have a positive
correlation with a lender’s supply of loans to a neighborhood. Furthermore, the sign of the
coefficient on percent sold, three-year foreclosure rates, and percent conventional are all
in the direction of the expected bias. In Table 5, OLS results for census tracts without
a previous branch show a similar pattern and, most importantly, that branches increase
aggregate credit access in these tracts. Together, a naive interpretation of these results
could be that branches improve credit access for borrowers – perhaps through the effects of
competition and the collection of soft information.
2.5.2. First-stage estimates
Identification of the causal effect of branch presence in this study depends on the relevance
of my network density instruments. I find that the density of branches surrounding a tract
has a strong and highly statistically significant impact on the presence of a lender’s branches
in a census tract. Columns 1-4 of Table 6 show that the presence of a lender’s own branches
in each ring of distance has an independent effect on their own branch presence. And
column 5 shows that these coefficients are very stable when measures of distance to the
overall network and competitors’ branches are included. The density of branches around
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a census tract similarly determines competitors’ presence, except that competitors prefer
locations away from another lender and near their own branches. These differential effects
suggest that, despite being predicted by the same set of instruments, the predicted number
of own and competitor branches will be well identified.
Instruments based on overall branch and lender density for the presence of any branch in the
subsample of tracts before and after their first branch also satisfy the relevance condition.
Table 7 shows that the strongest instruments for the first branch are the density of branches
around the tract and the number of lenders operating at least 5 branches in each ring of
distance from the tract centroid. The number of branch network centers in each ring of
distance is not as strong a set of instruments, but given the relevance of very close centers
5-10 miles away, I also include these instruments in my estimation. Column 4 shows the
combined significance of my preferred set of instruments and serves as the first stage for
estimating the effect of branches in these tracts. Other first stage instruments with similar
evidence can be found in Appendix A.
The instrumented branch variables mean that the IV results will rely on different variation
in the data to identify causal effects. The lender-specific IV results will be identified off of
the differences in a specific lender’s mortgage outcomes in tracts that have different numbers
of predicted branches for each lender, rather than their actual number of branches in each
tract. Similarly, the aggregate IV results will be identified off of the difference in aggregate
mortgage outcomes in tracts with different numbers of predicted total branches, rather the
actual total number of branches in each tract. These predictions from the instruments
correct for the endogeneity of branch location choice and allow for the causal interpretation
of the second-stage estimates. The comparison of the OLS and IV estimates for the effect
of branches on lender-specific and aggregate lending will show that these instruments are
key to capturing the true effect of branches on local mortgage outcomes.
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2.5.3. Lender-specific effects
The IV results for all banks, reported in Table 8, provide strong evidence that lenders
respond to the presence of their own and competing branches as if branches provide an
informational advantage. The IV results still show that a one-standard deviation increase
in a bank’s predicted branches in a census tract increases their lending overall and to more
profitable borrowers, consistent with the findings from the OLS results. However, the effect
of competing bank branches is very different. The IV results show that, rather than having
almost no effect (as in the OLS results), competing bank branches increase the denial rates
of other lenders and shift their lending toward more conventional borrowers, who must have
high-quality hard information to qualify for those loans. These effects are consistent with an
adverse selection problem due to informational asymmetries in borrower soft information.
Separating banks into local and non-local banks and branches by their specialty produces
results that suggest organizational structure affects the informational advantage conveyed by
branches. In particular, branches owned by local banks and specializing in mortgages appear
to use soft information to significantly increase lending to low-quality hard-information
borrowers. As seen in Panel A of Table 9, a one standard deviation increase in these
branches leads to a decrease of 0.9 percentage points for conventional mortgages and a
decrease in average income of 0.9 percentage points (about $1,000). Despite the decrease in
the observational quality of borrowers this implies, local banks appear to view these loans
as more profitable since they decrease the percent sold by 3.1 percentage points.
In contrast, other branches appear to be be used by lenders to primarily cream-skim high-
quality hard information borrowers. For example, Panel B of Table 9 shows that for non-
local banks, a one standard deviation increase in the presence of either branch type has a
large negative impact on the percent of loans sold to the secondary market and foreclosure
rates, driven by a shift to more borrowers that qualify for conventional loans. These dif-
ferential effects of lender size and branch type are consistent with the hypothesis that the
effects of soft information are strongest in cases where lenders have the skill and ability to
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process it.
The patterns in individual bank total mortgage supply and demand provide additional
evidence that adverse selection drives this lending behavior. In the last three columns of
Table 9, it is clear that branches can be a powerful way to attract and choose borrowers from
a larger pool of applicants. Applications, total originations, and denial rates all increase
for every own branch type – except for mortgage branches owned by local lenders which
show no change. But the more important point is that applications and denial rates also
increase with the number of competing branches, regardless of bank size. The matching and
searching of borrowers for lenders described in the model seems like the best explanation for
this fact; more low-quality applicants could be applying to lenders without branches after
receiving less attractive offers from lenders with branches.
2.5.4. Aggregate effects
Given the potentially offsetting effects of different lenders with and without branches, the
expected aggregate effect of a branch on mortgage origination features and credit access
is unclear. Empirically, it could be positive or negative. Using the subsample of census
tracts before and after they acquire their first branch, I first estimate the instrumented
aggregate effect of a bank branch when branches owned by mortgage brokers and non-
bank lenders are excluded from the analysis. Table 10 shows no evidence that the adverse
selection harms aggregate credit access. In fact, the average income of borrowers decreases
by 5.7 percentage points, suggesting that branches do shift lending toward low-quality hard
information borrowers. Ending the investigation here would, again, lead to the conclusion
that even if adverse selection affects individual lenders, the aggregate effect of branches is
to improve access for low-socioeconomic status borrowers.
However, excluding points of mortgage access from the analysis may create measurement
error that biases the true effect. Like banks, non-banks lenders and mortgage brokers en-
dogenously choose the location of their branches. For example, if they prefer higher (lower)
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income neighborhoods, then the miss-measurement of the aggregate number of branches will
be higher (lower) in those neighborhoods. The non-negative correlation between income and
the size of the error term will then bias the effect of a branch.
In fact, once mortgage broker and non-bank branches are included in the aggregate analysis,
I find strong evidence of an adverse selection problem in this subsample. The first column of
Table 11 shows that a one standard deviation increase in branches causes a 4.2 percentage
point decrease in the total percent of loans sold to the secondary market. This can be
explained by lenders’ dramatic shift toward high-quality hard information borrowers. In
aggregate, average borrower income increased by 10.2 percentage points and the percent
originated as conventional increased by 9.0 percentage points. Though the increase in
foreclosure rates of 1.9 percentage points suggests that higher quality was not entirely borne
out, overall these results suggest that the introduction of a branch into a neighborhood
without a previous branch reduces credit access for low socioeconomic status borrowers.
Separating branches by type and lender size again uncovers significant heterogeneity that
supports soft information as the force driving these effects. As shown in Table 12, in tracts
without a previous branch, general service bank branches shift credit away most strongly
from borrowers with low-quality hard information. A one standard deviation increase in
general service bank branches increases average borrower income by 31.8 percentage points
and increases the percent of loans originated as conventional by 16.6 percentage points.
The same problem affects census tracts that receive a bank branch specializing in mort-
gages and, more significantly, causes a 2.7 percentage point increase in percent sold to the
secondary market and 1.8 percentage point decrease in three-year foreclosure rates. The
strong effect for these two measures, in particular, suggests that lenders perceive competing
mortgage branches to convey such a significant advantage that their mortgages from that
neighborhood should be moved out of portfolio to avoid losses. Given that these branches
are more likely to have the in-house expertise to collect and use soft information, the soft
information is a likely mechanism for changes in lender behavior in response to branches.
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Additional support for the view that soft information through branches drives lender behav-
ior is seen in the response to branches owned by local banks. I find that market segmentation
is the dominate result, rather than adverse selection, when that general service or mortgage
bank branch is owned by a small, local bank.63 In Table 12, the coefficients on the effect
of a local branch move the total effect for a local mortgage or general service bank branch
back toward zero. For mortgage branches owned by a local lender, the combined effect
is a decrease of 0.3 percentage points for percent sold, indicating greater overall expected
profitability. Furthermore, being a local branch reduces the increase in average borrower
income to only 7.3 percentage points and the percent originated as conventional to 6.5 per-
centage points. The less severe adverse selection is consistent with local banks’ ability to
use soft information to specialize in low-quality hard information borrowers and segment
the market rather than compete directly with non-local lenders.
The effect of branches on aggregate mortgage credit availability is dependent on the severity
of the adverse selection problem. In the final three columns of Table 12, a one standard
deviation increase in branches has no detectable effect on log loans, log applications, or
percent of originations denied. But when branches are separated by type and lender size in
Table 6, the final three columns show that general service bank branches owned by non-local
banks actually reduce the overall amount of credit. The reduction in mortgage credit for low-
quality hard information borrowers by lenders without a branch appears to dominate any
increase in lending by the bank operating the branch. Local bank branches, which showed a
less severe adverse selection problem in the first three columns, are shown in the last three
columns to increase aggregate credit. In this case, it appears that market segmentation
allowed the local bank branch to cater to low-quality hard information borrowers without
drastically reducing the mortgage activity of other lenders.
Branches beyond the first branch produce results that are broadly consistent with the effects
63Bank branches are either general service or mortgage specialists and owned by a local or non-local bank.
There is not enough variation in the data to measure a separate interaction effect for banks that are of each
type and owned by local bank. Branches specializing in mortgages are relatively uncommon.
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of the first branch. Specifically, I examine the effect of an additional lender operating at
least one branch of each type and size on the same mortgage outcomes. These results can
be found in Table 13. The effects of lenders operating general service bank branches, bank
branches specializing in mortgages, and the difference of those effects when owned by a
local lender are similar, but somewhat diminished from the effects of the first branch. This
is expected; the more competitors with branches there are, the more lenders have access to
soft information and the less any individual lender has a large competitive advantage.64
However, the results for mortgage brokers and non-bank lenders are much more statistically
significant in this larger sample. A one standard deviation increase in mortgage brokers
operating a branch in a census tract increases the percent of loans sold on the secondary
market by 0.6 percentage points. At the same time, the percent of loans originated as
conventional increases by 1.9 percentage points and average borrower income increases
by 1.9 percentage points. Although it could be argued that this aggregate effect is not
working through the increased screening on soft information by mortgage brokers, credit
clearly shifts away from borrowers with low-quality hard information. In contrast, non-
bank lenders who do not suffer from such agency problems and have incentive to use the
available soft information, have a negative effect on the percent of originations sold of 0.8
percentage points. Like banks, the incentive structure of mortgage brokers and non-bank
lenders affects the severity of adverse selection, with broker branches increasing aggregate
denial rates and non-bank lenders decreasing aggregate denial rates.
2.6. Conclusion
In contrast to previous research, I show that asymmetries in soft information are present
in the mortgage market and adversely affect low socioeconomic status borrowers. I build
evidence for this by examining changes in lenders’ mortgage supply in the presence of their
own and competitors’ branches and how their combined responses affect aggregate credit
64The negative coefficients on log loans and log applications for local lenders in Table 7 is likely the result
of the presence of lenders who are not required to report their loans to HMDA.
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outcomes. Branches attract a substantial share of applicants for the operating lender, which
allows them to screen for the most profitable borrowers using soft information. Lenders
respond to other lenders’ branch advantage by raising their own credit standards. These
responses are symptomatic of a classic adverse selection problem, such that, in aggregate, I
find that a branch reduces the share of credit going to low socioeconomic status borrowers.
These outcomes vary with branch type and lender size in ways that closely correspond with
theory and provide additional evidence that soft information is the mechanism affecting
lenders’ supply decisions. Local lenders adversely affect low-quality hard information bor-
rowers the least, particularly when they specialize in mortgages. Their incentive and ability
to cater to borrowers of these types likely allows them to specialize in lending with soft
information and segment the market. Local lenders are also found to increase aggregate
mortgage credit despite some adverse selection, unlike non-local lenders who create such a
strong adverse selection problem that they reduce it.
This paper makes original use of lenders’ branch network optimization problem to measure
the effect of branch presence on mortgage credit access through soft information. The
instruments derived from this problem are both valid and plausibly exogenous. They are
valid because lenders have a strong preference for building dense branch networks – placing
new branches close to their other branches and the center of their own network – due to
economies of density. My instruments are also exogenous if the presence of branches is
unrelated to mortgage outcomes in neighborhoods that are somewhat close by. I argue
that this is largely true due to the large fixed costs of operating a branch that create
slow-changing branch networks. These two features support a causal interpretation of my
results.
These findings are based on a more complete dataset than has yet been used to study
mortgage credit access. The excellent coverage and granularity allow me to detect fine
changes in local mortgage markets, at both the lender-specific and aggregate neighborhood
level. Furthermore, the incorporation of new information on mortgage broker and non-bank
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lender branches reduces measurement error and is critical to my finding that branches create
an adverse selection problem.
This study has important implications for mortgage and housing policy. For policy makers,
increasing mortgage access for underserved groups has long been a mission statement. This
paper does not speak to whether that, in itself, is an appropriate policy goal. But it does
make clear that the policy of encouraging lenders to open branches in underserved areas
or create other environments with asymmetric information has consequences that can run
counter to that goal. However, increases could still come from more symmetric increases
in soft information, such as better automated underwriting systems or additional fields in
mortgage applications that could “harden” some types of soft information.
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Table 2.1: Tract Mortgage Characteristics Summary Statistics.
% Sold 3-Year Fore. Log Avg. Income % Conv.
Median SD Median SD Median SD Median SD
1994 0.50 0.22 0.000 0.033 3.93 0.42 0.89 0.18
1995 0.50 0.21 0.000 0.039 3.93 0.42 0.89 0.17
1996 0.50 0.17 0.000 0.043 3.94 0.40 0.90 0.14
1997 0.54 0.16 0.000 0.04 3.98 0.41 0.90 0.13
1998 0.62 0.14 0.000 0.037 4.03 0.38 0.91 0.12
1999 0.57 0.14 0.003 0.037 4.04 0.39 0.91 0.11
2000 0.54 0.14 0.006 0.04 4.08 0.42 0.91 0.11
2001 0.60 0.13 0.004 0.035 4.16 0.40 0.92 0.11
2002 0.64 0.14 0.004 0.036 4.21 0.41 0.93 0.09
2003 0.70 0.14 0.003 0.035 4.25 0.38 0.94 0.09
2004 0.67 0.14 0.006 0.044 4.26 0.40 0.96 0.07
2005 0.68 0.14 0.018 0.056 4.32 0.42 0.97 0.05
2006 0.65 0.13 0.035 0.069 4.39 0.44 0.97 0.05
2007 0.61 0.13 0.030 0.064 4.41 0.45 0.96 0.07
2008 0.66 0.17 0.015 0.052 4.39 0.45 0.82 0.14
2009 0.76 0.18 0.004 0.045 4.37 0.43 0.74 0.19
Notes: Table is based on observations at the tract by year level.
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Table 2.2: Tract Mortgage Supply Summary Statistics
Branches Log Loans Log Apps % Denied
Median SD Median SD Median SD Median SD
1994 1 2 4.42 1.59 4.65 1.52 0.18 0.15
1995 1 2 4.19 1.48 4.48 1.42 0.22 0.16
1996 1 2 4.43 1.19 4.79 1.08 0.27 0.16
1997 1 3 4.52 1.11 4.92 1.01 0.30 0.16
1998 1 3 4.96 1.15 5.34 1.03 0.28 0.16
1999 1 3 4.84 1.08 5.25 0.98 0.32 0.15
2000 1 3 4.61 1.05 5.08 0.96 0.36 0.15
2001 1 3 5.05 1.17 5.42 1.04 0.29 0.15
2002 1 3 5.18 1.22 5.50 1.09 0.25 0.14
2003 1 3 5.46 1.24 5.77 1.12 0.25 0.14
2004 1 3 5.15 1.12 5.53 1.02 0.31 0.13
2005 1 3 5.15 1.13 5.55 1.03 0.32 0.13
2006 1 3 5.06 1.10 5.47 1.02 0.33 0.12
2007 1 4 4.83 1.06 5.29 0.98 0.37 0.13
2008 1 4 4.44 1.08 4.91 0.97 0.36 0.14
2009 1 4 4.56 1.26 4.90 1.11 0.28 0.14
Notes: Table is based on observations at the tract by year level.
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Table 2.3: Branch Location Decision
Branches Branches Branches
Households 0.002** 0.006*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Median Income 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
%White 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
%Degree 0.000 -0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
%Poverty 0.003*** -0.000 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%Owner Occupied -0.007*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
%Mortgaged -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Branches 5-10 M. 0.059** 0.056** 0.056**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Branches 10-20 M. 0.014* 0.020** 0.020**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Branches 20-50 M. 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Branches 50-100 M. 0.018*** 0.017** 0.018**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Dist to Center -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.045***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Std. Distance 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Comp Branches 5-10 M. -0.011***
(0.002)
Comp Branches 10-20 M. -0.005***
(0.001)
Comp Branches 20-50 M -0.017***
(0.002)
Comp Branches 50-100 M. -0.020***
(0.003)
Within R-sq. 0.01 0.01 0.01
No.Obs 583575309 530201529 530201529
Year FE Y Y Y
Lender FE Y Y Y
Notes: Significance levels are * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the county by lender level. The number of a lender’s branches in a census tract is regressed
on measures of distance to the lender’s own network, measures of distance to competitors’ networks, census
tract demographics, and census tract housing market statistics. All variables are scaled by their standard
deviation.
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Table 2.7: Instrumenting for the First Branch
Branch Branch Branch Branch
Branches 5-10 Mi. 0.008 -0.102 -0.105 -0.132*
(0.056) (0.064) (0.064) (0.059)
Branches 10-20 Mi. -0.140** -0.022 -0.023 -0.161*
(0.054) (0.076) (0.076) (0.074)
Branches 20-50 Mi. 0.112** 0.180* 0.180* 0.145
(0.043) (0.091) (0.091) (0.095)
Branches 50-100 Mi. -0.051 -0.037 -0.041 -0.158*
(0.039) (0.080) (0.079) (0.069)
5 Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. 0.037 0.063*
(0.026) (0.026)
5 Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. 0.144*** 0.159***
(0.029) (0.028)
5 Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. 0.104** 0.111**
(0.036) (0.040)
5 Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. 0.172*** 0.185***
(0.041) (0.041)
Branch Centers 5-10 Mi. 0.096 0.097 0.116**
(0.050) (0.050) (0.038)
Branch Centers 10-20 Mi. -0.057 -0.056 -0.011
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
Branch Centers 20-50 Mi. -0.021 -0.021 -0.036
(0.049) (0.049) (0.052)
Branch Centers 50-100 Mi. -0.011 -0.008 0.062
(0.047) (0.047) (0.035)
Mean Std. Distance 5-10 Mi -0.002
(0.003)
Mean Std. Distance 10-20 Mi 0.000
(0.004)
Mean Std. Distance 20-50 Mi 0.004
(0.005)
Mean Std. Distance 50-100 Mi 0.005
(0.005)
Within R-sq. 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
No. Obs 333979 333979 333979 333979
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Tract FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Significance levels are * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the county level. Sample restricted to census tracts in years when they have 0 or 1 branches.
The presence of a branch is regressed on the number of branches within rings of distance of the tract centroid,
the number of lenders with at least 5 branches operating in each ring of distance from the tract centroid,
the number of branch network centers within each ring of distance from the tract centroid, and the mean
standard distance of lenders operating a least 1 branch within each ring of distance from the tract centroid.
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Figure 2.1: FirstMerit Bank Branch Network, 1996 - 2008
(a) 1996 (b) 1998
(c) 2000 (d) 2002
(e) 2004 (f) 2006
Notes: In each year, pre-existing branches are shown as small black dots, newly established branches as
large blue stars, and acquired branches as large red traingles. In a typical year, the bank adds a few new
branches close to its existing branches.
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Figure 2.2: Census Tracts that Receive One Lender Branch
Notes: Solid blue census tracts are those that receive their first branch during
the sample period.
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Figure 2.3: NMLS Lender Branch Network Distribution
Notes: Each line is a moment of the NMLS lender branch network size distribtu-
ion. Lenders in this dataset are classified as either non-bank lenders or mortgage
brokers.
Figure 2.4: Number of NMLS Lenders
Notes: The line shows the number of unique lenders in the NMLS data. Lenders
in this dataset are classified as either non-bank lenders or mortgage brokers.
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Figure 2.5: Number of NMLS Branches
Notes: The line shows the number of NMLS branches in operation. Branches in
this dataset can belong to either lenders or mortgage brokers.
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Figure 2.6: Bank Branch Network Distribution
Notes: Each line is a moment of the bank branch network size distribtuion. The
distribution of network size is extremely skewed, with most networks consisting of
a small number of branches. There are a few networks that are much larger.
Figure 2.7: Number of Bank Branches
Notes: The line shows the number of bank branches in operation in the FDIC
data.
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CHAPTER 3: Affordability, Financial Innovation, and the Start of the Housing
Boom
3.1. Introduction
The dominance of the 30-year fixed rate mortgage is one of the defining features of the
United States housing market. For a brief period in the mid-2000s, however, this domi-
nance was challenged by the popularity of non-traditional mortgage products that allowed
borrowers easier access to credit through variable interest rates with teasers, extended pay-
ment terms, or interest only or negative amortization schedules. In effect, borrowers could
pay less than 30-year fully amortizing monthly payments for some period of time and thus
purchase homes of greater value. As Figure 1 shows, the share of mortgages with at least
one “alternative financing feature” grew sharply during the years of the most rapid (and
ultimately unsustainable) house price appreciation. At their peak in 2005, more than sixty
percent of all purchase loans originated in the United States contained at least one alterna-
tive financing feature. Their coincidence with increasing house prices led many to conclude
that these products were partly to blame for the housing boom. Consequently, their use
since the housing bust has been almost nonexistent, and many have called for permanent
restrictions on mortgage contracts with these features.
In this paper, we explore the direction and magnitude of the relationship between rising
house prices and alternative mortgage products. One possibility is that, as house prices rose,
borrowers flocked to non-traditional products to maintain affordability. In many instances,
the rise in local house prices during the last decade was not matched by a rise in local
incomes (Mian and Sufi 2009). Therefore, for households at the extensive margin of home
buying, greater mortgage affordability was a necessary condition for home purchase. Greater
affordability and access can generally be accomplished in three ways: a reduction in credit
quality standards, lower down-payment requirements, or a reduction in the required monthly
payment. Because many households face short-term liquidity constraints that restrict the
resources they can devote to mortgage payments each month, we might therefore expect
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the reduction in mortgage payments permitted by alternative mortgage products to be a
particularly important way for households to access housing services in an environment with
high house prices.
However, the relationship between house prices and alternative mortgage products is more
complicated. For one, borrowers may have used these alternative products to purchase
more valuable homes in anticipation of a future rise in house prices. Such a relationship
would suggest that the use of alternative mortgage products creates negative externalities
through speculation (as in Barlevy and Fisher 2011). And the use of these products may
have contributed to rising house prices, not just through speculation, but also through
additional housing demand supported by greater availability of mortgage credit. In this
case, there would be grounds for policymakers to restrict, or at least carefully monitor,
alternative mortgage products in the interest of macroprudential regulation.
Previous research suggests that the nature and direction of the relationship between ris-
ing house prices and alternative mortgage products is unclear for at least three reasons.65
First, much of the research treats the housing boom as a single, national event and lacks
both cross-sectional and time-series variation in the timing and size of local house price
booms.66 Second, without a clear, exogenous shock to either house price growth or the use
of alternative mortgage products, adequately addressing the simultaneity between house
prices and mortgage products becomes extremely difficult. And third, concurrent changes
in a local market, such as economic fundamentals, could confound the relationship between
house prices and alternative mortgage products.
Our paper addresses these three challenges using novel data and methods. We first con-
struct a dataset with an unprecedented level of detail and precision. The data are at the
65In addition, other studies debate over the role of investors and speculative activity, the role of subprime
borrowers, and the degree to which changing economic fundamentals can explain the boom and bust. These
studies include, but are not limited to, Haughwout et al. (2011), Amromin et al. (2010), Barlevy and Fisher
(2011), Mian and Sufi (2009), Glaeser et al. (2010), Demyanyk and van Hemert (2011), Himmelberg et al.
(2005), Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Chinco and Mayer (2014), and Favilukis et al. (2013).
66Three notable exceptions are Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Charles et al. (2014), and DeFusco et al.
(2017).
104
county-by-month level, which allows for heterogeneity among local housing markets and
fine measurement of changes within them. In addition, the loan-level datasets from which
we construct our county-by-month data cover a large portion of the purchase market and a
wide array of variables describing almost every possible feature of every loan. For roughly
1,200 counties, we construct measures of house price growth, use of alternative mortgage
products, credit supply, and economic fundamentals in each month from 1993 to 2007. This
novel dataset provides an unusual level of granularity in our study of the housing market and
allows us to discern patterns that would be obscured at higher levels of data aggregation.
Next, we take advantage of a break point randomization methodology, based on the theory
in Hansen (2000) and similar to that implemented by Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) and
Charles et al. (2014), to identify the start of each county’s housing boom. This method
identifies the month in which each county’s house price growth deviates most sharply from
its prior trend. Each county’s “break point” then serves as the start of its house price
boom. On average, we estimate that house price growth discontinuously increased by 6.5
percentage points at the start of a boom. This is an economically significant increase relative
to the average 2 percent house price growth prior to the house price break. However, we find
significant heterogeneity in the timing and size of local house price booms across counties.
Some break points occurred as early as 1993 and others as late as 2007, and jumps in house
price growth range from 4 to 10 percentage points. Given such large heterogeneity, a purely
national study could miss many of the important features that led local house price booms
to differ across time and place.
Our data and methods allow us to examine how trends in alternative financing in each
county evolved before and after the start of its house price boom. We find that, in many
counties, the prevalence of these alternative financing products picks up notably before the
timing of the county-specific house price break. One remarkable example is the experience
of Clark County, Nevada, which includes Las Vegas, whose house prices are seen in Figure
4(a). Our methodology estimates that the Clark County/Las Vegas housing boom began in
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February 2004. As shown in Figure 4(a), there is a clear difference in both the house price
path and rate of house price appreciation on either side of the estimated breakpoint. In
Clark County, we find that the rapid adoption of alternative mortgage products with lower
monthly payments began earlier than the estimated start of the local housing boom (shown
in Figure 4(b)). Prior to the boom in the early 2000s, 20 percent of purchase mortgage
contracts had an alternative feature; this share increases sharply beginning around mid-
2003 so that by early 2004, 60 percent of contracts have one. This example with Clark
County provides an overview of our empirical approach and highlights how, in one market,
non-traditional housing finance trends pre-dated the house price boom.
An important feature of our analysis is to distinguish between the characteristics of “early”
and “late” housing booms. The two decades that span the start of our local house price
booms were characterized by very different conditions in the broader economy. Housing
markets with early booms are defined to have experienced structural breaks in house price
before 2000 and, as Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) and DeFusco et al. (2017) find, many
urban, coastal markets, such as San Francisco and Boston, fall into this category. Counties
with late booms that start in 2000 and after include places like Las Vegas and Phoenix.
The geographic differences in the timing of the boom suggests that differences in the local
economies may help our understanding of the drivers of housing booms. Consistent with
this intuition, we find stark differences in the characteristics of housing booms when we
separately analyze early- and late-booming housing markets.67
We find that in markets with early house price booms (before 2000), alternative mortgage
products and deteriorating underwriting standards are unlikely to have contributed to the
sharp increase in house prices seen around the local break points. We also examine how
measures of credit supply evolved during the housing boom. In early-booming markets, we
67To be clear, when we use the terms early and late housing booms, we mean mean booms that start
before and after 2000, respectively. Some markets that are characterized as having early booms may have a
boom period – that is a prolonged duration of strong house price appreciation – that extends beyond 2000
but because this paper is focused on conditions near the start of housing booms, we classify based on the
estimated start date.
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find little evidence of credit supply growth or availability in the years immediately before
or after the start of the boom. Notably, we find that, on average, denial rates increase,
the share of loans with full documentation grows, and that the credit quality of borrowers
is fairly constant through the boom. These results suggest that explanations for why the
early housing booms started are likely to be outside of the mortgage market and may have
had more to do with economic fundamentals as in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011).
In contrast, we find a more prominent role for alternative mortgage products in markets
with later house price booms and that loosening financing constraints through alternative
financing options more directly contributed to the start of booming house prices. Moreover,
in late-booming markets, we find important changes to credit supply that occur before the
boom begins. For one, we find that the greater use of “piggyback” loans was an important
source of additional leverage. In addition, we see an important shift in financing toward
subprime loans and away from FHA borrowing before the start of the boom. And we
find little evidence of a deterioration in underwriting standards as a direct contributor to
the boom, as measured by average borrower FICO scores and lenders’ denial rates. An
additional change in late-booming markets that we estimate is the rising investor share of
loans prior to the start of the boom.
Of course, the very existence of alternative mortgage products depends on the willingness
of lenders to offer them. Although invented much earlier, these products were not much
utilized until the late 1990s, at which point they became more attractive to lenders for
several reasons. Advances in technology, including automated underwriting and better
credit monitoring, made lenders more confident in their ability to assess the risk of such
products (Gates et al. 2002). Financial liberalization and a deepening of the secondary
market allowed lenders to not only make more mortgages, but pass on the riskiest to third
parties (Keys et al. 2010; Rajan et al. 2015). Advances in contract theory also suggest that
in healthy economies with rising house prices, lenders are more willing to make contracts
with incomplete information (Bolton and Faure-Grimaud 2010; Tirole 2009; Piskorski and
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Tchistyi 2011). Our findings thus contribute to the literature on financial innovation by
presenting evidence that the use of alternative mortgage products – and the relaxing of
households’ financial constraints offered by them – contributed to rapidly rising prices in
markets where the risks of making such loans may have been less known.
Our results integrate a number of strands of recent literature on the determinants of the
housing boom and the degree to which rising prices reflected justifiable credit supply ex-
pansions due to improving economic fundamentals or unjustified speculation (Ferreira and
Gyourko 2011, Davidoff 2013). Such research points to the role of investors (Haughwout
et al. 2011, Mayer and Chinco 2012) and the role of affordable and/or “exotic” mortgage
products (Amromin, et al. 2013; Barlevy and Fisher 2011; Piskorski and Tchistyi 2011;
Keys, et al. 2013). Experts are divided on whether these factors are a cause or consequence
of rising prices, in part because of the challenge that, in many economic models, expecta-
tions of future price increases affect borrowers’ and lenders’ behavior when mortgages are
originated. On one side of the discussion, research finds that economic fundamentals and
investor speculation contributed to the housing boom (Haughwout et al. 2011, Mayer and
Chinco 2012, Ferreira and Gyourko 2011). Other sides of the literature find that alternative
mortgage features can only arise in a speculative bubble (Barlevy and Fisher 2011) while
others put forth that only minimal easing of lending standards occurred (Gyourko, Glaeser,
and Gottlieb 2013). Many others are silent on whether alternative mortgage features con-
tributed to or accelerated the housing boom (Amromin et al. 2013). In our paper, we find
that, in late-booming markets, the popularity of affordable mortgage products generally
increased before structural breaks in house price appreciation, and that this was facilitated
by an expansion of credit, providing support for the view that financial market liberalization
was central to the timing of house price increases, especially in late-booming markets.
In the next section, we describe our data. Section 3 presents a stylized theoretical model
to highlight the ways in which house prices and alternative mortgage products interact.
Section 4 describes our break point methodology and its application to house prices. In
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section 5, we provide our results of our study for all counties and explore how those results
change when we consider early- and late-booming counties separately. Section 6 concludes.
3.2. Data and Measurement
The unique dataset we construct has three key features that make it well-suited to study the
relationship between rising house prices and alternative mortgage products. First, we are
able to observe a large number of local housing markets because we have very comprehensive
house price data. Importantly, our repeat-sales house price indices are based on the sales
backed by a large range of loan types rather than just conforming loans. This feature is
important because these indices should capture the house price movements of properties
financed with alternative mortgage products, which is likely to reduce measurement error.
Second, we take advantage of administrative loan-level data that are comprehensive in
their geographic and loan characteristic coverage. These data cover a large swathe of the
mortgage market across these dimensions so we are able to measure with great precision
the prevalence of alternative mortgage products for a large number of local markets. To
our knowledge we are the first to construct such measures. Third, using multiple years of
administrative loan-level data allows us to take measurements at a monthly frequency, which
makes it possible to pinpoint sharp changes in our variables and to follow the order in which
they occur. Our unique county-level dataset gives our analysis more granularity across three
dimensions — the geographic level (county), time period (month), and mortgage-level detail
— than any previous study along these lines to the best of our knowledge.
Specifically, our primary analysis combines house price data and mortgage financing char-
acteristics for counties. We obtain county-level house price indices from CoreLogic (CL).
These indices are, for our purposes, preferable to others, such as those produced by the Fed-
eral Housing Finance Agency, which only include properties backed by conforming loans, or
those produced by Case-Shiller, which are limited to a smaller set of markets. At the time of
our analysis, CL produced 1,163 county-level house price indices for single-family detached
properties using their repeat sales methodology. CL indices have the advantage of going
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back for many more years than other indices, such as Zillow (though there is considerable
overlap between the two sources in recent years). The CL indices start back as far as 1973
for some counties, but we limit our analysis to 1993, when many indices begin, and later.
No indices are produced for counties that experience fewer than five sales in a least one
month over their collection period. The sample counties cover over 80 percent of the US
population. The remaining 20 percent consists of rural counties that experienced very little
of the housing boom.
Our mortgage financing characteristics are from CL, LPS Applied Analytics (LPS), and
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. CL and LPS provide loan-level records
for first-lien non-agency (subprime and alt-A) mortgages agency (mostly prime) mortgages,
respectively, for the 1993-2012 period. Both CL and LPS collect these records from a
group of mortgage servicers. Their combined coverage of the mortgage market in the early
1990s is less than ideal, 20-40 percent, but grows with the addition of more servicers over
time. The data after 2004 covers over 80 percent of the first-lien market. While the
representativeness of our data in earlier years and compositional shifts over time are a
concern, this data remains the best, if not only, source for detailed information on loan
characteristics. Additionally, for the purposes of our analysis, it is unlikely that changes in
coverage are correlated with the timing of county-level structural breaks in house prices or
our other market variables so our research design is, to a certain extent, able to overcome
this particular limitation of the data. The sample is limited to purchase loans since we
are interested in the actions of borrowers entering the market, rather than current owners
who refinance or extract equity from their homes. Our measures for each county in each
month of the share of loans with a variable rate, extended term, interest only, negative
amortization, FHA, full documentation, and any alternative financing feature come from
this combined dataset. In addition, we calculate average FICO scores and the average
first-lien loan-to-value ratio with this data.
We obtain additional mortgage characteristics from HMDA for the same period (1993-
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2012). Passed by Congress in 1975, HMDA requires every lender satisfying any of a broad
list of criteria to report every loan and a set of its characteristics to a central repository.68
Because of this requirement, coverage for this dataset is broad. Again, we limit ourselves to
purchase loans. From this source, we obtain additional information on loan and borrower
attributes not available in the CL and LPS data. The measures we calculate from HMDA
for each county and month include percent of loan applications denied, percent subprime,
second lien share of originations, percent owner-occupied, average debt-to-income ratio, and
average borrower income.69
Using CL, LPS, and HMDA, we construct our measures of housing market characteristics for
each county and each month in the sample. Additional county characteristics are obtained
from the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These data sources provide
additional information on household income and county unemployment rates. Because
household income is only collected annually, we linearly interpolate monthly values between
years.
We focus on the financing characteristics of the mortgage that would allow a borrower to
pay less than the 30-year fully amortizing monthly payment. These characteristics include
teaser variable rates, interest-only or negative amortization designs, and extended term
contracts. In order to concisely summarize the value to the borrower of these types of
contracts in relaxing the monthly payment constraint, we construct a summary measure,
the percent of mortgages with any alternative financing feature. If a mortgage possesses a
least one feature, such as negative amortization, then it is counted as having any alternative
financing feature. We view the percent any alternative financing feature measure as useful
not only for the purposes of this study, but more broadly for monitoring the mortgage
68The most important criteria include having assets above a low threshold and operating a branch within an
MSA. For a full discussion of reporting requirements see http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/2013guide.pdf.
69Subprime loans are identified by matching HMDA agency and lender codes with the subprime lender
list created by HUD. According to Mayer and Pence (2009), this method should adequately capture the
size of the subprime market. HMDA itself includes an indicator for “high-cost” loans in the later years of
data, but this measure may not capture whether the loan is actually subprime (given the lack of data on
creditworthiness).
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market. As is clearly shown from Figure 1, the time series of the any alternative financing
feature measure indicates quite strongly when borrowers and lenders began to use affordable
mortgage products to help borrowers purchase homes. As the analysis will show later, the
timing of the entrance of these products in different markets across the country is highly
related to house price growth in the market.
3.3. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop a stylized neighborhood mortgage market to show how non-
traditional mortgages can be both a cause and consequence of house price booms and
motivate our empirical investigation. The central insight from the model is that non-
traditional mortgage products can be used to both maintain affordability of houses in a
market with rising house prices and to speculate on those future increases. Furthermore,
speculative use of non-traditional mortgages can particularly be fueled by a fall in the cost
of capital that lenders use to supply loans. The model here borrows heavily from the designs
of Barlevy and Fisher (2011) and Relihan (2017) and the insights from other work on the
interaction of non-traditional mortgage use and house prices (Campbell and Cocco 2003;
Piskorski and Tchisty 2010, 2011, and 2013, Kung 2015, and Guren et al. 2017). However,
unlike these previous models we do not presuppose a set of available mortgage contract
types or focus on one optimal mortgage design and instead allow a menu of mortgage types
to be an endogenous outcome of the model.
3.3.1. Setting
There are three key elements to our model. First, consumers have different wages so that
they differ in their ability to pay for housing services. Consumers with high wages will not
pay more than the marginal utility from housing, while lower wage consumers cannot pay
more than their wage in any period. Second, to purchase a house, consumers must use a
mortgage from the one available lender, who is able to perfectly price discriminate. Thus,
the lender offers a menu of mortgage types to consumers, with fixed and varying payments
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matched to consumers’ wage profiles, to fully extract consumers’ surplus from owning a
house.70
Third, uncertainty about the path of future house prices, common to both consumers and
the lender, can generate speculative use of non-traditional mortgage products. In particular,
if the future expected house price is high relative to the house price today, the lender may
increase expected profit by shifting the supply of loans toward future consumers. If they
do so, the current equilibrium house price and loan size rise, increasing current consumers’
leverage relative to wages and/or use of back-loaded mortgages. Without this uncertainty,
there is no speculative use of non-traditional mortgages and changes in their use can only
come through reduced capital costs to the lender.
More formally, in period t = 1 there is a unit mass of consumers, denoted as generation
g = 1. With some probability q < 1 another generation of consumers of size n will arrive
in the second period. Denote them as generation g = 2. Once arrived, consumers live
an infinite number of periods. Each consumer i in generation g in period t is identical
except for her initial wage, wgit, which is independently and identically distributed W
g. In
subsequent periods, each consumer receives an independent shock to their wage, git ∼ Eg,
such that wgit+1 = w
g
it + 
g
i . This information is common to all agents.
The consumer’s problem is to maximize her total lifetime utility, which depends on her con-
sumption of housing services through homeownership and consumption of all other goods.71
The marginal utility of consuming all other goods in a period is normalized to 1. The rel-
ative size of consumers’ marginal utility from housing will be crucial in determining the
equilibrium house price and mortgage contracts; only consumers who can access housing
services for no more than their marginal utility will have demand for a house. Suppressing
70At the other extreme, with perfect competition all mortgages would be lent at cost. Therefore, to
generate a menu of mortgage contracts with fixed and varying payments, it would be necessary instead to
have some other variation such as in risk premiums or credit market frictions.
71For simplicity, we do not discount the future profit for the lender. This does not have any meaningful
impact on the model’s conclusions.
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the generation index, each consumer’s problem is:
max
{cit},{Mit}
∞∑
t=1
βt(cit + µMit) (3.1)
such that
cit ≥ 0, Mit{0, 1} ∀ t (3.2)
and
cit + pitMit ≤ wit + htMit−1 ∀ t (3.3)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, cit is consumption of all other goods excluding
housing, Mit indicates an outstanding mortgage, pit is the consumer’s mortgage payment,
and ht is the house price. Per period marginal housing utility is µ(β
−1−1), such the utility
from owning a house in perpetuity is µ. Consumers can only purchase a house in the first
period of her lifetime.72 Houses are the only durable asset across periods.
We also assume that there is only one lender from whom a mortgage must be obtained to
purchase a house. The lender’s problem is to choose the consumers in each generation it
should offer loans to and the payments on each respective mortgage that maximize its total
expected profit:
max
{pit}
∑
i
∑
t
E[pi(Mit)] (3.4)
such that ∑
i
∑
t
E[pi(Mit)] ≥ 0 (3.5)
where E[pi(Mit)] is the expected profit from a mortgage made to person i at time t. If a
consumer defaults on a loan in period u > t, the lender takes immediate possession of the
72Without this assumption, a first generation consumer’s purchase decision in period 1 is a function of the
purchase decisions of other first generation consumers in period 1. Therefore, this assumption makes the
model solution more tractable.
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house and can resell it to another consumer in period u. The lender has recourse to the
period u wages of a borrower in default. Therefore:
E[pi(Mit)] =

∑
tE[pit]− r if default not expected∑u
t E[pit] + E[hu∗] + E[wiu]− r if default expected
(3.6)
where r is the fixed cost of making a loan.73 If two customers are equally profitable, the
lender will randomly break ties in allocating loans.
We make several additional assumptions to focus on the space of interesting outcomes.
First, assume that there is a fixed supply of houses, H1 < 1, available in the first period so
that some consumers in the first generation will not be able to purchase a house. Second,
the house price in a period is the highest price that clears the market for the available
houses, as in a sealed bid auction with multiple units and one price. Third, we assume
non-negative expected wage growth in each period to focus on the dynamics of house price
booms.
3.3.2. Outcomes
The optimal choices of the first generation consumers and lender depend on their expectation
of future house prices. Therefore, we solve for the first period equilibrium house price and
mortgage contracts through backward induction. In period 3 and thereafter, we have the
degenerate case in which the house price is 0 and there is no mortgage market, because there
are no consumers who can purchase houses.74 Moving to period 2, if the second generation
does not arrive, then the house price and mortgage markets similarly collapse.
Now, imagine the second generation does arrive. Consumers from the second generation
will only want to contract for a mortgage if they get at least as much utility from housing
73We assume a fixed cost to each loan and that lenders offer the smallest profit maximizing loan, again,
for simplicity. Capital costs scaled to loan size would provide similar results.
74If consumers in the later periods of life were to trade houses among themselves, the house price would
still be the smaller of µ and the willingness to pay of the marginal consumer, but solving the model would
be significantly less tractable while not providing any extra insight.
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through the mortgage as they would from consuming other goods. In other words, their total
mortgage payments cannot exceed their maximum lifetime utility from housing:
∑
t pit ≤ µ.
As the sole supplier of mortgages, the lender is able to perfectly price discriminate. It will
therefore choose to offer each consumer a mortgage contract with the highest payments
possible that still satisfies each consumer’s budget constraint. For consumers with expected
wages above µ(β−1 − 1) for all periods, the most the lender can charge is µ(β−1 − 1) each
period. Other consumers cannot be charged more than their wage in any period. Therefore,
in equilibrium, consumers are offered mortgages with both fixed and variable payments such
that:
pit∗ =

µ(β−1 − 1) if wi2 ≥ µ(β−1 − 1)∀ t
min(E[wit], µ(β
−1 − 1)) if wi2 < µ(β−1 − 1)
(3.7)
for t = 2, ...,∞ for borrowers who receive a mortgage. Note that this means there can be
mortgages with both fixed and variable payments in equilibrium, even without expectations
of future house price increases.
Consumers from the second generation will have a willingness to pay for housing that is at
most µ, their lifetime marginal utility from owning a house. Denote the period a consumer’s
wages are expected to exceed µ(β−1− 1) for the first time as period s. If the expected sum
of a consumer’s lifetime wages are less than µ at time t, then she would be willing to pay
all of the discounted utility from her wages up until date s,
∑s
t β
twit, and the discounted
utility she would receive from owning a house for her remaining lifetime, βs−tµ, for a house
in period t.
Denote H2 as the mass of houses available for purchase in the second period through defaults
and vacancies.75 Then the house price is determined by the intersection of the housing
supply and willingness to pay lines as in Figure 3. If there are more second generation
consumers whose willingness to pay is µ than houses, then the house price that clears the
75Note that in order for a first generation consumer to sell a house, it must be that h2∗ > µ. This is
impossible, so H2 will be composed of houses repossessed by the lender and houses which were not sold in
period 1.
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market is µ and a random subset of those consumers will be allocated the H2 houses.
However, if there are more houses than consumers with the maximum willingness to pay,
then the price falls to the willingness to pay of the k′ consumer that clears the market.
Hence:
h2∗ =

µ if φ2 > H2∑s
t=2 β
twk′t + β
s−2µ if φ2 ≤ H2
(3.8)
where the mass of consumers in a generation with initial wages wji ≥ µ(β−1 − 1) is φj .
We have now solved for the period 2 equilibrium mortgage contracts and house price,
depending on whether the second generation arrives. If they do not, with probability
(1 − q), then the house price will be 0. If they do, with probability q, the house price will
be determined as in (8). Then in period 1, the lender will consider the expected house price
for period 2:
E[h2∗] =

µq if φ2 > H2
(
∑s
t=2 β
twi∗t + β
s−2µ)q if φ2 ≤ H2
(3.9)
when offering mortgages to first generation consumers in period 1. For instance, if the
lender knew that no second generation consumers would arrive, it would lend to all first
generation consumers with mortgage contracts structured as in (7) and all houses would
be purchased. But, if the lender expects with high probability that a high wage second
generation consumer will arrive in period 2, it might be more profitable for the lender to
deny a mortgage to a first generation consumer so that there is a house available for that
possible second generation consumer to buy with one of its mortgages. Alternatively, it
might be more profitable to lend to one low-wage first generation consumer who is expected
to default, so the lender can both resell the house and lend to a second generation consumer.
More formally, we start from the top of the wage distribution of first generation consumers
in considering whether the lender should lend to each first generation consumer. For first
generation consumers who are expected to make at least µ(β−1− 1) each period, the lender
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will always supply them with a contract with that fixed payment each period and the
consumerw will not be expected to default. This is because those payments extract the
maximum willingness to pay from any customer in any generation, such that there is no
circumstance under which the lender would prefer the option of lending to some second
generation customer to lending for certain to them.
For consumers who make less than µ(β−1− 1) in the first period, but are expected to make
at least that in period 2 and later, the lender will also always supply them with a mortgage
on which they are not expected to default. The first period payment is her wage and later
payments are µ(β−1− 1). That is at least as much as any expected profit that can be made
from the option to lend to a second generation consumer.
At this point, if there are enough first generation consumers in these two categories to
purchase all the houses, then the mortgage contracts and house price will again be structured
as in (7) and (8). Furthermore, the period 2 house price and mortgage markets will stagnate,
as no first generation consumers will sell her house for less than µ and no second generation
consumers will buy one for more than µ.
Now imagine that there are more houses than first generation consumers with wages in
the two categories above. We consider the remaining first generation consumers for whom,
E[wi2] < µ(β
−1 − 1), and all potential second generation consumers. Call consumer i∗
the first generation consumer with the highest wages such that E[wi2] < µ(β
−1 − 1). Call
consumer j∗ the first generation consumer with the highest wages such wi1 + βE[wi2] <
µ(β−1 − 1) – when this holds, consumers would prefer a contract on which they expect
to default to no mortgage at all. Finally, call consumer k∗ the consumer with the highest
willingness to pay in the second generation.
If the lender makes a loan to consumer i∗, it will not expect her to default and offer her a
mortgage with payments of min(E[w1i∗t], µ(β
−1 − 1)) each period. Expected profit would
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be:
w1i∗1 + E[w
1
i∗2] +
∞∑
t=3
min(E[w1i∗t], µ(β
−1 − 1))− r. (3.10)
However, if the lender instead offers consumer j∗ a mortgage up to size L(j∗) large enough
to guarantee it a house with payments of (pj∗1, pj∗2) = (wj∗1, L(j
∗) − wj∗1), the consumer
will accept the loan and default in period 2, allowing the lender to sell the house and offer a
mortgage to second generation to consumer k∗ with payments of min(E[w2k∗t], µ(β
−1−1)).76
Across those two mortgages the lender expects profits of:
w1j∗1 + E[w
1
j∗2] + E[h2∗] +
∞∑
t=2
min(E[w2k∗t], µ(β
−1 − 1))q − r(1 + q). (3.11)
Finally, the lender could also decide to lend just to consumer k∗ in the second period with
expected profits:
∞∑
t=2
min(E[w2k∗t], µ(β
−1 − 1))q − rq. (3.12)
The lender will then allocate the next loan to the consumer(s) from (10), (11), and (12)
with the highest marginal profitability. If the probability the second generation arrives, the
size of their cohort, or their wages are low, then the lender is more likely to make the loan
to consumer i∗. Otherwise, the lender may deny them a loan in favor of lending to both
j∗ and k∗, or k∗ alone. Additionally, the lender will choose to lend to both j∗ and k∗ over
k∗ alone if wj∗1 +E[wj∗2] +E[h2∗]− r > 0, which is more likely when the expected second
period house price is high relative to the cost of lending. Once the next loan is allocated,
the lender will reconsider (10), (11), and (12) with the remaining customers and continue
allocating loans until all the houses are accounted for or the lender can no longer make
a loan with positive expected profits. Thus, in this model the lender trades off lending
mortgages to high-wage first generation consumers who are not expected to default against
speculating on the arrival of the second generation by supplying mortgages on which it
76The lender is willing to offer these customers a loan of any size since the payments are structured to
ensure to the consumer defaults. We assign them a loan just large enough to ensure their ability to outbid
the remaining consumers in the market for houses.
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expects low-wage first generation consumers to default and reserving the option to lend to
high-wage second generation consumers.
The first period house price will again be determined by the lowest marginal willingness to
pay of the first generation consumer who can receive a mortgage, consumer i′, such that:
h1∗ =

µ if φ1 > H1
(
∑s
t=1 β
twi′t + β
s−1µ) if φ1 ≤ H1
. (3.13)
Importantly, if the expected house price and revenue from lending to consumers in the
second generation are too low, the lender will allocate loans to the first generation such that
they can purchase all the houses – the price will be as if no second generation will arrive at
all. However, each mortgage the lender denies to a high-wage first generation consumer in
favor of a back-loaded mortgage to a low-wage first generation consumer and/or the option
to lend to second generation consumers puts upward pressure on h1∗. Then, consequent of
the higher house price, the loan size of each consumer who receives a mortgage will also be
higher. For consumers, those with those lowest wages will experience the largest relative
increase in leverage, with especially highly leveraged low-wage consumers if back-loaded
mortgages are offered.
3.3.3. Discussion
The model clarifies the simultaneous relationship between non-traditional mortgage use
and rising house prices. If economic fundamentals, such as wages or population growth,
are expected to improve in the future and raise future house prices, lenders will shift their
supply of mortgages to future consumers and non-traditional mortgage products to current
consumers to increase their expected profit. This shift, then increases current house prices
and consumer leverage relative to wages.
However, a fall in the cost of lending today could also lead to more use of non-traditional
mortgages. A lower cost of lending lowers the payments needed by the lender from the
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consumers to ensure non-negative profits in expectation. Therefore the lender is willing to
give more back-loaded mortgages with variable payments to consumers farther down the
wage distribution. In other words, the causality between non-traditional mortgage products
and rising house prices could run in either direction.
Ideally, an exogenous change in house prices or non-traditional mortgage use would provide
the clearest evidence of their causal relationship. Barring that, the model suggests that the
relative timing of initial increases in house prices and complex mortgage use can provide
important insight into their relationship. If house prices rise before an increase in the use of
non-traditional mortgages, it is more likely to be driven by improvements in expectations
over economic fundamentals. However, if non-traditional mortgage use rises first, it is more
likely the case to be driven by reduced costs to lenders. With regard to the latter, it is well
documented, that the extensive financial liberalization subsequent to 2000 dramatically
lowered these costs. Therefore, capturing the timing of the relationship between house
price booms and non-traditional product use before and after this liberalization provides
two separate environments in which fundamentals are known to be different.
3.4. Methodological Framework
We are primarily concerned with studying changes in local housing markets at the start of
their house price booms. This, of course, requires a definition of the start of a house price
boom. Unfortunately, no clear definition exists since considerable uncertainty characterizes
the empirical work in the literature to identify booms (Himmelberg et al. 2005, Case and
Shiller 2003, Mayer 2011). For example, consider the counties in Figure A.1, where there
is a clear run-up in house price levels and growth rates. In part because the trends are not
visually discontinuous, additional structure is necessary to define the start of the housing
boom for each county.
Our approach is to identify the start of a county’s housing boom by using a break point
randomization methodology that selects the month in which 12-month house price appreci-
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ation rates first deviate most sharply from prior trends. We assume that this large deviation
indicates that the forces driving local house prices changed in some fundamental way. This
follows the approach taken by Hansen (2000) and applied to metropolitan housing markets
by Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Charles et al. (2014), and DeFusco et al. (2017).
For each county c and month m, we run regressions over all possible breakpoints λ∗c,m of
the form:
δPc,m = αc + βc1[λc,m ≥ λ∗c,m] + c,m (3.14)
In the sample for each county, we only include the months up to and including the month
with the largest 12-month change in house prices. This restriction ensures our methodology
chooses a structural break associated with the boom in house prices, rather than a break
associated with the later bust. Practically, this methodology usually involves running some-
where between 60 and 150 regressions (one for each month observed for a given county from
the beginning of the data to the house price peak) for each of the 1,163 counties with an
available house price index from CL. From each regression, we recover the sum of squared
errors, S(λc,m) and identify the structural breakpoint in house price growth as:
λ∗∗c,m = argmin(S(λc,m)) (3.15)
We exclude any county for which this chosen break point is not significant at the 5 percent
level.77 This leaves us with 984 counties in our main analysis sample.
In addition, we allow for the possibility of multiple breaks in a county. As seen in Figure
A.2, house price cycles in some markets are more frequent between 1993 and 2008, and
there are multiple local maxima in house price appreciation rates. Knowing the timing of
a second structural break may help not just better characterize the data on house prices
but may also provide a useful source of variation for estimating the relationship between
alternative financing and house prices. To locate the second house price break, we apply a
77In our robustness analysis, we have made our significance threshold more restrictive and our conclusions
are little changed. These results are available upon request.
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similar search strategy as with the first – searching over the periods between 6 months after
the first house price break and the period with the second highest house price appreciation.
As with the first house price break, we only consider breaks that are significant at the 5
percent level in our analysis.
After recovering the month in which house price growth deviates most sharply from trend,
what we call the start of the local housing boom, we use this date to conduct an event study
analysis of house prices, as well as of mortgage and borrower attributes. More specifically,
we estimate regressions of the form:
Yc,m = αc + βf(λ∗c,m) + γXc,m + g(m) + c,m (3.16)
Here, αc is a county fixed effect, g(m) is a set of calendar time controls, and f(λ∗c,m) is a
vector of relative-year dummies. We normalize the dummies so that the year prior to the
house price break in county c is the omitted category (and set to equal 0). Our dependent
variables Yc,m include house price growth in county c in relative year m, the use of specific
types of alternative mortgage products, our aggregate measures of alternative mortgage
product use, and the availability of credit. The β coefficients tell us whether these other
characteristics changed significantly in the year in which house prices began to boom. The
inclusion of county fixed effects is important to the extent that counties’ time-invariant
characteristics explain both the timing of house price breaks and how the attributes of
mortgages and borrowers change around the house price break. For example, Amromin et al.
(2013) argue that borrowers using mortgages with alternative features tend to have higher
income and more education. Because these households geographically segregate along these
dimensions that also matter for housing markets, it is important to estimate the relationship
between house prices and mortgage features within counties. Controlling for calendar time
helps control for the underlying trends in mortgage and borrower characteristics so that the
estimated relationship between house price breaks and these attributes is independent of
these trends.
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In addition to this event study analysis of mortgage market developments around house
price breaks, we conduct two additional analyses to better understand the direction of the
causality. First, we estimate when various housing and mortgage market characteristics
experience a significant deviation from their prior trends. That is, rather than searching
for house price breaks in Equation 14, we search for county-specific breaks in our alterna-
tive financing variables, including the percent of mortgages with any alternative financing
feature. We can then compare the timing of this structural break with when house prices
start to boom. If the boom occurs before a break in, for example, the share of mortgages
with any alternative financing feature, we would find it more challenging to infer that shifts
in financing caused the housing boom. Second, we perform more formal Granger causality
tests. While neither approach is sufficient to definitively establish causality, both provide
useful insights.
There is an important consideration to this approach that we wish to point out. Other
break point studies typically split their sample into two parts, one that they use to estimate
the break point and another to estimate the size of the jump (e.g. Card et al. (2008)).
In doing so, some issues related to specification search bias can be ameliorated (Leamer
1983). We are unable to do this because we take our house price indices as given, rather
than calculated directly. Our analysis applies already-constructed house price indexes from
CoreLogic because we would otherwise need either: (1) the exact property address to con-
struct our own repeat-sales index or (2) property attributes to estimate a hedonic index.
Because we have neither, we do not have the ability to construct a credible house price series
with our loan-level data. To gauge how our conclusions might be affected by this issue, we
conduct robustness analysis where we weight our analysis using the t-statistic for λ∗ that
is obtained when estimating Equation 1. We also compare the distribution of our house
price breaks those found in studies that apply a split sample approach (e.g. Ferreira and
Gyourko (2011) and DeFusco et al. (2017)). These analyses suggest that our conclusions
would be little changed if we were to apply a split sample approach, and these results are
available upon request.
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3.5. Results
Figure 1 shows that, for the U.S. as a whole, house price appreciation and the use of
alternative financing, measured as the share of mortgages originated with at least one
alternative financing feature, peak at roughly the same time during the housing boom. But
applying our breakpoint methodology to these data highlights important differences in when
booms occur, suggesting that these differences may reveal important information about the
causes and consequences of housing booms. Specifically, the breakpoint methodology finds
that, between 2000 and 2007, the start of the national house price boom occurs in March
2004, with the growth rate in house prices peaking in April 2005. Our methodology also
estimates that the structural break in alternative financing, using the national measure,
occurs in September 2003, six months before the estimated house price break.
Because the data in Figure 1 aggregate trends across many local housing markets and are
limited to the post-2000 period, it masks the many explanations for why house prices rose
so rapidly and whether changes in financing methods contributed or responded to that
rise. Moreover, aggregating local trends can blur important geographic differences. For
example, Figure 2 shows that the share of loans with a payment gap, which measures the
difference between a borrowers actual payment and what he would have paid with a 30-
year fixed-rate mortgage, increases beginning in mid-2003 and much more sharply for “sand
states (Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada) than for the rest of the country. These
differences motivate our interest in analyzing local housing markets.
We turn to our earlier example of Clark County, Nevada to provide an overview of our
analytical approach. Shown in the upper panel of Figure 4, our estimation method identifies
February 2004 as the structural break in house prices (that is, the start of the local housing
boom) and house price growth peaks in 2005. When we juxtapose this break in house
prices with trends in alternative financing in the lower panel of Figure 4, we find that
the share of mortgages with any alternative finance feature starts to rise from about 20
percent in 2003 to 60 percent by mid-2004. From the timing of this relationship, we first
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infer that, in Clark County, rising house prices appear unlikely to have directly led to the
greater use of alternative mortgage products. That is, it appears unlikely that rising prices
drove households to alternative financing products as a means of maintaining affordability.
Rather, we conclude that either changes in financing or in Clark County’s local economic
conditions, including house price expectations, were more likely to have contributed to the
start of its boom. This is the first piece of evidence that we present that in some markets,
expanded use of alternative financing preceded, and thus could have contributed to, house
price growth.
More systematically, we estimate the timing of house price breaks across 1,163 local housing
markets, allowing these breaks to occur between 1993 and 2007.78 We also allow for the
existence of multiple breaks.79 The majority of the first structural breaks occur between
1998 and 2006, with 1998 being a particularly notable year thanks to the tech boom in
Coastal California and the Northeast. Another important year is 2004, which aligns with
the popular narrative about the housing boom. The occurrence of second house price breaks
is clustered quite late over the period we study in the minority of markets with such a break.
Among the 452 counties with a second house price break, 20 percent occur between mid-2004
and mid-2005.
This heterogeneity immediately questions the notion of a single, national house price boom
(see, e.g. Ferreira and Gyourko (2012) for similar results). It also challenges the interpre-
tation of directly inferring a relationship between house prices and alternative financing
based on national trends. And it allows more scope for heterogeneous characteristics of
house price booms.
In Table 1, we quantify the magnitude of the initial house price break by applying our event
study approach. House prices, on average, appreciate at a roughly 7 percentage point higher
78We also find that out of our 1,163 local markets, 179 of these markets did not experience a (statistically
significant) housing boom during this time.
79Examples of markets with one and two house price breaks are in Figures A.1 and A.2, respectively.
Figure A.3 shows the histograms of the timing of the first and, where they exist, second house price breaks.
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pace in the year of the first break relative to the previous year (panel a). Prior to the break,
house prices grow at an average pace of approximately 2 percent per year; thus a 7 per-
centage point jump is both economically and statistically meaningful. In the odd-numbered
columns, controlling for county fixed effects allows for the within-county comparison of
house price growth. Including additional controls in the even-numbered columns accounts
for national macroeconomic conditions, such as the interest rate environment, and local
economic characteristics that may be correlated with the timing of breaks and house prices,
such as income and unemployment. Finding estimates of similar magnitude when these
controls are included would arise if the timing the timing of local structural breaks in house
prices were largely independent of a common macroeconomic trend.
Figures 5 and 6 and Table 1 draw out important distinctions for different types of structural
breaks in house prices. Looking first at early and late booms, house prices in counties
with structural breaks occurring before 2000 jump about 6 percentage points while later-
occurring breaks average nearly 8 percentage points. This pattern is consistent with the
popular narrative that the housing boom intensified over time, especially during the 2004–
2006 period when the private secondary market was most active. Furthermore, markets
with a second boom, on average, experience a smaller (roughly 4 percentage point) increase
in the growth rate of house prices subsequent to the first break, which averages about 7
percentage points.
Next, we turn to how changes in the use of alternative mortgage products correlated with
the start of local housing booms. Figure 7 shows that the share of mortgages with al-
ternative financing features tends to rise in the two years prior to the boom and then
continues to remain elevated in the first few years of the boom. Moreover, the develop-
ments in alternative financing prior to housing booms is accompanied by further changes
in the mortgage market, as seen in Figure 8. Notably, a decline in FHA borrowing and
an increase in subprime borrowing precede the booms, consistent with the broader mar-
ket trends documented in Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009). Loans insured by the FHA
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(Federal Housing Administration) are typically 30-year fixed-rate mortgages that require a
minimum 2.5 percent downpayment. So a borrower choosing a subprime loan over an FHA
mortgage would be more likely to experience a reduction in monthly payments or be able
to buy a more expensive house from the alternative financing features rather than from
relaxing the downpayment constraint.80 There is also an increase in the investor share of
loans before and into the boom, consistent with the trends in investor activity and possible
speculation documented in Haughwout et al. (2011) and Chinco and Mayer (2016).
While these results apply to both the first and second house price booms, the shifts are more
apparent for second booms, perhaps because borrowers and lenders in an already buoyant
house price environment are more willing to use alternative forms of financing or because
a larger shift in financing is necessary to trigger another structural break in house prices.
Also, as Figure 7 shows, the increase in subprime borrowing is much sharper prior to the
second boom, as is the rise in investor activity.
Looking at early- and late-booming markets separately in Figure 8 and Table 2, we find
important differences between the two types of markets, with the latter showing a stronger
role for alternative financing in pre-dating rapidly rising house prices. For markets with
early housing booms, we find very modest or negligible shifts in financing when house prices
start to rise sharply. Indeed, Figure 8 shows that the share of mortgages with alternative
financing features was trending down or flat in the years prior to the early booms and
relatively flat thereafter.
The findings for early markets are consistent with those of Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), who
find that local economic conditions such as household income growth can explain a relatively
large share of the initial house price appreciation in these markets. In their work and
ours, early-booming markets, such as Boston, were likely propelled by improving economic
conditions in the late 1990s, a period when alternative mortgage financing was available
80In addition, FHA loans cannot be larger than the conforming loan limit whereas subprime loans do not
face such a cap.
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but relatively dormant. Indeed, as seen in Figure 9 and Table 3, we find that borrowers
living in these areas faced rising denial rates and stricter documentation standards in the
years around the structural break in house prices. The absence of changes in alternative
financing, combined with tightening underwriting standards in early-booming areas, point
to factors outside of the mortgage market. Table 3 shows a role for rising incomes in early-
booming markets. We find a rising trend in median household income in the years prior to
and subsequent to the boom in early-booming counties. This increase in income, however,
coincided with only a modest, at best, tightening of labor market conditions, as measured
by the unemployment rate.81
Our central contribution is establishing that the relationship between alternative financing
and house prices is considerably different in markets with later-occurring booms. As seen
in Figure 8, markets with booms after 2000, such as Las Vegas and Phoenix, experience
shifts in financing prior to the start of the boom and into the first few years of the boom.
In particular, we see notable increases in the share of mortgages with adjustable rates and
interest-only features before the boom, while the shares with extended terms or negative
amortization appear to increase after the start of the boom. Our summary measure, the
percent of purchase originations with any alternative financing feature, shows a sizable and
quantitatively significant increase in the year preceding the boom and for a couple of years
thereafter. These results show that the patterns we presented for Clark County, Nevada,
were indicative of a wider set of late-booming markets, over-represented in the sand states.
At the start of the boom, late-booming markets also experienced an increase in credit supply,
as seen in the sharp increase in the share of loans that are second liens, or “piggybacks”
(see Figure 10). This pattern, combined with a very modest decline in the average first-lien
loan-to-value ratio before the house price break, suggests that piggybacks were an important
source of greater leverage and that this increase in leverage occurred in advance of the house
81Recall that early-booming markets are those with structural breaks in house prices prior to 2000. The
unemployment rate in the mid- to late-1990s was quite low and close to the natural rate, leaving little room
for further declines.
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price boom in late-booming markets. In spite of this greater leverage, denial rates are
relatively constant in the years prior to and after the boom in late markets. Lastly, average
borrower FICO score is little changed in the years before and into the housing boom among
late-booming markets, while there is only a slight decrease in the share of loans that are
fully documented. These results on denial rates, FICO scores, and documentation status
provide little support for the view that a sharp deterioration in underwriting standards,
as measured by these variables, directly contributed to, or even accompanied, house price
acceleration in late-booming markets.
Moreover, these developments in the mortgage market do not appear to be fully explained
by changes in economic fundamentals. As seen in Table 3, late-booming markets did not
experience a significant rise in median household income as credit supply was expanding
prior to the housing boom, consistent with results in Mian and Sufi (2009). However, local
unemployment rates decreased beginning about two years prior to the start of the boom
(marked by the vertical line at t = 1 in Figure A.5) and continued decreasing, on average, for
two years thereafter. This labor market tightening may have contributed to borrowers’ and
lenders’ assessments about borrowers’ ability to repay their mortgages in an environment
where prices were rising but household incomes were not.
Table A.2 provides additional support for shifts in alternative financing playing a con-
tributing role in house price growth in late-booming markets and less so in early-booming
markets. Here, we show the results obtained from estimating structural breaks in each of
our financing measures. Then we compare the timing of the house price break with when
the breaks in alternative financing occur. In the early-booming markets, we find that the
financing structural breaks typically occur after the house price breaks across a large major-
ity of markets. This result, which we can also see in Figure 8, suggests, at best, an indirect
role for financing in explaining the start of early booms. In contrast, structural breaks in
financing in late-booming markets are more likely to occur than in early-booming areas
before or at the same time as the housing booms. These results are consistent with looser
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financing constraints playing a contributing role to the start of later booms.
The differences in how the mortgage market evolved between early- and late-booming mar-
kets suggest that there are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions that lead to housing
booms. Indeed, the link between mortgage market developments and housing prices can
vary across markets, depending on the prevailing economic conditions when house prices
begin to rise in the first place. Whereas early-booming markets experienced higher incomes
along with rising house prices, late-booming markets did not. Instead, credit supply ex-
pansions that lead to loosening financing constraints seem to play a more dominant role in
late-booming markets in spite of the limited support of rising incomes.
Furthermore, the patterns that we uncover across counties and over time support the view
that changes in mortgage contract availability and second lien availability beginning in
2003 (or thereabouts) played an important role in the rise of house prices from 2004–2006,
especially in markets that previously had not experienced sharp increases in prices. These
patterns are consistent with the concurrent work of Justiniano, et al. (2017), who analyze
mortgage spreads during the housing boom and conclude that mid-2003 “marked a turning
point in the development of the credit boom”.
Especially in markets that had not experienced sharp increases in house prices, this credit
expansion appears to have preceded and prompted subsequent price increases. While the
credit expansion did not manifest itself across all possible dimensions of growth, we show
that access to both second liens and alternative mortgage contract types expanded, relaxing
both down-payment and monthly payment constraints. In these late-booming markets,
our evidence supports the view that the credit boom influenced subsequent house price
appreciation.
3.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to disentangle the timing of the use of alternative mortgage
products and the timing of house price growth during the housing boom. To do so, we
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compile a novel dataset on the precise timing of mortgage contracts, and use transparent
methods to identify the timing of the introduction and growth of the use of these alternative
products. During the housing boom of the 2000s, the growth in the use of alternative
mortgage products was as spectacular as the rise in house prices. We find that in many local
housing markets where the start of the booms occurred after 2000, greater use of alternative
mortgage products predated the boom in house prices, providing suggestive evidence that
loosening households’ financing constraints contributed to rising prices. Markets where
booms started earlier (prior to 2000) show no such relationship. Moreover, we find that the
use of alternative mortgage products in late-booming markets cannot be fully accounted for
by the increase in the share of subprime borrowers.
Our separate analysis of early- versus late-booming counties shows the importance of treat-
ing the housing boom as a local, heterogeneous event. Counties with the start of their house
price booms before 2000 show few changes in the composition of mortgage activity but we
estimate gains in median income in these markets. This result complements the findings
of Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) and supports the view that the initial house price boom
was driven by economic fundamentals. In contrast, late-booming counties seem to be those
where the acceleration of house prices, use of alternative mortgage products, and the expan-
sion of credit are most closely linked. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that alternative
mortgage products allowed borrowers to maintain affordability even as they contributed to
rising prices.
Our work has particularly focused on the start of local house price booms, rather than
their evolution over time. An important and nascent body of research focuses on how a
boom changes into a “bubble” in which prices become unmoored from market fundamentals
(see, e.g. Mayer (2011)). Our approach regarding how high house prices led borrowers to
use alternative mortgage products to maintain affordability ignores the feedback effects of
these products during the bubble period. Whether there were important feedback effects
remains a topic for future research. Our research is also limited in explaining why the use of
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alternative mortgage products first started to increase in late-booming markets. Research
on the role of expectations in the housing boom suggests that borrowers and lenders started
to use alternative mortgage products in anticipation of rising house prices but more formally
testing this hypothesis is a direction for future research.
In the wake of the crisis, regulators have placed significant limitations on a number of the
alternative mortgage features discussed in this paper by excluding them from the definition
of a “Qualified Mortgage” for regulatory purposes. As laid out by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) in their January 2013 report, lenders will no longer be able
to underwrite a qualified mortgage loan based on a “teaser” rate in determining ability to
pay. Moreover, mortgages cannot contain interest-only, negative amortization, or extended
term features if lenders want to meet the legal presumption of complying with the qualified
mortgage regulation.82 As we have shown, whether restricting these contract features will
have an impact on the formation and magnitude of housing price cycles in the future depends
crucially on the context of the use of these features. Although these rules have only recently
come into effect, the consequences of limiting these products is also likely to reduce credit
access for some households, while guiding others into more standard contracts. Even with
these shifts in the composition of borrowers and their contracts, our results show that
banning these products is unlikely to eliminate housing booms altogether. What impact
these changes in credit access have on house prices going forward is also a promising area
of future research.
82See the CFPB report on ability to repay rules and qualified mortgages: http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201301_cfpb_ability-to-repay-rule_what-it-means-for-consumers.pdf
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Table 3.1: Magnitude of Break in House Price Growth Rate around County-Specific
Structural Break Points
(a) First House Price Break
Overall Early Late
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price Growth 7.12 6.93 6.23 5.53 7.84 7.99
(0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y N Y N Y
Econ Fundamentals? N Y N Y N Y
Within R-sq. 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.39 0.26 0.36
No. Obs 92092 92092 39419 39419 52673 52673
No. County 984 984 434 434 550 550
(b) Second House Price Break
Overall Early Late
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price Growth 3.91 4.68 4.07 5.03 3.75 4.32
(0.16) (0.17) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y N Y N Y
Econ Fundamentals? N Y N Y N Y
Within R-sq. 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.34 0.18 0.24
No. Obs 42790 42790 22090 22090 20700 20700
No. County 452 452 231 231 221 221
(c) First and/or Second House Price Break
Overall Early Late
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price Growth 6.11 6.19 5.46 5.34 6.66 6.87
(0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y N Y N Y
Econ Fundamentals? N Y N Y N Y
Within R-sq. 0.16 0.23 0.14 0.29 0.20 0.26
No. Obs 134882 134882 61509 61509 73373 73373
No. County 1106 1106 434 434 672 672
Notes: The table presents coefficients from an event study regression of the change in house prices around
the timing of the estimated structural break in house prices. Estimates are the percentage point difference
in the annual growth rate of house prices in year of the house price break relative to the previous year.
Quadratic controls for calendar time used. Odd number columns show the results with no economic
controls and even number columns show those with the economic controls, income level and
unemployment rate. Income as a response variable is only controlled for unemployment rate,
and vice versa. “Early” signifies counties with house price break prior to 2000. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are in parentheses. Source: Authors’ calculations using CoreLogic data.
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Table 3.2: Changes in Mortgage Financing around House Price Structural Breaks
Overall Early Late
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Any 3.11 2.21 -0.65 -1.10 6.24 4.54
(0.37) (0.40) (0.53) (0.57) (0.46) (0.52)
% Variable Rate 2.79 2.10 -0.58 -1.07 5.62 4.30
(0.37) (0.40) (0.52) (0.57) (0.47) (0.53)
% Extended Term 0.07 0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.19 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
% Interest Only 2.09 1.24 -0.04 -0.23 3.84 2.38
(0.18) (0.18) (0.04) (0.06) (0.30) (0.30)
% Negative Amortization 0.41 0.63 0.28 0.34 0.53 0.88
(0.21) (0.29) (0.37) (0.48) (0.25) (0.34)
% with Payment Gap 2.58 1.39 0.86 -0.16 4.02 2.43
(0.26) (0.29) (0.39) (0.47) (0.32) (0.36)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y N Y N Y
Econ Fundamentals? N Y N Y N Y
No. County 715 715 328 328 387 387
Notes: The table presents coefficients from an event study regression of the change in mortgage financing
features in a county relative to the timing of the estimated structural break in house prices. Estimates
are the percentage point difference in each mortgage financing feature in year of the house price break
relative to the previous year. Quadratic controls for calendar time used. Odd number columns show
the results with no economic controls and even number columns show those with the economic
controls, income level and unemployment rate. Income as a response variable is only controlled
for unemployment rate, and vice versa. “Early” signifies counties with house price break prior to 2000.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Source: Authors’ calculations using HMDA,
LPS Applied Analytics, Census, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and CoreLogic data.
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Table 3.3: Changes in Credit Availability and Underwriting around First House Price
Structural Breaks
Overall Early Late
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% FHA -1.28 -1.08 -1.05 -0.08 0.09 0.17 -2.23 -2.03 -1.90
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17)
% Subprime 2.03 1.14 1.23 1.38 0.32 0.24 2.60 1.97 1.90
(0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25)
% Denied -0.11 0.66 0.50 0.51 0.98 0.91 -0.61 0.17 0.12
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.26) (0.26) (0.15) (0.20) (0.19)
% Full Documentation -1.48 -0.90 -0.98 -0.67 1.05 1.00 -2.09 -2.33 -2.24
(0.35) (0.44) (0.44) (0.66) (0.83) (0.83) (0.38) (0.45) (0.44)
FICO 0.40 -0.57 -0.44 -0.05 -0.19 0.14 0.64 -1.02 -0.78
(0.46) (0.59) (0.59) (0.93) (1.20) (1.21) (0.37) (0.50) (0.50)
1st Lien Loan-to-Value -0.15 -0.24 -0.30 0.30 -0.27 -0.24 -0.52 -0.30 -0.33
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Second Lien Share of All Originations 0.81 0.48 0.50 0.05 -0.26 -0.28 1.43 1.13 1.09
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
% Owner-occupied -1.13 -0.57 -0.58 -0.14 0.01 0.03 -1.92 -1.06 -1.00
(0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18)
Debt to Income Ratio 0.05 -0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income (in 1000s) 1.20 0.15 0.12 1.42 0.26 0.26 1.04 0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Unemployment -0.24 -0.19 -0.17 -0.40 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.22 -0.22
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Econ Fundamentals? N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: The table presents coefficients from an event study regression of the change in credit availability and
underwriting in a county relative to the timing of the first estimated structural break in house prices. Esti-
mates are the percentage point difference in each mortgage financing feature in year of the house price break
relative to the previous year. Income as a response variable is only controlled for unemployment
rate, and vice versa. “Early” signifies counties with the first house price break prior to 2000. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Source: Authors’ calculations using HMDA, LPS Applied Analytics, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, and CoreLogic data.
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Table 3.4: Changes in Credit Availability and Underwriting around House Price
Structural Breaks
1st and/or 2nd Breaks 1st Break Only 2nd Break Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% FHA -1.17 -1.20 -1.13 -1.28 -1.08 -1.05 -0.93 -1.50 -1.35
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18)
% Subprime 2.23 1.48 1.57 2.03 1.14 1.23 2.68 2.26 2.33
(0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) (0.29) (0.30)
% Denied -0.01 0.79 0.61 -0.11 0.66 0.50 0.20 1.05 0.81
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.22)
% Full Documentation -1.13 -0.81 -0.91 -1.48 -0.90 -0.98 -0.39 -0.63 -0.75
(0.28) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.44) (0.44) (0.46) (0.56) (0.55)
FICO -0.19 -1.15 -1.03 0.40 -0.57 -0.44 -1.49 -2.41 -2.18
(0.37) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.59) (0.59) (0.63) (0.71) (0.73)
1st Lien Loan-to-Value -0.04 -0.16 -0.21 -0.15 -0.24 -0.30 0.20 0.02 -0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Second Lien Share of All Originations 0.91 0.59 0.62 0.81 0.48 0.50 1.14 0.86 0.89
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
% Owner-occupied -1.03 -0.54 -0.54 -1.13 -0.57 -0.58 -0.81 -0.49 -0.50
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27)
Debt to Income Ratio 0.05 -0.00 -0.00 0.05 -0.00 -0.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income (in 1000s) 1.21 0.16 0.11 1.20 0.15 0.12 1.21 0.16 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Unemployment -0.20 -0.21 -0.19 -0.24 -0.19 -0.17 -0.09 -0.26 -0.23
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Econ Fundamentals? N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: The table presents coefficients from an event study regression of the change in credit availability and
underwriting in a county relative to the timing of the estimated structural breaks in house prices. Estimates
are the percentage point difference in each mortgage financing feature in year of the house price break relative
to the previous year. Income as a response variable is only controlled for unemployment rate, and
vice versa. Source: Authors’ calculations using HMDA, LPS Applied Analytics, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
and CoreLogic data.
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Table 3.5: Changes in House Price Appreciation around Mortgage Structural Breaks
Overall Early Late No. County
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
% Any 1.66 2.18 0.71 1.41 2.39 2.87 429
(0.19) (0.22) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.31)
% Variable Rate 1.39 1.92 0.54 1.19 2.04 2.54 403
(0.19) (0.22) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.30)
% Extended Term -4.21 -2.61 -3.61 -1.57 -4.57 -3.22 584
(0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.30) (0.39) (0.38)
% Interest Only 2.49 3.40 1.22 2.57 3.28 4.01 851
(0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) (0.23)
% Negative Amortization -1.47 -1.19 -1.51 -1.15 -1.44 -1.18 491
(0.22) (0.19) (0.32) (0.26) (0.30) (0.25)
% with Payment Gap 1.30 1.57 0.06 0.26 2.14 2.54 345
(0.23) (0.25) (0.32) (0.33) (0.30) (0.34)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y N Y N Y
Econ Fundamentals? N Y N Y N Y
Notes: The table presents coefficients from an event study regression of the change in the 12-month house
price appreciation rates in a county relative to the timing of the estimated structural break in mortgage
financing features. Estimates are the percentage point difference in house price appreciation in year of the
mortgage price break relative to the previous year. Quadratic controls for calendar time used. “Early”
signifies counties with house price break prior to 2000. Standard errors clustered at the county level in
parentheses. Column (7) shows the number of counties with a valid structural break for each mortgage
variable. Source: Authors’ calculations using HMDA, LPS Applied Analytics, Census, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and CoreLogic data.
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Pooled Sample of Counties
Overall Early Late
(1) (2) (3)
HPA 8.5 6.8 9.7
(6.2) (4.6) (6.9)
% Any 19.4 11.5 24.8
(15.9) (9.6) (17.0)
% Variable Rate 18.9 11.3 24.1
(15.3) (9.5) (16.3)
% Extended Term 0.2 0.2 0.2
(0.9) (1.0) (0.8)
% Interest Only 3.6 0.2 5.9
(8.2) (1.2) (9.9)
% Negative Amortization 7.7 5.6 9.1
(11.0) (11.4) (10.5)
% with Payment Gap 18.2 11.8 22.6
(13.7) (10.5) (14.0)
% Denied 15.2 17.6 13.6
(8.8) (10.9) (6.4)
% Subprime 10.3 5.1 14.0
(8.7) (4.9) (9.0)
% FHA 14.1 15.8 12.9
(9.2) (9.5) (8.8)
% Full Doc 69.0 71.4 67.3
(18.4) (21.9) (15.3)
FICO 694.1 692.9 694.9
(25.7) (32.2) (19.9)
LTV Ratio 83.9 83.5 84.2
(4.5) (5.0) (4.1)
2nd Lien Share of All Originations 2.2 0.3 3.6
(3.4) (0.9) (3.8)
% Owner Occupied 87.1 91.5 84.2
(11.2) (8.3) (11.9)
Income (in 1000s) 43.4 43.3 43.4
(10.1) (10.7) (9.6)
Unemployment Rate 4.8 4.4 5.1
(2.2) (2.3) (2.1)
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for all counties with an estimated structural break in house
prices. Values are county-month averages, with standard deviations in parentheses. Sample consists of
county-months in the year before and after the county experiences a house price break. Source: Authors’
calculations using HMDA, LPS Applied Analytics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and CoreLogic data.
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Figure 3.1: Share of Loans Originated with Any Alternative Financing Features and
National House Prices
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Note: The figure shows the fraction of purchase loans originated in a given month with any alternative
financing feature (the blue line, and left y-axis), as well as year-over-year house price appreciation at the
national level (the red line, and corresponding right y-axis). The alternative financing features are those
that reduce the monthly payment relative to a fully amortizing 30-year fixed rate mortgage payment: teaser
variable rate, extended term, interest-only, or negative amortization. See text for details.
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Figure 3.2: Share of Loans with Payment Gap, Overall and by Sand/Non-Sand
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Note: The figure shows the share of loans with a payment gap, defined as the deviation between the actual
mortgage and the payment associated with a fully amortizing 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. The figure shows
an increase in the share beginning in mid-2003, particularly in sand states.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium House Price in the Second Period
H
WTP
H2φ2
h2∗ = WTPk′
µ
Note: This figure shows how the equilibrium house price is derived from the intersection of the inelastic
housing supply curve, H2, and the schedule of the willingness to pay of the second generation consumers,
WTP . At the intersection is the WTP of consumer k′. All consumers with WTPi ≥ WTPk′ then pay h2∗
with loans of size h2∗ from the lender.
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Figure 3.4: Estimated House Price Break and Use of Alternative Mortgage Products in
Clark County
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Note: The figure the timing of the estimated house price break in Clark County, NV, which is where Las
Vegas is located. House price break is estimated using a break-point methodology described in the text.
The upper figure shows both the level of house prices (the blue dashed line, and the left y-axis) and the 12-
month appreciation rate (the red line and corresponding right y-axis). The lower figure shows the fraction
of purchase loans with a “payment gap,” or any deviation from the fully amortizing 30-year fixed-rate
mortgage payment (blue dashed line), and the share with any alternative financing feature (the red line) in
Clark County, NV. The vertical line represents the month in which the house price break occurred.
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Figure 3.5: Event Study Figure of First House Price Breaks the Early and Late County
Specification
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Note: The figure shows event study figures for the 12-month house price appreciation where where time=0
is the year of the structural break in house prices. See text for details of break-point methodology. “Early”
counties are defined to have the first house break before January 2000 and “late” counties have the break
in January 2000 or later. Dashed line represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Event study specifica-
tion include county fixed effects, a quadratic in calendar time and economic fundamentals (income and
unemployment). See text for details on event study methodology.
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Figure 3.6: Event Study Figure of First and Second House Price Breaks
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Note: Counties are defined to have a valid first break if the corresponding break is statistically significant at
95% and have at least 36 months between January 1993 and the month of the month of peak HPA. Similarly,
counties are defined to have a valid second break if the corresponding break is statistically significant at
the 95% and have at least 12 months between the first peak and the second peak. Among 1,163 in-sample
counties, 984 have a valid first house break and 452 have a valid second house break.
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Figure 3.7: Event Study Figure of Alternative Financing Variables around First and
Second House Price Break
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Note: The figure shows the event study figures for alternative financing variables where where time=0 is
the year of the first and second structural break in house prices, respectively. See text for details of break-
point methodology. Dashed line represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Event study specification include
county fixed effects, a quadratic in calendar time and economic fundamentals (income and unemployment).
See text for details on event study methodology
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Figure 3.8: Alternative Financing Variables with the Early and Late County Specification
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Note: The figure shows the event study figures for alternative financing variables where where time=0 is
the year of the structural break in house prices. See text for details of break-point methodology. “Early”
counties have the first house break before January 2000 and “late” counties have the first break in January
2000 or later. Dashed line represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Event study specification include county
fixed effects, a quadratic in calendar time and economic fundamentals (income and unemployment). See
text for details on event study methodology.
147
Figure 3.9: Event Study Figure of Mortgage Variables around First and Second House
Price Break
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Note: The figure shows the event study figures for mortgage variables where where time=0 is the year of the
first and second structural break in house prices, respectively. See text for details of break-point methodology.
Dashed line represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Event study specification include county fixed effects,
a quadratic in calendar time and economic fundamentals (income and unemployment). See text for details
on event study methodology
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Figure 3.10: Mortgage Variables with the Early and Late County Specification
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Note: The figure shows the event study figures for mortgage variables where where time=0 is the year of
the structural break in house prices. See text for details of break-point methodology. “Early” counties have
the first house break before January 2000 and “late” counties have the first break in January 2000 or later.
Dashed line represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Event study specification include county fixed effects,
a quadratic in calendar time and economic fundamentals (income and unemployment). See text for details
on event study methodology.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Online Retail Data
A.1.1. Estimation of Projected Effects with 2016 Data
Industry projections suggest that a 20 percent adoption rates for online grocery platforms
is reasonable in the next one-two decades. For instance, a recent Nielson report, The
Digitally Engaged Food Shopper (2017), suggests that as many as 70 percent of consumers
will regularly purchase food online by 2025, through platforms and other online grocery
services. Furthermore, I already find rates of high-use take-up above 15 percent in some
isolated zip codes by the end of my sample period. Back-of-the-envelope calculation of
project effects for 2016 are also based on: Census estimates of total retail sales for groceries
of $626 billion; Nielson estimate of online grocery sales of $20.5 billion; Mintel estimate of
$2.39 billion in total sales for ready-to-serve coffee; Starbucks’ 10-K for 2016 showing 74
percent of sales came from ready-to-serve drinks.
A.1.2. Online Retail Classification
I define a transaction as “online” if the consumer uses the internet for payment and is not
physically present at an oﬄine retail establishment at the time of exchange. This definition
focuses on the type of online retail that physically separates consumers and merchants, thus
possibly breaking the chain of stores a consumer would visit on a particular shopping trip.
Under this definition, many of the types of purchases commonly thought of as online, like
those made at a large online retailer or through a merchant’s webpage, are online. However,
some purchases which are considered to be online under other definitions are not included
under this definition. For example, a consumer may be able to reserve and pay for a pair of
shoes or tv set online and then pick up that purchase in-person at a store. I do not consider
that to be an online purchase in this research because the consumer still travels to the
store. This varies from other definitions, largely developed by government organizations,
150
whose goal is to measure the size of online retail markets. For example, the Census defines
e-commerce as, “the sale of goods and services where the buyer places an order, or the price
and terms of sale are negotiated over an Electronic Data Interchange, the Internet, or any
other online system,” in which, “payment may or may not be made online.”
I use a classification algorithm to target these transactions and assign purchases to be
online or oﬄine. The algorithm takes indicators for whether the card was present at the
time of purchase, merchant location information, and merchant descriptions to decide the
most likely retail channel for a particular purchase. International purchases, returns, and
non-product or service related transactions (i.e. tax payments) are discarded. The share of
products classified as online versus oﬄine is higher than other estimates because a greater
share of online purchases are made on card and some purchase categories (i.e. airline tickets)
are included in my data, but excluded from other retail data. For this reasons, Figure A.1.1
shows that the share of online retail in my data is 25 percent in the most recent month,
while the MRTS estimates online retail at just 8.2 percent.
To classify online purchases as online grocery purchases, I use merchant descriptions to
identify purchases from each specific platform that qualifies as an online grocery platform.
To be an online grocery platform, I require that the service directly delivers groceries to a
consumer. These platforms were identified through web searches and existing lists of online
grocers. There are 14 merchants that are currently identified and classified as an online
grocery platform.
A.1.3. Additional Summary Statistics
Basic summary statistics for the 4.6 million consumers, their spending patterns, and the
retail density in their zip codes can be found in Table A.1.1. In my sample, consumers make
online purchases 4.3 days per month and oﬄine purchases 19.5 days per month, on average.
In addition, they average 1-2 purchases at 1-2 stores per day. Grocery stores are the largest
spending category, while restaurants are purchased on the most days per month. To control
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for the different sizes of cities, I measure retail density in a zip code as the percent of retail
stores in a city located in that zip code. At the beginning of my sample, consumers on
average live in the same zip code as 0.5 percent of the retail stores in their city, though
there is substantial variation, particularly in the density of clothing stores and coffee shops
in the same zip code.
The spending patterns of these consumers compare well to outside datasets. For example,
Figure A.1.2 shows that the growth in overall retail spending between my sample data and
the Monthly Retail Trade Survey is very similar for the last three years. In addition, the
distribution of income (including customers outside the fifteen cities) closely matches that
of a recent analysis of the Consumer Population Survey. However, the sample population
skews slightly younger, likely reflecting the younger customers are more likely to be heavy
card users and so included in the sample. In terms of shopping behavior, the customers in
my sample compare well with the most recent National Household Transportation Survey in
2009. In that survey, individuals made an average of 60.4 shopping related trips per month
and households made an average of 3.0 online purchases per month (more for households
with children). My sample is roughly in line with this, though online purchases are more
common, likely reflecting the differences in sample periods and populations.
A.1.4. Effects by Take-up Timing
Consumers that take-up an online grocery platform in the first months after a platform
entry use them more intensely than consumer that take-up later. Figure A.1.3 shows the
average effect in the month of take-up on spending at grocery stores and on online grocery
platforms, compared to consumers high-use early adopters who take-up one month later.
However, after the first three months after entry, there is no discernible difference in the
intensity of substitution from oﬄine to online.
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A.1.5. Effects for High-Use Late Adopters
Results for the reorganization of grocery store and coffee shops visits for high-use late
adopters are very similar to the main results for high-use early adopters. The most signifi-
cant difference is the stronger persistence over time in the shift from trips only to grocery
stores to staying at home home, rather than conversion back toward zero. This may reflect
these users only taking up platforms once they need them.
A.1.6. Effects on Other Products
I measure the effect of platform entry on other product types to show that the disruption
to consumer spending patterns extends beyond the extreme examples of groceries and cof-
fee. Table A.1.2 shows the frequency with which different products are purchased with
oﬄine groceries and coffee across the population, making them susceptible to increases and
decreases in their trip frequency. For example, consumers make restaurant and pharmacy
purchases 32 percent and 7 percent, respectively, of the days on which purchases are made
at grocery stores. However, unlike coffee shops, they are also vulnerable to product substi-
tution – restaurants are an option for food away from home and pharmacies sell medication
and basic food stuffs (like milk and eggs). While it is difficult to separate out the im-
portance of these two mechanisms individually for these products, Figure A5 shows that
grocery platforms have a positive effect on the frequency of purchases at restaurants and a
negative effect on pharmacies in large cities, with opposite effects in smaller cities. These
differences may be attributable to differences in retail density in large versus small cities or
differences in the composition of their customer populations.
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Table A.1.1: Customer Sample Summary Statistics
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Central City 0.27 0.44 0 1
Age 44.87 14.32 18 X
Annual Income 66,048.39 60,942.40 10,000.00 1,000,000.00
Month Spend 2,139.01 2,187.00 X X
N Online Trips 4.30 4.19 0 31
N Grocery Online Trips 0.02 0.22 0 27
N Shopping Trips 19.47 7.09 1 31
N Days in Month 30.43 0.84 28 31
Avg. N Txns. 1.54 1.03 0.03 80.58
Avg. N Products 1.23 0.71 0.00 7.68
Avg. N Stores 1.45 0.94 0.00 49.74
Spend Share Rest Oﬄine 0.11 0.11 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Cloth Oﬄine 0.03 0.06 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Grocery Oﬄine 0.15 0.14 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Fuel Oﬄine 0.08 0.09 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Nondur Oﬄine 0.11 0.12 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Services Oﬄine 0.02 0.04 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Pharm Oﬄine 0.03 0.05 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Coffee Oﬄine 0.004 0.01 0.00 1.00
Avg. Trips Rest Oﬄine 0.26 0.23 0.00 1.00
Avg. Trips Cloth Oﬄine 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.94
Avg. Trips Grocery Oﬄine 0.18 0.15 0.00 1.00
Avg. Trips Fuel Oﬄine 0.17 0.17 0.00 1.00
Avg. Trips Nondur Oﬄine 0.13 0.12 0.00 1.00
Avg. Trips Services Oﬄine 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.94
Avg. Trips Pharm Oﬄine 0.05 0.07 0.00 1.00
Avg. Trips Coffee Oﬄine 0.03 0.07 0.00 1.00
Avg. Spend Rest Oﬄine 7.19 9.34 0.00 3,091.17
Avg. Spend Cloth Oﬄine 2.08 5.79 0.00 2,626.71
Avg. Spend Grocery Oﬄine 9.04 10.21 0.00 2,058.22
Avg. Spend Fuel Oﬄine 4.89 5.88 0.00 1,711.25
Avg. Spend Nondur Oﬄine 7.54 10.59 0.00 2,580.65
Avg. Spend Services Oﬄine 1.11 3.12 0.00 1,179.52
Avg. Spend Pharm Oﬄine 1.55 3.82 0.00 1,803.33
Avg. Spend Coffee Oﬄine 0.21 0.64 0.00 72.68
Spend Share Rest Online 0.004 0.02 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Cloth Online 0.01 0.03 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Grocery Online 0.001 0.01 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Nondur Online 0.03 0.07 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Services Online 0.003 0.02 0.00 1.00
Spend Share Pharm Online 0.001 0.01 0.00 1.00
Avg. Spend Rest Online 0.32 3.14 0.00 3,406.87
Avg. Spend Cloth Online 0.47 3.92 0.00 2,174.51
Avg. Spend Grocery Online 0.04 0.83 0.00 611.60
Avg. Spend Nondur Online 2.18 8.22 0.00 3,950.35
Avg. Spend Services Online 0.27 3.03 0.00 3,258.36
Avg. Spend Pharm Online 0.07 1.40 0.00 2,251.50
Take-up Online Grocery 0.03 0.18 0 1
N Mths. Use Platform 5.12 8.00 1 56
N Platforms in City 5.17 3.87 0 13
Init. Rest Zip Density 0.53 0.57 0.00 6.75
Init. Cloth Zip Density 0.54 0.91 0.00 10.58
Init. Grocery Zip Density 0.57 0.61 0.00 5.52
Init. Fuel Zip Density 0.52 0.54 0.00 4.18
Init. Nondur Zip Density 0.52 0.55 0.00 5.50
Init. Services Zip Density 0.55 0.63 0.00 5.34
Init. Pharm Zip Density 0.56 0.59 0.00 5.06
Init. Coffee Zip Density 0.54 0.72 0.00 7.50
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of a 10 million observation random sample and reflect the
observations of 10 or more customers. 154
Table A.1.2: Product Combinations
Bought With Grocery Coffee
Clothing 0.04 0.06
Coffee 0.04
Fuel 0.23 0.24
Grocery 0.25
Liquor 0.02 0.02
Non-durables 0.20 0.21
Pharmacies 0.07 0.10
Restaurants 0.32 0.50
Services 0.04 0.05
Notes: This table shows the frequency with which other products are purchased
with groceries and coffee.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of 4.5 million customers.
Figure A.1.1: Online Retail Share
Notes: This figures shows the growing share of online retail over time. The
online retail share is greater in this data due to greater shares of online purchases
appearing on card and the inclusion of product categories, typically excluded from
other retail data, that are commonly made online (i.e. airline tickets).
Source: Author’s calculations using the card transactions from a 4.5 million cus-
tomer sample.
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Figure A.1.4: Change in Grocery Store and Coffee Shop Trips for High-use Late Adopters
(a) Grocery Store and Coffee at Home (b) Coffee Shop
(c) Grocery Store and Coffee Shop (d) Coffee at Home
Notes: This figure shows that high-use late adopters change the composition of their trips to grocery stores
and coffee shops after they take-up an online grocery platform.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of high-use late adopters of online grocery platforms and
each of their two nearest neighbors matched on zip code, demographics, and pre-take-up spending patterns.
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Figure A.1.5: Changes in Frequency of Visits to Restaurants and Pharmacies
(a) Big cities: Restaurants (b) Big cities: Pharmacies
(c) Small cities: Restaurants (d) Small cities: Pharmacies
Notes: This figure shows the average impact of each grocery platform entry on the average trip frequency
for restaurants and pharmacies for across all customers, regardless of platform use, in big versus small cities.
Large cities show a positive effect for restaurants and a negative effect for groceries, while small cities show
the opposite effects.
Source: Author’s calculations using the transactions of customers outside of New York.
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A.2. Trip-chaining Model
A.2.1. Comparison to Logit and Nested Logit Models
The logit model assumes that the taste shocks for each trip are ij ∼ EV 1 and iid. Therefore
the probability of making a trip only to the coffee shop is:
Pgnc1 =
exp(v(c1)− 2τt(c1))∑
ij exp(v(gi) + v(cj)− T (i, j))
(A.2.1)
with the probabilities of the other three trips, conditional on take-up choice, similarly
defined. The derivatives of the relative probabilities of the coffee ship trip with the other
three trips with respect to the value of the grocery store visit are:
ln(
Pgnc1
Pgnc0
) = v(c1)− v(c0) + τ(t(c0)− 2t(c1)) =⇒ −
∂ln(
Pgnc1
Pgnc0
)
∂v(g1)
= 0 (A.2.2)
ln(
Pgnc1
Pg1c1
) = −v(g1) + τ(td + t(g1)− t(c1)) =⇒ −
∂ln(
Pgnc1
Pg1c1
)
∂v(g1)
= 1 (A.2.3)
ln(
Pgnc1
Pg1c0
) = v(c1)−v(g1)−v(c0)+τ(2t(g1)+ t(c0)−2t(c1)) =⇒ −
∂ln(
Pgnc1
Pg1c0
)
∂v(g1)
= 1 (A.2.4)
which tells us that only the relative probabilities of choices containing grocery stores are
affected by the reduction in grocery store value. Furthermore, even those derivatives do not
capture any of the richness of the substitution patterns that we would expect to come for
consumers having different values for the two stores or being located at different relative
distances to them.
The classic solution to capturing a richer set of substitution is to group correlated choices
within nests and then estimate the nested logit model. This allows any choices within the
same nest to be correlated, so that a given choice is directly affected by changes in features
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of other choices within the nest and only affected by the features of choices outside the nest
through the inclusive value of the other nests. For example, we expect a shock to the value
of a visit to the coffee shop to affect the odds of visiting both trips containing the coffee
shop visit. This implies I should nest the coffee shop trip and the trip to the grocery store
and the coffee shop in the same nest. Then, the relative probability of a trip outside of that
two trip nest changes with the inclusive value of that nest, Ignc1,g1c1 . For example:
ln(
Pgnc1
Pgnc0
) =
v(c1)− 2τt(c1)
1− σgnc1,g1c1
− v(c0)− τt(c0)
1− σgnc0
+ Ignc1,g1c1
=⇒ −
∂ln(
Pgnc1
Pgnc0
)
∂v(g1)
= −∂Ignc1,g1c1
∂v(g1)
(A.2.5)
However, the relative probability of the coffee shop trip to the coffee at home trip remains
unchanged from before. Furthermore, it is not clear that this is the correct way to nest
these trips. For example, if the value of the grocery store is high for an unknown reason,
we would expect the the probabilities of the trip to the grocery store and coffee at home
and the trip to the grocery store and the coffee shop to both be higher. In fact, the value
of each trip choice in this two-store model example is likely to be correlated with any other
trip choice through either the values of the stores or their time costs. This means that to
appreciate the full impact of any fall in v(g1), I need to account for the cross elasticities
of all the choices. The PCL model allows for this flexibility and variation by consumers’
unique relative locations.
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A.2.2. Predictions from the Paired Combinatorial Logit Model
For any two trips, the effect of lowering the value of a trip to the grocery store, holding all
else equal, on the relative probability of any two trips is:
∂ln
(
Pgicj
Pgrcs
)
∂v(g1)
=
∑
gxcy 6=gicj
(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Pgicj |gicj ,gxcy
∂v(g1)
Vgicj ,gxcy +
(2)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pgicj |gicj ,gxcy
∂Vgicj ,gxcy
∂v(g1)∑
gxcy 6=gicj Pgicj |gicj ,gxcyVgicj ,gxcy
−
∑
gxcy 6=grcs
(3)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Pgrcs|grcs,gxcy
∂v(g1)
Vgrcs,gxcy +
(4)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pgrcs|grcs,gxcy
∂Vgrcs,gxcy
∂v(g1)∑
gxcy 6=grcs Pgrcs|grcs,gxcyVgrcs,gxcy
(A.2.6)
so that the 6 derivatives of the relative pair probabilities all depend on the 6 values of the
trips pairs, the 12 conditional probabilities of each trip in a pair, and the derivatives of each
of those values with respect to the value of the grocery store visit. These derivatives are in
Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2 below. They show that the value of all the trip pairs containing a
trip that includes a visit to the grocery store fall, with the pair including two trips with a
visit to the grocery store (the pair in the second row) falling the most. The value of the
pair without a trip to the grocery store (the pair in the fifth row) is not affected. For the
conditional values, the probabilities of picking a trip with the grocery store fall and the
probabilities of picking a trip with the coffee shop or coffee at home rise.
These changes in trip values show that, for all consumers, the value of making trips for the
collection of trip pairs falls and falls the most for consumers for whom making trips is most
costly. This especially includes consumers for whom making grocery store visits is costly.
In addition, the changes in conditional trip values vary for trips of different types with the
coffee at home trip and the trip to only the coffee shop becoming relatively more valuable
compared to trips including the grocery store.
Return to equation (4) from section 1.3, the derivative of the relative probabilities of going
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to the coffee shop versus staying at home with respect to the value from a visit to the grocery
store. The first six predictions outlined in that section derive directly from the corresponding
equations for (A.2.6). In set (1) of equation (A.2.6), the probability of picking the coffee
shop trip out of any pair will stay the same or increase, making these terms positive. The
terms in set (3) capture the same probabilities for the coffee at home trip, and will also be
positive. When the coffee shop is close to the consumer, the coffee shop trip is made more
likely because the terms in set (1) will increase relative to those in set (3). In sets (2) and
(4) of equation (A.2.6), values for pairs in which the coffee shop trip or coffee at home trip
are paired with a trip to the grocery will be lower, making those terms negative. A similar
exercise comparing the change in relative likelihood of the coffee shop trip against the other
trips flushes out the full first 6 predictions.
With respect to the addition of more grocery stores and coffee shops to the consumer’s
choice set, this quickly increases the pairs of possible trips. The patterns of substitution
between any two trip pairs follows the same general logic. Most importantly, with the
increase in trip options, any single trip or pair of trips becomes less likely and it is easier for
consumers to make marginal substitutions away from trips with lower utility value. This
increase in options leads directly to predictions (7) and (8) in the section 1.3.
Table A.2.1: Change in Values of Trip Pairs
Trip Pair Change Sign
g1c0, gnc1 Pgnc1|g1c0,gnc1Vg1c0,gnc1 −
g1c0, g1c1 Vg1c0,g1c1 −
g1c0, gnc0 Pg1c0|g1c0,gnc0Vg1c0,gnc0 −
gnc1, g1c1 Pg1c1|gnc1,g1c1Vgnc1,g1c1 −
gnc1, gnc0 0
g1c1, gnc0 Pg1c1|g1c1,gnc0Vg1c1,gnc0 −
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Table A.2.2: Change in Trip Values Conditional on Trip Pair
Trip | Trip Pair Change Sign
g1c0|g1c0, gnc1 11−σgnc1,g1c0 Pg1c0|gnc1,g1c0 [1− Pg1c0|gnc1,g1c0 ] −
gnc1|g1c0, gnc1 − 11−σgnc1,g1c0 [Pgnc1|gnc1,g1c0 ]
2 +
g1c0|g1c0, g1c1 0
g1c1|g1c0, g1c1 0
g1c0|g1c0, gnc0 11−σg1c0,gnc0 Pg1c0|g1c0,gnc0 [1− Pg1c0|g1c0,gnc0 ] −
gnc0|g1c0, gnc0 − 11−σg1c0,gnc0 [Pgnc0|g1c0,gnc0 ]
2 +
gnc1|gnc1, g1c1 − 11−σgnc1,g1c1 [Pgnc1|gnc1,g1c1 ]
2 +
g1c1|gnc1, g1c1 11−σgnc1,g1c1 Pg1c0|gnc1,g1c1 [1− Pg1c1|gnc1,g1c1 ] −
gnc1|gnc1, gnc0 0
gnc0|gnc1, gnc0 0
g1c1|g1c1, gnc0 11−σg1c1,gnc0 Pg1c1|g1c1,gnc0 [1− Pg1c1|g1c1,gnc0 ] −
gnc0|g1c1, gnc0 − 11−σg1c1,gnc0 [Pgnc0|g1c1,gnc0 ]
2 +
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A.3. Branch Density Instruments
Table A.3.1: Instrumenting for Local Bank Branches
Gen. Branches Mort. Branches Comp. Branches
Gen. Branches 5-10 Mi. 0.240*** -0.013 -0.047***
(0.021) (0.007) (0.004)
Gen. Branches 10-20 Mi. 0.069*** 0.005 0.000
(0.017) (0.008) (0.005)
Gen. Branches 20-50 Mi. 0.059*** -0.014* 0.010
(0.018) (0.006) (0.005)
Gen. Branches 50-100 Mi. 0.115*** 0.013 -0.023***
(0.019) (0.008) (0.003)
Mort. Branches 5-10 Mi. -0.003* 0.043* -0.004**
(0.001) (0.018) (0.001)
Mort. Branches 10-20 Mi. -0.004*** 0.038 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.021) (0.002)
Mort. Branches 20-50 Mi. -0.008*** 0.052*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.008) (0.003)
Mort. Branches 50-100 Mi. -0.014*** 0.019*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Comp. Branches 5-10 Mi. -0.011*** 0.001 0.066***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Comp. Branches 10-20 Mi. -0.021*** -0.008* 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Comp. Branches 20-50 Mi. 0.002 0.007* 0.071***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Comp. Branches 50-100 Mi. -0.006** 0.013*** -0.037***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Dist to Center -0.010*** -0.008** -0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Std. Distance -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Within R-sq. 0.02 0.01 0.05
No. Obs 8515381 8515381 8515381
Year FE Y Y Y
Tract x Lender FE Y Y Y
Notes: Significance levels are * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001. This table corresponds to
the first stage of the 2SLS results found in Table 6: Panel B. Sample restricted to observations for local
banks that have a positive national stock of branches. The number of a local bank’s branches of each type
and competitors’ branches in a census tract are regressed on measures of distance to the bank’s branch
network, branches of each type, and distance to competitors’ branches.
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Table A.3.2: Instrumenting for Non-Local Bank Branches
Gen. Branches Mort. Branches Comp. Branches
Gen. Branches 5-10 Mi. 0.060*** -0.008* -0.005
(0.011) (0.004) (0.003)
Gen. Branches 10-20 Mi. 0.014 0.003 -0.001
(0.010) (0.003) (0.002)
Gen. Branches 20-50 Mi. 0.045*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Gen. Branches 50-100 Mi. 0.038*** -0.002 -0.014***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Mort. Branches 5-10 Mi. -0.008*** 0.033*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Mort. Branches 10-20 Mi. -0.003 0.037** -0.004*
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002)
Mort. Branches 20-50 Mi. -0.001 0.048*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
Mort. Branches 50-100 Mi. -0.003** 0.036*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
Comp. Branches 5-10 Mi. 0.001 0.011 0.068***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Comp. Branches 10-20 Mi. -0.024*** -0.002 0.009*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Comp. Branches 20-50 Mi. 0.017** -0.010 0.055***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Comp. Branches 50-100 Mi. -0.027*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Dist to Center -0.073*** -0.029** -0.036***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
Std. Distance 0.046*** 0.018*** 0.005*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Within R-sq. 0.03 0.03 0.03
No. Obs 5435901 5435901 5435901
Year FE Y Y Y
Tract x Lender FE Y Y Y
Notes: Significance levels are * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the county by lender level. This table corresponds to the first stage of the 2SLS results
found in Table 7: Panel B. Sample restricted to observations for non-local banks that have a positive national
stock of branches. The number of a non-local bank’s branches of each type and competitors’ branches in a
census tract is regressed on measures of distance to the bank’s branch network, branches of each type, and
distance to competitors’ branches.
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Table A.3.3: Instrumenting for First Branch Type
Gen.
Branch
Mort.
Branch
Local
Branch
Broker
Branch
NBL
Branch
Branches 5-10 Mi. 0.056 0.091 0.078* -0.334*** -0.136**
(0.034) (0.052) (0.036) (0.079) (0.051)
Branches 10-20 Mi. 0.010 0.159** -0.039 -0.311** -0.066
(0.076) (0.052) (0.057) (0.115) (0.066)
Branches 20-50 Mi. 0.182* 0.072 0.127 -0.118 -0.095
(0.088) (0.100) (0.072) (0.130) (0.091)
Branches 50-100 Mi. 0.257** 0.148 0.291*** 0.101 -0.181**
(0.079) (0.084) (0.083) (0.118) (0.061)
Branch Centers 5-10 Mi. -0.034 -0.039 -0.038 0.212*** 0.092*
(0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.037) (0.041)
Branch Centers 10-20 Mi. -0.038 -0.022 -0.038 0.058 0.024
(0.032) (0.022) (0.033) (0.051) (0.037)
Branch Centers 20-50 Mi. -0.060 -0.029 -0.043 -0.021 0.038
(0.033) (0.028) (0.026) (0.064) (0.042)
Branch Centers 50-100 Mi. -0.062* -0.036 -0.093*** 0.011 0.110**
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.044) (0.039)
2 Gen. Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. 0.043 -0.013 -0.028 0.144* 0.090*
(0.044) (0.036) (0.032) (0.059) (0.045)
2 Gen. Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. 0.074 0.146* 0.039 0.254*** 0.127*
(0.050) (0.058) (0.042) (0.074) (0.054)
2 Gen. Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. 0.048 -0.126* -0.045 -0.194 -0.041
(0.055) (0.058) (0.045) (0.107) (0.058)
2 Gen. Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. 0.204** -0.075 0.248*** -0.014 0.282***
(0.077) (0.064) (0.066) (0.090) (0.059)
2 Mort. Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. 0.018 0.076*** 0.029 0.048 -0.007
(0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.027) (0.021)
2 Mort. Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. -0.071* 0.024 -0.038* 0.002 0.067**
(0.029) (0.028) (0.018) (0.037) (0.023)
2 Mort. Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. 0.019 -0.032 -0.008 -0.028 0.078**
(0.027) (0.039) (0.030) (0.041) (0.029)
2 Mort. Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. 0.002 -0.036 -0.007 0.054 0.209***
(0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.050) (0.047)
2 Local Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. 0.053 -0.038 0.079** -0.064 -0.042
(0.043) (0.035) (0.029) (0.059) (0.040)
2 Local Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. 0.017 -0.148* 0.046 -0.142 -0.105
(0.054) (0.058) (0.045) (0.074) (0.058)
2 Local Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. -0.020 0.113 0.091 0.129 -0.067
(0.058) (0.074) (0.055) (0.103) (0.061)
2 Local Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. -0.017 0.009 -0.167* 0.037 -0.256***
(0.089) (0.082) (0.083) (0.104) (0.072)
2 Broker Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. -0.017* -0.012 -0.015* 0.045* -0.003
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.022) (0.010)
2 Broker Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. -0.002 -0.035** -0.011 0.048 -0.038**
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.028) (0.014)
2 Broker Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. 0.005 -0.007 0.003 0.109*** 0.008
(0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016)
2 Broker Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. -0.056** -0.008 -0.042* -0.010 -0.029
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.018)
2 NBL Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. -0.021** -0.006 -0.027*** -0.007 0.074***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.016)
2 NBL Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.021* 0.037**
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
2 NBL Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. 0.007 0.009 0.010 -0.010 0.036*
(0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
2 NBL Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. -0.010 -0.021** -0.000 -0.002 0.009
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Within R-sq. 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03
No. Obs 333979 333979 333979 333979 333979
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Tract FE Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Significance levels are * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the county level. This table corresponds to the first stage of the 2SLS results found Table
10: Panel B. Given the large number of covariates relative to the number of observations, significance is
weaker, but the coefficients are still consistent with other specifications. The sample is restricted to census
tracts in years when they have 0 or 1 branches. The presence of each branch type is regressed on measures
of the density of branches and lenders operating branches of each type nearby. All variables are scaled by
their standard deviation.
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Table A.3.4: Instrumenting for Number of Lenders Operating Each Branch Type
Gen.
Branch
Lender
Mort.
Branch
Lender
Local
Branch
Lender
Broker
Branch
Lender
NBL
Branch
Lender
Branches 5-10 Mi. 0.016 0.068* 0.020 -0.387*** -0.088*
(0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.083) (0.043)
Branches 10-20 Mi. 0.033 0.115*** 0.032 -0.392*** 0.034
(0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.112) (0.058)
Branches 20-50 Mi. 0.191*** 0.165** 0.129** -0.164 -0.103
(0.035) (0.051) (0.042) (0.096) (0.067)
Branches 50-100 Mi. 0.117*** 0.012 0.079* 0.002 -0.234***
(0.029) (0.037) (0.040) (0.110) (0.047)
Branch Centers 5-10 Mi. -0.026** -0.019 -0.004 0.184*** 0.103**
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.050) (0.039)
Branch Centers 10-20 Mi. -0.026 -0.008 -0.006 0.114* -0.044
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.057) (0.032)
Branch Centers 20-50 Mi. -0.053*** -0.066*** -0.016 -0.004 0.011
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.060) (0.036)
Branch Centers 50-100 Mi. -0.030** -0.034** -0.054** 0.011 0.107**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.040) (0.039)
2 Gen. Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. 0.089*** -0.050* -0.024 0.266*** 0.147***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.049) (0.031)
2 Gen. Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. 0.038 -0.001 -0.031 0.304*** 0.173***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.026) (0.066) (0.041)
2 Gen. Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. 0.038 -0.068* -0.091** -0.029 -0.001
(0.023) (0.033) (0.029) (0.089) (0.061)
2 Gen. Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. 0.114*** -0.096* -0.114** -0.271** 0.256***
(0.033) (0.043) (0.037) (0.102) (0.050)
2 Mort. Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. 0.011 0.108*** -0.014 0.088** 0.007
(0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.029) (0.018)
2 Mort. Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. -0.050*** 0.053** -0.032* -0.035 0.001
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.034) (0.020)
2 Mort. Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. -0.005 0.044* -0.008 0.042 0.086***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.037) (0.025)
2 Mort. Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. -0.010 0.003 -0.057* 0.006 0.172***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.052) (0.040)
2 Local Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. -0.005 0.014 0.141*** -0.130* -0.061
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.052) (0.032)
2 Local Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. 0.026 -0.008 0.121*** -0.168* -0.094*
(0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.068) (0.044)
2 Local Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. -0.043 0.078 0.219*** 0.024 -0.117
(0.030) (0.043) (0.036) (0.089) (0.060)
2 Local Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. -0.003 0.075 0.227*** 0.357** -0.208***
(0.037) (0.053) (0.047) (0.115) (0.063)
2 Broker Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. -0.006 -0.010* -0.001 0.053* 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.022) (0.009)
2 Broker Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. -0.004 -0.019*** -0.014** 0.064* -0.040**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.028) (0.014)
2 Broker Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. -0.006 -0.002 -0.011 0.157*** -0.023
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.014)
2 Broker Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. -0.033*** 0.007 -0.008 -0.002 -0.053**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.016)
2 NBL Branch Lenders 5-10 Mi. -0.007** 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.032
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.026)
2 NBL Branch Lenders 10-20 Mi. 0.011* 0.005 0.013** 0.028* 0.074***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.015)
2 NBL Branch Lenders 20-50 Mi. -0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.019 0.122***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.020)
2 NBL Branch Lenders 50-100 Mi. -0.006 0.006 -0.007 0.026 0.112***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.016)
Within R-sq. 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11
No. Obs 811427 811427 811427 811427 811427
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Tract FE Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Significance levels are * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the county level. This table corresponds to the first stage of the 2SLS results found in Table
11: Panel B. The sample is restricted to census tracts in years when they have less than 10 branches. The
number of lenders operating branches of each type is regressed on measures of the density of branches and
lenders operating branches of each type nearby. All variables are scaled by their standard deviation.
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A.4. Branch Presence Robustness
A.4.1. Alternative Instrument Construction
In the main set of results, to estimate the causal effect of branch entry on aggregate census
tract mortgage outcomes, I employ instruments that are also calculated at the census tract
level. For example, in Table 6, I use the number of branches, the number of lenders operating
at least 5 branches, the number of branch centers, and the average standard distance of
networks within each ring of distance from the census tract centroid. While valid, a better
set of instruments would leverage my lender by census tract data to take advantage of
the heterogeneity in lender location decisions. Or, in other words, predict the number of
branches for each lender with the lender by census tract data and then take the sum of that
prediction by census tract as the predicted aggregate number of branches in the second
stage of estimation.
I undertake this exercise in my first set of robustness checks in Tables A.3.1 - A.3.3. First,
the lender by census tract data is used to predict the number of each lender’s branches in a
census tract using the same instruments for the number of a lender’s branches as in Table
4.
̂Branchesitj = ΣNn=1βnNetDistnitj + ΣMm=1βmCompDistmit−j + αij + γt (A.4.1)
Second, the aggregate number of predicted branches is
̂Branchesit = ΣJj=1 ̂Branchesitj (A.4.2)
And third, OLS results are reported for the equation
Yit = β1 ̂Branchesit + αi + γt (A.4.3)
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Calculating correct standard errors for these results is no small task. The usual 2SLS
correction does not apply, and bootstrapped standard errors would be preferable. However,
given the size and complexity of the data, this calculation is impractical. Therefore, the
regular OLS standard errors are reported. The main concern is if the estimated coefficients
meaningfully differ from my main results.
I find that the results from using my imputed instruments closely agree with my main set
of results for the effect of branches on aggregate mortgage activity. Compare Table A.3.1
with Table 11 for the effect of the first branch. The coefficients in Table A.3.1 are smaller
in absolute size, but agree in sign for every outcome except log average income and log
applications. Comparing Table A.3.2 with Table 12 for the effect of the first branch by
branch type, the imputed results show very strong effects in the percent of applications
denied, log average income, and percent of originations sold. And consistent with my
main results, general service bank branches owned by local branches affect these aggregate
mortgage outcomes in ways consistent with an adverse selection problem. While branches
owned by local banks, mortgage brokers, and non-bank lenders appear to increase credit
access for borrowers with low-quality hard information. These patterns are repeated in
Table A.3.3 for the affect of multiple lenders operating branches (compare to Table 13).
A.4.2. Neighbors with Few Branches:
My model and empirical work assume that borrowers do not travel to seek offers at branches
outside of their neighborhood. This assumption may be incorrect, especially in areas where
census tracts are small and traveling to neighboring census tracts does not impose large
costs. Therefore, I run a version of my main, aggregate results in which I further limit to
census tracts without many neighboring branches. More specifically, I count up all of the
branches in the neighboring census tracts and in the neighbors of the neighboring census
tracts. Then, I keep only census tracts while they have fewer than 20 branches in this
double ring of neighbors. These census tracts, therefore, contain households which are
much more restricted in their ability to travel to outside branches. Unfortunately, this also
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dramatically cuts down the sample size and my statistical power; F-stats are much smaller
and second-stage coefficients are far less significant.
However, the results for census tracts with few neighboring branches are still widely con-
sistent with my main set of results. Comparing Table A.3.4 to Table 12, in tracts without
neighboring branches there is even stronger evidence for an adverse selection problem. The
percent denied has a borderline significant increase of 14.8 percentage points, log average
income increases by .758 log points, the percent conventional has a borderline significant
increase of 16 percentage points, and foreclosure rates fall by 7.8 percentage points. This
again points to a general retrenchment towards borrowers with high-quality hard informa-
tion when a single branch is present. Comparing Table A.3.5 to Table 12, little is statistically
significant and that F-stats are especially low. There is more statistically power by type
when we look beyond the first branch in Table A.3.6 (compare to Table 13). Here ad-
ditional lenders operating general service bank branches increase both log loans and log
applications and decrease the percent sold by 10.6 percentage points. This is some evidence
against adverse selection. More non-bank lenders operating branches significantly decreases
the percent denied by 19.0 percentage points and the percent sold by 18.1 percentage points.
Restrictions on different numbers of neighboring branches are also widely consistent with
my main set of results.
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A.5. Branch Model Details
A.5.1. Solving the Simple Game
There are two lenders operating in a neighborhood, call them L1 and L2. Both lenders face
the same cost of supplying a loan and opening a branch.
Case 1: No information asymmetry. Either both lenders open a branch or neither lender
opens a branch.
Stage 4: Lenders compete for households’ business by offering their most competitive rate.
Households accepts rcθi = min{r
j
θi
, r−jθi } if (2) and (3) hold for their effective interest rate,
reθi . The effective interest rate solves the equation (1−ρ)reθi = rcθi , where rho is the discount
factor. We have reθi =
rcθi
(1−ρ) .
Stage 3: Households will only pay search costs if the benefits outweigh the costs, i.e.
E[reθi |η
j
i = θi, n = 1] < r
j
θi
, the initial offer from lender j, and E[reθi |η
j
i = θi, n = 1] < I,
meaning search is affordable. To determine their expected competitive interest rate, they
will compare the minimum rate they can receive from their original lender and the minimum
rate they expect to receive from the other lender if they search. The expected competitive
rate
E[rci |ηji = θi, n = 1] = min{rji , E[r−jθi |η
j
i = θi, n = 1]} (A.5.1)
where
E[r−jθi |η
j
i = θi, n = 1] = P (θi = θh|ηji = θi)[q−j(b)r−jθh + (1− q−j(b))r
−j
θl
]+
P (θi = θl|ηji = θi)[(1− q−j(b))r−jθh + q−j(b)r
−j
θl
]
(A.5.2)
Which has the property that E[rcθi |η
j
i = θh, n = 1] < E[r
c
θi
|ηji = θl, n = 1].
Stage 2: Lenders make their initial offer to households, rjθi , conditional on the type signaled
by the screening technology. The initial offer will depend on I, µ, ρ, and E[rcθi |η
j
i = θi, n =
180
1]. Using Bayes’ theorem I can solve for the lenders’ lowest rate they are willing to offer
borrowers with ηj = θi
1:
rjθh =

c[1 + θlθh
1−q
q
1+q
2−q ] if η
−j
i = θl, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
1−q
q ] otherwise
(A.5.3)
rjθl =

c[1 + θlθh
q
1−q
1+q
2−q ] if η
−j
i = θl, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
q
1−q ] otherwise
(A.5.4)
The second term inside the brackets in equations (A.5.3) and (A.5.4), what I call the infor-
mation markup, captures the negative relationship between information quality and rates.
With full information about borrowers, lenders could offer rates at cost for θh households
and the information markup would be zero. When household type is uncertain, the infor-
mation markup increases with the proportion of type θl borrowers in the neighborhood and
further increases if they are expected to apply to both lenders. But as screening technology
improves, households with ηji = θh receive lower rates and households with η
j
i = θl receive
higher rates. Of course, the lender may be able to charge borrowers interest rates above
the minimum and increase profits if I, µ, or ρ are high.
The expected profits of each lender from mortgages will depend on whether borrowers with
ηji = θl search and the interest rates they can charge borrowers of each type such that
1For example, calculation of the minimum rate, rjθh , when η
−j
i = θl, n = 1 uses Bayes’ theorem to calculate
P (θi = θh|ηji = θh) = P (ηji = θh|θi = θh) ∗ P (θi = θh)/P (ηi = θh) = (qθh + qθh(1− q))/(qθh + (1− q)θl +
qθh(1 − q) + qθl(1 − q)). Then rearrange P (θi = θh|ηji = θh) ∗ rjθi ≥ c to find r
j
θi
≥ c/P (θi = θh|ηji = θh).
This simplifies to equation (8).
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conditions (2) and (3) hold. Let 1{rjθi} signify that r
j
θi
satisfies conditions (2) and (3).
pije = [
1
2
θhq(r
j
θh
− c)− 1
2
θl(1− q)c]1{rjθh}
+ [
1
2
θh[(1− q)(rjθl − c)1{η
−j
i = θl, n = 0}+ (1− q)2(rjθl − c)1{η
−j
i = θl, n = 1}]
− 1
2
θl[qc1{η−ji = θl, n = 0}+ (q)2c1{η−ji = θl, n = 1}]]1{rjθl}
(A.5.5)
The amount of credit in neighborhood i, is determined by θh, θl, I, µ, and ρ. If r
j
θh
and
rjθl are low enough, then all borrowers will want a mortgage. If both are too high, then
there will be no mortgage demand. And if only rjθh is low enough, then only borrowers who
receive at least one signal that they are of type θh will demand mortgages. The quanity of
credit in equilibrium, Q, is:
Q = [θhq + θh(1− q)q1{ηj = θl, n = 1}+ θl(1− q) + θlq(1− q)1{ηji = θl, n = 1}]1{rjθh}
+ [θh(1− q)21{ηj = θl, n = 1}+ θl(q)21{ηji = θl, n = 1}]1{rjθl}
(A.5.6)
In comparison to when neither lender has a branch and q = q(b = 0), the mortgage profits
for each lender when both lenders open a branch and q = q(b = 1) are necessarily higher.
The use of soft information gives them higher expected profits from type θh borrowers.
Whether or not overall profits are higher will depend on the mortgage profits relative to
the cost of opening the branch.
The difference in credit between no branches and two branches is ambiguous. Borrowers of
type θh, may now demand credit if they didn’t before since minimum rates for them have
fallen. For borrowers of type θl, they may now decide not to demand credit if rates have
risen too high. The overall effect on credit will therefore depend on the mortgage takeup
given different rates and the share of each borrower type in the neighborhood.
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Case 2: One lender, say L1, opens a branch and L2 does not.
Stage 4: Lenders compete for households’ business by offering their most competitive rate.
Households accepts rcθi = min{r
j
θi
, r−jθi } if (2) and (3) hold for their effective interest rate,
reθi .
Stage 3: Again, households will only pay search costs if the benefits outweigh the costs, i.e.
E[reθi |ηj = θi, n = 1] < r
j
θi
and E[reθi |ηj = θi, n = 1] < I.
The expected competitive rate has the property that E[rcθi |η2 = θh, n = 1] < E[rcθi |η2 =
θl, n = 1] and E[r
c
θi
|η1 = θl, n = 1] < E[rcθi |η1 = θh, n = 1].
Stage 2: Lenders make their initial offer to households. Given lenders’ minimum rates,
there are a few possible equilibrium search patters: no search, search only by households
originally matched to L1 with η1i = θl, search only by households originally matched to L2
with η2i = θh, and search by both of these sets of households.
Any search will create asymmetry in the applicant pool. And so, each lender should adjust
the rates they charge households. Using Bayes’ theorem we can then calculate the minimum
interest rates for each lender:
r1θh =

c[1 + θlθh
1−q1
q1
1−q2
1+q2
] if η2i = θh, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
1−q1
q1
] otherwise
(A.5.7)
r1θl =

c[1 + θlθh
q1
1−q1
2−q2
1+q2
] if η2i = θh, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
q1
1−q1 ] otherwise
(A.5.8)
r2θh =

c[1 + θlθh
1−q2
q2
1+q1
2−q1 ] if η
1
i = θl, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
1−q2
q2
] otherwise
(A.5.9)
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r2θl =

c[1 + θlθh
q2
1−q2
1+q1
2−q1 ] if η
1
i = θl, n = 1
c[1 + θlθh
q2
1−q2 ] otherwise
(A.5.10)
Searching amounts to multiplying the information markup by an additional term. In the
case of L1, when households with η2i = θh are part of its applicant pool, it raises the
average quality and thus lowers the rates it needs to charge households with both signal
types. Conversely, when households with η1i = θl are part of L2’s applicant pool, it lowers
the average quality and necessitates a rise in interest rates for households with both signal
types. Expected profits for L1 are:
pi1e = [
1
2
θh[q
1(r1θh − c) + q2q1(r1θh − c)1{η2i = θh, n = 1]
− 1
2
θl[(1− q1)c+ (1− q1)(1− q2)c1{η2i = θh, n = 1}]]1{r1θh}
+ [
1
2
θh(1− q1)(r1θl − c)1{η1i = θl, n = 0} −
1
2
θlq
1c1{η1i = θl, n = 0}]1{r1θl}
(A.5.11)
Expected profits for L2 are:
pi2e = [
1
2
θh[q
2(r2θh − c)1{iη2 = θh, n = 0}+ q2(1− q1)(r2θh − c)1{η2i = θh, n = 1}]
− 1
2
θl[(1− q2)c1{η2i = θh, n = 0}+ (1− q2)q1c1{η2i = θh, n = 1}]]1{r2θh}
+ [
1
2
θh[(1− q2)(r2θl − c) + (1− q2)(1− q1)(r
j
θh
− c)1{η1i = θl, n = 1}]
− 1
2
θl[q
2c+ q1q2c]1{η1i = θl, n = 1}]]1{r2θl}
(A.5.12)
Mortgage profits for L1 will be at least as high as when both lenders have a branch. If
borrowers with η2i = θh search, it lowers the minimum rates it needs to charge to all
borrowers and raises expected profits. Therefore overall profits including the cost of the
branch opening will be higher. The exact opposite will be true for L2.
The total quantity of credit in equilibrium is the sum of credit supplied and accepted from
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both lenders:
Q = [
1
2
θl[q
2 + q1q21{η1i = θl, n = 0] +
1
2
θh[(1− q2) + (1− q2)(1− q1)1{η1i = θl, n = 0}]]1{r2θl}
+ [
1
2
θh[q
2
1{η2i = θh, n = 0}+ q2(1− q1)1{η2i = θ2, n = 1}]
+
1
2
θl[(1− q2)1{η2i = θ2, n = 0}+ (1− q2)q11{η2i = θ2, n = 1}]]1{r2θh}
+ [
1
2
θlq
1 +
1
2
θh(1− q1)]1{η1i = θl, n = 0}1{r1θl}
+ [
1
2
θl[(1− q2) + (1− q2)(1− q1)1{η2i = θ2, n = 1}] +
1
2
θh[q
1 + q2q11{η2i = θ2, n = 1}]]1{r1θh}
(A.5.13)
The difference in the amount of credit in comparison to no branches or two branches is
again ambiguous, and depends on changes in mortgage takeup and the share of type θh and
θl borrowers. However, in comparison to no branches, type θh borrowers are unambiguously
better off and type θl borrowers are unambiguously worse off.
A.5.2. Alternatives
L1 and L2 may not be symmetric in costs and utilization of soft information. We can write
a more general expression for the minimum rates charged by each lender:
rjθh =

cj [1 + θlθh
1−qj
qj
1−q−j
1+q−j ] if η
−j
i = θh, n = 1
cj [1 + θlθh
1−qj
qj
1+q−j
2−q−j ] if η
−j
i = θl, n = 1
cj [1 + θlθh
1−qj
qj
] otherwise
(A.5.14)
rjθl =

cj [1 + θlθh
qj
1−qj
2−q−j
1+q−j ] if η
−j
i = θh, n = 1
cj [1 + θlθh
qj
1−qj
1+q−j
2−q−j ] if η
−j
i = θl, n = 1
cj [1 + θlθh
qj
1−qj ] otherwise
(A.5.15)
With this construction, we can make predictions about how the entry of branches owned
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by lenders of different size and type vary in their effect. For example, say that L1 is a local
lender such that q1(b = 1) > q2(b = 1). Then L1 will offer even lower rates to high-quality
borrowers and higher rates to low-quality borrowers. This will, of course, also raise the
rates that must be charged by L2 if borrowers with η1 = θl search and enter its applicant
pool. However, if we also say that c2 < c1 than this rise may not be as dramatic. In this
way, it is more likely that a local lender with a branch will expand credit for high-quality
borrowers with low hard information quality.
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A.6. Affordability
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Table A.6.1: Magnitude of Break in House Price Growth Rate around County-Specific
Structural Break Points Using Alternative Specification: Pre-2000 vs. Post-2000 Breaks
(a) First House Price Break
Overall Pre-2000 Post-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price Growth 7.12 6.93 6.23 5.53 7.84 7.99
(0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y N Y N Y
Econ Fundamentals? N Y N Y N Y
Within R-sq. 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.39 0.26 0.36
No. Obs 92092 92092 39419 39419 52673 52673
No. County 984 984 434 434 550 550
(b) Second House Price Break
Overall Pre-2000 Post-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price Growth 3.91 4.68 3.93 4.04 3.91 4.87
(0.16) (0.17) (0.29) (0.31) (0.19) (0.21)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y N Y N Y
Econ Fundamentals? N Y N Y N Y
Within R-sq. 0.21 0.29 0.11 0.14 0.26 0.34
No. Obs 42790 42790 10214 10214 32576 32576
No. County 452 452 111 111 341 341
(c) First and/or Second House Price Break
Overall Pre-2000 Post-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House Price Growth 6.11 6.19 5.75 5.19 6.33 6.77
(0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
County FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Calendar Time Controls? N Y N Y N Y
Econ Fundamentals? N Y N Y N Y
Within R-sq. 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.31 0.19 0.30
No. Obs 134882 134882 49633 49633 85249 85249
No. County 1106 1106 510 510 792 792
Notes: The table presents coefficients from an event study regression of the change in house prices around
the timing of the estimated structural break in house prices. Estimates are the percentage point difference
in the annual growth rate of house prices in year of the house price break relative to the previous year.
Quadratic controls for calendar time used. Odd number columns show the results with no economic
controls and even number columns show those with the economic controls, income level and
unemployment rate. Income as a response variable is only controlled for unemployment rate,
and vice versa. “Early” signifies counties with house price break prior to 2000. Standard errors clustered
at the county level are in parentheses. Source: Authors’ calculations using CoreLogic data.
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Table A.6.2: Timing of Structural Breaks in Mortgage Financing Variables Relative to
House Price Structural Breaks, 1st vs. 2nd Breaks
(a) First House Price Break
With Respect to House Price Break Share
Before Same After Estimated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Break 9.55 1.63 26.93 38.11
Variable Rate Break 9.35 1.32 25.00 35.67
Extended Term Break 4.57 0.81 44.92 50.30
Payment Gap Break 11.28 2.64 15.96 29.88
FHA Break 12.80 3.15 27.64 43.60
2nd Lien break 13.01 3.96 56.00 72.97
Denied Break 25.00 1.63 20.22 46.85
(b) Second House Price Break
With Respect to House Price Break Share
Before Same After Estimated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Break 16.81 1.99 11.95 30.75
Variable Rate Break 15.71 1.99 11.5 29.20
Extended Term Break 7.52 1.55 35.84 44.91
Payment Gap Break 15.93 1.33 7.52 24.78
FHA Break 22.57 2.88 16.81 42.26
2nd Lien break 23.67 6.42 40.27 70.35
Denied Break 29.42 1.33 15.27 46.02
Notes: The tables show whether structural breaks in mortgage financing variables occur before, concurrently,
or after first or second estimated structural breaks in house prices in a given county. The mortgage break is
defined to occur “before” if (difference)<3, “concurrently” if -3<(difference)<3, and “after” if (difference)>3.
First three columns do not necessarily sum to 100 percent in a given row because counties do not always
have an estimated break in other variables. Sample consists of counties experiencing each house price
break. Source: Authors’ calculations using HMDA, LPS Applied Analytics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
CoreLogic data.
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Table A.6.3: Timing of Structural Breaks in Mortgage Financing Variables Relative to
House Price Structural Breaks, Early vs. Late Counties
(a) Counties with First Break before January 2000 (“Early”)
With Respect to House Price Break Share
Before Same After Estimated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Break 4.38 0.23 38.25 42.86
Variable Rate Break 4.15 0.23 35.71 40.09
Extended Term Break 2.07 0.69 47.47 50.23
Payment Gap Break 6.68 1.15 24.42 32.26
FHA Break 5.53 0.23 39.86 45.62
2nd Lien break 0.46 0 75.35 75.81
Denied Break 8.99 1.15 36.64 46.77
(b) Counties with First Break in January 2000 and after (“Late”)
With Respect to House Price Break Share
Before Same After Estimated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Break 13.64 2.73 18.00 34.36
Variable Rate Break 13.45 2.18 16.55 32.18
Extended Term Break 6.55 0.91 42.91 50.36
Payment Gap Break 14.91 3.82 9.27 28.00
FHA Break 18.55 5.45 18.00 42.00
2nd Lien break 22.91 7.09 40.73 70.73
Denied Break 37.64 2.00 7.27 46.91
Notes: The tables show whether structural breaks in mortgage financing variables occur before, concurrently,
or after first estimated structural breaks in house prices in early or late counties. The mortgage break is
defined to occur “before” if (difference)<3, “concurrently” if -3<(difference)<3, and “after” if (difference)>3.
First three columns do not necessarily sum to 100 percent in a given row because counties do not always
have an estimated break in other variables. Sample consists of counties experiencing each house price
break. Source: Authors’ calculations using HMDA, LPS Applied Analytics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
CoreLogic data.
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Table A.6.4: Summary Statistics for Year prior to the First House Price Estimate
Overall Early Late
(1) (2) (3)
HPA 4.0 6.1 5.3
(3.3) (4.2) (4.0)
% Any 11.6 21.8 17.7
(9.8) (15.2) (14.2)
% Variable Rate 11.4 21.5 17.5
(9.7) (14.8) (13.9)
% Extended Term 0.2 0.1 0.2
(1.2) (0.6) (0.9)
% Interest Only 0.3 4.0 2.5
(1.4) (7.6) (6.2)
% Negative Amortization 5.4 8.9 7.5
(11.3) (10.7) (11.1)
% with Payment Gap 11.2 20.6 16.9
(10.3) (13.1) (12.9)
% Denied 17.2 13.7 15.1
(10.9) (6.9) (8.9)
% Subprime 4.3 12.7 9.4
(4.5) (8.5) (8.3)
% FHA 15.9 14.2 14.9
(9.6) (9.1) (9.3)
% Full Doc 71.3 68.4 69.5
(22.7) (15.7) (18.9)
FICO 693.5 694.5 694.1
(33.9) (20.3) (26.6)
LTV Ratio 83.4 84.5 84.0
(5.1) (4.1) (4.6)
2nd Lien Share of All Originations 0.3 2.8 1.8
(0.8) (3.4) (3.0)
% Owner Occupied 91.6 85.2 87.8
(8.3) (11.4) (10.7)
Income (in 1000s) 42.8 42.9 42.8
(10.5) (9.5) (9.9)
Unemployment Rate 4.5 5.2 4.9
(2.4) (2.1) (2.3)
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for all counties with an estimated structural break in house
prices. Values are county-month averages, with standard deviations in parentheses. Sample consists of
county-months in the prior year of the county’s house price break.
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Figure A.6.1: Sample Counties with Only One House Price Break
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Notes:The figure shows the timing of structural house price breaks in four counties with only one break:
Fresno County, CA (top left), San Francisco County, CA (top right), Orange County, FL (bottom left), and
Maricopa County, AZ (bottom right). Structural breaks estimated using break-point methodology described
in the text. Each panel shows both the house price index (blue dashed line) and 12-month appreciation rate
(red line).
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Figure A.6.2: Sample Counties with Both First and Second House Price Break
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Notes:The figure shows the timing of structural house price breaks in four counties with two house price
break: Alameda County (top left), Sonoma County (top right), Santa Clara County (bottom left), and
Marin County (bottom right), all in California. Structural breaks estimated using break-point methodology
described in the text. Each panel shows both the house price index (blue dashed line) and 12-month
appreciation rate (red line).
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Figure A.6.3: Distribution of Structural House Price Breaks with Average Magnitude
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Notes: 984 counties have a valid first house price break. 452 counties have a valid second house price break.
The magnitude of house price break is calculated as HPAt+11 − HPAt−1, where t is a month of the first
house price break.
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Figure A.6.4: Event Study Figure of Alternative Financing Variables around First House
Price Breaks
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Notes:The figure shows the event study figures for alternative financing variables where where time=0 is the
year of the first structural break in house prices. See text for details of break-point methodology. Dashed line
represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Event study specification include county fixed effects, a quadratic
in calendar time and economic fundamentals (income and unemployment). See text for details on event
study methodology.
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Figure A.6.5: Event Study Figure of Mortgage Variables around First House Price Breaks
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Notes:The figure shows the event study figures for mortgage variables where where time=0 is the year
of the structural break in house prices. See text for details of break-point methodology. Dashed line
represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Event study specification include county fixed effects, a quadratic
in calendar time and economic fundamentals (income and unemployment). See text for details on event
study methodology.
196
Figure A.6.6: Economic Fundamental Controls with the Early and Late County
Specification
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Notes:The figure shows the event study figures for economic fundamentals (income and unemployment rate)
where where time=0 is the year of the structural break in house prices. See text for details of break-point
methodology. “Early” counties have the first house break before January 2000 and “late” counties have the
first break in January 2000 or later. Dashed line represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Event study
specification include county fixed effects, and a quadratic in calendar time. See text for details on event
study methodology.
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Figure A.6.7: Time Series of New Originations with Alternative Financing Features
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Notes:The figure shows the time series of the fraction of purchase loans with each of four alternative financing
features: extended term (top left), variable rate (top right), negatively amortizing contract (bottom left),
and interest-only contract (bottom right). See text for additional details.
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